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ABSTRACT 
 
Caught in the Immigration Cross-Fire: The Changing Dynamics of Congressional 
Support for Skilled Worker Visas 
 
By 
 
Maryam Tanhaee Stevenson 
 
Dr. David Damore, Examination Committee Chair 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 This project examines the congressional politics associated with legislation on 
skilled foreign workers, specifically the H-1B visa which was created by the Immigration 
Act of 1990. It attempts to explain why legislative policies were successful on a small 
scale between 1998 and 2004 and completely unsuccessful after 2004.  
 Specifically, this study is a longitudinal qualitative analysis that uses Krehbiel’s 
pivotal politics model (1998), Cox and McCubbins’ party politics models (2005; 2007), 
Sinclair’s (2007) unorthodox lawmaking theory, and Gilmour’s (1995) strategic 
disagreement model to explain four key periods of H-1B legislation: (1) the passage of 
the Immigration Act of 1990; (2) passage of stand-alone legislation from 1998 through 
2002; (3) passage of legislation through the use of riders from 1998 through 2002: and 
(4) complete stalemate after 2004. Using polarization as the main independent variable to 
explain shifts in congressional behavior, this study attempts to explain why congressional 
behavior dramatically shifted from 1990 to date.  It concludes with a comparison of 
similar policies in Canada and Australia in order to ascertain whether their legislative 
experiences on foreign skilled workers coincide or differ from that in the United States 
and attempt to understand why.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Various scholars have studied Congress as an institution and its individual 
members as policymakers. As a result, the literature on Congress and congressional 
behavior is extensive. It includes studies on elections and campaigns, bill adoption, 
partisanship, bipartisanship, polarization, budgeting, bureaucracy, campaign finance, 
committees, the filibuster, separation of powers, constituencies, decision making, 
redistricting, lobbying, agenda setting, and the media
1
.  
 There is also a fair amount of research on immigration policy. As a policy area 
that Congress constitutionally maintains exclusive control over, scholars have found it an 
interesting area to study. These studies typically focus on one specific policy area as 
outlined below.  
 Immigration policy was delineated into two main realms in the Immigration Act 
of 1952: immigrant and nonimmigrant. Nonimmigrant visas are visas that provide 
authority to stay and/or work
2
 for a temporary period only, and immigrant visas provide 
legal permanent residence status
3
. Both include categories for family and employment 
based immigration and within employment based immigration, categories exist for both 
skilled and unskilled labor.  
 Most studies on the politics of skilled worker immigration focus their scope on 
the immigrant category and policy on immigrant visas because it grants permanent 
resident status. Within these studies, scholars have examined congressional behavior on 
                                               
1 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all of the congressional literature, but an illustration of the 
various issues studied.  
2 Employment is not a requirement or even permissible for some nonimmigrant visas.  
3 Throughout this study, the terms legal permanent residence and green card will be used interchangeably.  
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both family based and employment based immigrant visas, including skilled worker 
immigration. Yet the majority of immigrants to the United States that enter legally enter 
the country on a nonimmigrant visa first and then go through the process of permanent 
residence.  
 Additionally, the H-1B visa is the only visa category generally
4
 for U.S. 
employers to obtain foreign skilled workers in a relatively short period of time
5
. As a 
result, a study of congressional behavior on immigrant visas is premature without also 
looking at congressional behavior on nonimmigrant visas as well. Therefore, this study 
will attempt to fill that gap in the literature and attempt to understand congressional 
behavior on the H-1B visa.  
Proposed Scope of Study 
 As stated, the H-1B visa is the only nonimmigrant visa available exclusively to 
skilled workers. It requires the applicant have a sponsoring United States employer, and 
that the position require at least a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent in work experience. 
The visa was created by the Immigration Act of 1990 and was capped at 65,000. Since 
the cap was hit for the first time in 1997, Congress has debated various ways to increase 
the cap and/or alter the visa program in most years. Congress was successful in 
addressing the cap through legislation successfully between 1998 through 2004. After 
that, legislation was attempted between 2006 and 2008 as stand-alone legislation only 
and all failed. Post 2008, no legislation has been introduced. This study will attempt to 
                                               
4
 There are other nonimmigrant visa categories that can be used for foreign skilled workers but require 
some other showing, such as proof the alien is of extraordinary ability, a managerial type position, the alien 
is a national of Canada or Mexico, etc. The H-1B, however, is the only general visa available across the 
board for skilled workers without any additional showing (although in some cases if an additional obstacle 
to work exists, such as a license, proof of that is also required).  
5 Employers can file green card applications on behalf of a foreign skilled worker(s), but this process is 
lengthy and expensive and can take many years before the worker can come to the U.S. to work.  
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explain the change in congressional behavior on the H-1B visa in order to understand 
why Congress was proactive on the issue through 2004 and then averse to touching the 
issue amid constituent demands for change.  
  In a relatively short period of time, policy on the H-1B visa went from being 
relatively noncontroversial with bipartisan support to complete stalemate. This analysis 
will attempt to explain what changed. Briefly, while Congress is a well bound institution, 
it is also not impervious to the external macro environment. One major shift over time 
and during this time period has been the increase in polarization both in the broader 
political environment and within Congress as a result of ideological sorting coupled with 
economic and social changes. What we are left with is legislation that was once routine 
can now only be passed through unorthodox methods, if at all.   
 Consequently, I will look at H-1B policymaking within the context of these 
broader trends in American politics. And while the timeframe is short, the forces shaping 
the internal and external environment accelerated a great deal during this period. As a 
result, no one model of congressional decision making can explain congressional 
behavior on the H-1B during this time. Therefore, it is necessary to use a variety of 
congressional models, including pivotal politics, party models, unorthodox lawmaking, 
and stalemate game theory models in order to explain policymaking (or the lack thereof) 
on the H-1B visa. 
 Additionally, this analysis will seek to ascertain whether similar congressional 
trends in the U.S. have occurred in Canada and Australia in order to provide a 
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comparative analysis
6
. I chose this comparison because all three countries share similar 
colonial histories, similar needs to populate their countries with immigrants, and similar 
ethnic restrictive policies throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s. Since then, both 
Canada and Australia have recently held similar types of relatively open immigration 
policies as the United States and as a result, these three countries have over time been the 
largest immigrant receiving countries in the world. Because of this, there are a number of 
studies comparing and contrasting the various political and social phenomena between 
and among the United States, Canada, and Australia.   
 Therefore, my qualitative analysis will attempt to answer the following research 
questions: 
 1) What factors explain congressional policy making within the context of skilled 
 worker (H-1B) immigration?  
 2) Why did Congress stop using alternative methods (i.e. riders) to pass H-1B 
 legislation?  
 3) Why did even minor changes to the H-1B program that were successful as 
 stand-alone pieces of legislation pre-2004 fail after 2004?  
 4) Is the U.S. experience unique? How does it compare to legislation in Canada 
 and Australia?  
Essentially, I seek to explain a non event; specifically why Congress was not able 
to pass legislation just a few years after there was bipartisan support for it. Prior studies 
on congressional behavior use roll call votes to conduct quantitative analyses on 
individual members in order to explain shifts in support. While I would have liked to 
                                               
6 While the selection of Canada and Australia may leave this study open to selection bias, I am not 
attempting to make a true comparative analysis but rather ascertain whether other countries with a similar 
history of immigration policy have experienced the same level of difficulty in passing similar legislation. 
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have conducted such an analysis, the data was not available for the legislation I examine 
in this study. In fact, roll call votes only exist for five pieces of legislation out of a total 
36 bills. Because I am unable to examine individual members’ voting patterns, I will need 
to make an assessment of how and why Congress as a body changed their support for this 
type of legislation. Therefore, with the exception of some descriptive statistics, my 
approach is largely qualitative. The body of the study is as follows. 
Chapter two provides a broad overview of congressional policy goals on 
immigration generally and the H-1B visa specifically over time. It will begin by 
providing a history of general immigration law and immigration policymaking in the 
United States. The second part of the chapter will include an overview and detailed 
legislative history on the H-1B visa.   
Chapter three presents a literature review where I highlight the theoretical 
underpinnings of congressional behavior. Specifically, I will outline the theories and 
policy models that are relevant to this discussion. As the most extensively studied 
institution in the world, theory on Congress and congressional behavior is numerous and 
has been well debated, but has also grown muddled over time. Additionally, because the 
macro environment was constantly changing over the period I examine, one model 
cannot accurately explain legislative behavior over this period of time. Therefore, an 
analysis of legislation over time will need to use a variety of different theories and 
models to explain congressional behavior. It will begin with a review of the literature, 
followed by an review of the main congressional models, and examine the traditional 
cues and influences utilized and felt by members of Congress in both a general sense and 
more specifically when dealing with immigration legislation.   
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 Chapter four outlines and develops my hypotheses. It also provides a discussion 
of my methodology for the remaining analysis.  
Chapters five through eight are the main analysis chapters. They are broken down 
into the various periods in which Congress dealt with H-1B policy and will analyze the 
context in which legislation was either successful or unsuccessful and attempt to explain 
why.   
Chapters five and six will illustrate how the more traditional models of 
congressional behavior can be used to explain legislative behavior on the H-1B visa and 
why legislation either was or was not successful. Chapter five will examine the 
Immigration Act of 1990, the original piece of legislation that created the H-1B skilled 
worker visa within the context of pivotal politics. Chapter six will look at the legislation 
that was passed individually between 1998 and 2004 through party models.  
Chapters seven and eight will delve into the lesser known and more niche models 
of congressional behavior, including unorthodox legislation and strategic disagreement. 
Chapter seven will explain how the institutional nature of Congress has changed and how 
this change affected the success and failure of legislation in the context of unorthodox 
legislation. Chapter eight will use strategic disagreement game theory to explain the 
failure of all H-1B related legislation that was introduced between 2006 and 2008 and the 
lack of any legislation after 2008 to date.  
Finally, chapter nine will compare skilled immigration visa policies among the 
U.S., Canada, and Australia. It will attempt to ascertain whether Canada and Australia’s 
legislatures have had similar experiences passing or failing to pass skilled worker 
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immigration during the same time period throughout the 2000s within the context of both 
similar and different macro conditions.  
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CHAPTER 2  
TRACING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION  
AND THE H-1B VISA 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of congressional policy 
goals on immigration generally and the H-1B visa specifically over time. It will begin by 
discussing the history of general immigration law and immigration policymaking in the 
United States. These policy goals have ranged from being both restrictive and open. In 
the early years of the Republic, racial and ethnic differences were Congress’s main 
source of consideration, followed by a period of post industrialization when cheap labor 
was key, only to return full circle by a post-9/11 period of security concerns that resulted 
in racial concerns and implications, and accentuated by the economic crises of the mid to 
late 2000s.  
After providing a general historical view of immigration policy in the United 
States, I will then move on to examine the H-1B visa specifically. The second part of this 
chapter will include an overview and detailed legislative history on the H-1B visa, the 
only type of visa specifically reserved for skilled workers. In later chapters I will attempt 
to reconcile these policy goals with actual legislation (or lack thereof) on the H-1B visa. 
A History of Immigration Law and Policymaking
7
 
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution granted to the 
United States Congress the power to “…establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.” 
Pursuant to that power, Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790 which 
                                               
7 This is not intended to be an exhaustive legislative history on immigration policy in the United States (for 
such a discussion see Gimpel and Edwards (1999) or Zolberg (2006)). In fact, many key pieces of 
immigration will not be discussed. This chapter is designed to overview the important policy decisions 
leading up to current policy on skilled workers and the H-1B visa. 
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established the requirements and grounds for naturalization. While naturalization refers 
only to the process of becoming a citizen of a country one was not born in, since the Act 
of 1790 Congress has maintained exclusive jurisdiction over not only naturalization but 
over all immigration policymaking dealing with admission and naturalization.  
Following the 1790 Act, immigration was not a salient issue during the early 
years of the Republic. Throughout the 1800s, Congress remained relatively absent in 
immigration policymaking and its exclusive jurisdiction was exercised very little by early 
policymakers. The basic policy kept American borders open to immigrants from western 
European countries in order to maintain ethnic homogeneity while closed to others, 
resulting in the vast majority of immigrants to the United States being of western 
European descent (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Timmer and Williams 1998; Mann 1953). 
As a result, early American borders were considerably closed when compared to today.  
By the late 1800s, however, various groups began lobbying their anti-immigration 
interests to Congress. These groups included: (1) both unorganized and organized labor, 
represented by the American Federation of Labor and the Knights of Labor; (2) owners of 
capital, represented by the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Board of 
Trade, and local boards of trade and chambers of commerce; (3) immigrants; and (4) 
rural America, represented by Northern agriculturalists and the South (which was 
originally pro-immigration but became anti-immigration by the 1890s (Goldin 1994). 
Goldin (1994) lists several hypotheses to explain this shift in support. First, the South 
became adverse to immigration due to its own race problem and did not want to add an 
additional problem demographic. Second, because Southern manufacturing was not 
unionized, Southerners were able to benefit from paying their workers much lower wages 
10 
 
than their northern counterparts. Increased immigration would allow their Northern 
competitors these same benefits. Finally, the increase in immigration in the North had 
resulted in increased Northern control of the House. Thus, by the 1890s, these four 
groups created a united force to Congress staunchly opposing unrestricted immigration.  
Congress was largely responsive to this lobby and in 1882 passed the Chinese 
Exclusion Act. The Act essentially marked a second era of exclusionary immigration 
practices which lasted through the 1940s, despite congressional efforts to reverse some of 
these policies (described below). In an effort to exclude Chinese immigrants, Congress 
created an immigration bureaucracy for the first time with the Chinese Exclusion Act. 
Over time, this bureaucracy has evolved and grown. Today it is used to not only keep out 
and remove undocumented immigrants, but also regulate the visa processes of those that 
are documented.  
During this same period, however, many members of Congress began advocating 
for a more open immigration policy. As a result, Congress became divided on this issue 
throughout the late 1890s and there were no shifts or changes in immigration policy. By 
the 1900s, however, many groups who were previously against immigration, such as 
owners of capital, shifted their stance in favor of open immigration (Goldin 1994). In 
response, Congress began passing a variety of laws dealing with immigration, effectively 
steadily increasing the number of visas available across the board. The new debate among 
policymakers became not whether immigration policy should be open or closed, but 
rather whether immigrants should be granted access based on a first come first served 
policy or through some sort of preference rank order. 
11 
 
Beginning in 1921, Congress finally opted for a preference rank order under the 
Emergency Quota Act. The preference rank order system consisted of a strict per country 
preference system with annual quotas where national origin/ancestry determined 
admission to the United States. It created both numerical limits on immigration from 
Europe and a quota system to establish those numerical limits.  
Several factors likely played a part in the 1921 Act limiting immigration from 
various regions (Fischer 2005; Scharf 1999; Cohen 1995; Goldin 1994). While the 1920s 
were largely a period of economic growth and industrialization in the United States, this 
period was also marred by an economic recession beginning in 1920 that lasted through 
1921. Additionally, the end of the First World War in 1918 was still fresh in the minds of 
many and the success of the Russian Revolution in 1917 resulted in nationalistic 
sentiments and a fear of foreign radicalism and/or anarchy. These fears, combined with 
the addition of 800,000 immigrants from southern, eastern, and central Europe to the 
United States in 1920 resulted in a strong public sentiment against immigration that 
manifested itself in policy (Goldin 1994).  
While the 1921 Act brought about some change in immigration policy, it still 
favored immigrants from Europe. Between 1951 and 1960, for example, 53 percent of all 
immigrants were from Europe, 28 percent were from North America, and only the 
remaining 19 percent from Asia, the Caribbean, South America, Central America, and 
Africa (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).   
Congress amended the annual quota numbers in 1924, but the law still largely 
favored European immigrants. The Immigration Act of 1924 established quotas of two 
percent of a country’s population with 1890 as the base year which granted Europeans a 
12 
 
higher quota. Additionally, effective in 1927 it created a ceiling of 150,000 total new 
immigrants to be calculated with the 1920 national origin proportions.  
Immigration law and policy didn’t change dramatically again until the mid 1950s 
with the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) of 1952
8
 over 
President Truman’s veto9. Immigration policy as it exists today finds its roots the INA.  
The INA established the current system of family and employment based 
immigration, as well as refugee admission. It created the first system of visa 
preferences
10
, which continues today. It also created a per country quota in an attempt to 
rectify prior discriminatory policy and cap the number of western Europeans granted 
admission. It also gave the government increased powers to deport legal immigrants in 
the United States suspected of having Communist sympathies.  
The INA was likely partly a product of the Cold War and fears of communism, as 
well as a need for labor. The end of the Second World War resulted in a period of 
economic prosperity from 1945 to 1973 and technological advancements and growth in 
labor resulted in a shift from low income farm work to higher paying work in industry, 
resulting in a shortage of low paid farm workers
11
. 
 Between 1924 to 1965 (and during the INA debates), liberal politicians led by 
Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN), Warren Magnusun (D-WA), and Herbert H. Lehman (D-
NY) rallied the charge for more liberal and less discriminatory immigration policy 
(Gimpel and Edwards 1999). They argued that the United States’s anti-Communist 
                                               
8 To date the legislation is referred to as the INA.  
9 Truman preferred a greater departure from past policy and felt the INA was just an extension of the 1921 
law.  
10 Visa preference refers to giving preference to certain classes of immigrants with certain family 
relationships or certain employment skills. 
11 This resulted in the creation of the Bracero program in 1942, which continued until 1959.  
13 
 
foreign policy needed to be softened and combined with an open immigration policy 
(Reimers 1992). Additionally, after passage of the INA in 1952, liberal pressure from 
religious organizations (such as Protestants, Catholics, and Jewish groups), liberal groups 
such as the ACLU, and from business interests (including the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the Associated General Contractors, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and 
the National Industrial Conference Board) to liberalize immigration policy generally and 
refugee policy specifically resulted in the passage of 32 laws between 1953 and 1964 to 
modify the national-origins policy (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; LeMay 1987; Bennett 
1963).  
 Additionally, existing support by Democrats combined with new support for 
immigration reform by the Republican Party led by Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater in 
the 1960s resulted in bipartisan support for policy reform. In addition, both the 
Republican and Democratic parties made open immigration policy a part of their 
platforms in the 1960 elections.  
As a result, in 1965, Congress amended the INA to abolish the per country quotas 
that were instituted in 1921 and amended in 1924. This new amendment instituted a 
170,000 annual quota on all persons in the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 in the 
Western Hemisphere with a limit of 20,000 for any one nation. Since 1965, Congress has 
regularly changed the annual quotas on family and employment based immigrant visas.  
While Congress has delegated much of its general policymaking abilities to 
various agencies (Lowi 1979), Congress has maintained its exclusive jurisdiction on 
immigration policymaking as granted to them by Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. 
While various agencies (such as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, the 
14 
 
Departments of State, Labor, and Homeland Security, and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement) have been created by Congress to implement and enforce congressional 
policy through regulation, Congress has maintained its exclusive jurisdiction over actual 
policymaking.  
Through this jurisdiction, Congress has been active in not only making and 
passing legislation on the various immigration categories but also on setting quotas on the 
number of immigrants granted entry in each category. Specifically, Congress has 
exclusively set quota limits on the various immigration categories several times since 
1965 (See Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Various Immigration Categories 
and Congressional Quota Changes Over 
Time 
   Year Category New Quota
12
 
1965 E. Hemisphere 170,000 
  W. Hemisphere 120,000 
  Per Country 20,000 
1978 Total 290,000 
  Per Country 20,000 
1980 Total 270,000
13
 
1990 Total 700,000
14
 
  Employment Based 140,000 
  Diversity Visa 40,000-55,000 
   Source: USCIS  
  
                                               
12 Excluding those immigrants that obtain visas in categories without numerical limits, such as spouses of 
U.S. citizens. 
13 Excluding refugees. 
14 Excluding refugees. This quota was to be in effect for three years and then decrease to 675,000 for each 
subsequent year.  
15 
 
More recently, Congress delineated the regulation and admission of immigration 
policy into various categories, including asylum, enforcement, diversity lottery, family 
based immigration, and employment based immigration in the Homeland Security Act of 
2002. While these immigration categories already existed, the 2002 Act simply 
delineated them into clear categories and established a clear chain of command. It put the 
implementation of immigration policy in the hands of the newly created United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)
15
, an agency within the new Department of 
Homeland Security. USCIS was charged with crafting and implementing regulation to 
administer congressional policy within the areas of asylum, family based immigration, 
and employment based immigration
16
. As a result, the Act was simply a change in 
bureaucracy rather than a shift in policy or practice.  
Categories for Admission to the United States  
 Since the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, the two most common 
methods of admission
17
 into the United States are through immigrant visas and 
nonimmigrant visas. Nonimmigrant visas are visas that provide authority to stay and/or 
work
18
 for a temporary period only, and immigrant visas provide legal permanent 
residence status. These nonimmigrant and immigrant visas are issued through a variety of 
categories that were created by Congress for admission to the United States, including 
family based and employment based immigration (both created by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act of 1952), and the diversity visa lottery (created by the Immigration 
                                               
15 USCIS was immediately preceded by the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) and 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  
16 Enforcement was handled by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) rather than USCIS.  
17 There are a variety of other types of admission, including asylum, deferred admission, visa waiver, 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS), etc.  
18 Employment is not a requirement or even permissible for some nonimmigrant visas.  
16 
 
Act of 1990). Potential immigrants must obtain approval from USCIS and/or the 
Department of State
19
 and carry the burden of proof that they are admissible as 
immigrants based on both admissibility requirements set forth by Congress and various 
agencies, and the requirements of the visa they seek before obtaining authorization to 
enter the United States.  
 The asylum, diversity visa, and family based categories and the requirements for 
admission under each category will be briefly discussed below in an attempt to provide 
some background and context for the skilled worker visa category this study will focus 
on. The rest of the chapter will be devoted to employment based immigration and the H-
1B visa specifically.  
United States asylum policy is consistent with international laws on asylum, 
which were made a part of international law through the United Nations 1951 Refugee 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. As a signatory and 
drafter of these agreements, the United States is obligated to accept any person who 
would otherwise face persecution if they were forced to return to the country they 
emigrated from. These agreements were codified in the United States with the Refugee 
Act of 1980. The United States is one of many states throughout the world that accepts 
asylees and allows them to become legal permanent residents upon establishment of 
asylee status.  
The diversity visa lottery was established by the Immigration Act of 1990. As its 
name indicates, it is a lottery system that provides legal permanent resident status to 
                                               
19 Applicants outside the United States typically must obtain a visa from a United States consulate, which 
falls under the purview of the United States Department of State rather than USCIS. 
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applicants who apply and whose lottery numbers are selected by the annual lottery
20
. 
There is a per country quota on the number of diversity visas issued per year.  
Family based immigration refers to immigration on the basis of a family 
relationship and is rooted in the humanitarian concept of family reunification. 
Historically, immigration policy in the United States has centered and focused on family 
reunification efforts. According to a study by the Brookings Institution
21
, approximately 
three quarters of immigrants to the United States has previously been and currently is 
admitted on the basis of family reunification. Family based immigration is typically 
authorized on a legal permanent resident basis through the grant of an immigrant visa
22
. 
 Congress has further delineated various categories of family based immigration. 
Some categories, such as spouses and unmarried children of United States citizens, are 
considered immediate, which means that these individuals are immediately
23
 eligible for 
admission to the United States. Other individuals, such as married children, siblings, and 
parents of United States citizens and spouses and children of United States legal 
permanent residents, are granted admission based on a preference ordering of these 
categories. See Table 2.2 for a list of each of the above listed immigrant categories and 
the current annual cap for each.  
Employment based immigration in the United States refers to immigration on the 
basis of employment in the United States, specifically employment with a United States 
employer in the United States or employment with a foreign company located in the 
                                               
20Provided that all other requirements for legal permanent residence are met. 
21 http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/01_immigration_west.aspx 
22 Nonimmigrant visas are also available for fiancées of United States citizens for the sole purpose of 
entering the United States in order to conduct a legal marriage. 
23 As long as they are able to meet other requirements for eligibility for admission, such as security 
clearances, medical exam, etc.  
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United States. Within the context of employment based immigration, Congress has 
further delineated nonimmigrant visas (visas that provide authority to stay and work for a 
temporary period only), and immigrant visas (visas that provide legal permanent 
residence status).  
As with family based immigration, within the category of immigrant visas, 
Congress has created an annual quota of available immigrant visas. As mentioned above, 
immigrant visas are available for both family based and employment based immigration. 
Employment based immigrant visas have been delineated into five categories. The first 
category is available for immigrants of international renown (which does not necessarily 
require a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent), the second category for immigrants 
holding at least a Master’s Degree or its equivalent, the third category for skilled, 
professional, or unskilled workers, the fourth for religious workers, and the fifth for 
investors investing a significant amount of money in a business that will employ 
American workers.  
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the current visa numbers that are available per 
fiscal year in each of these categories. As Table 2.2 indicates, the largest majority of 
immigrant visas are issued in the family categories (FB). A total of 226,000 family based 
immigrants can be admitted each fiscal year, compared to just 139,800 employment 
based immigrants. Comparatively, the first three employment based (EB) visa categories, 
which include both skilled and some unskilled workers, are only available for about 
120,000 workers. 
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Table 2.2 Annual Immigrant Visa Cap Numbers 
  Visa Type 2012 Annual Cap 
    
Family   
FB 1 Unmarried Children of USCs 23,400 + any unused FB 4 numbers 
FB 2 Spouses / Minor Children / Unmarried 
Adult Children of LPRs 
114,200 + any unused FB 1 numbers 
FB 3 Married Children of USCs 23,400 + any unused FB 1 and 2 numbers 
FB 4 Siblings of Adult USCs 65,000 + any unused FB 1, 2, and 3 numbers 
  
Employment   
EB 1 Priority Workers 40,040 + any unused EB 4 and 5 numbers 
EB 2 Advanced Degree / Exceptional Ability 40,040 + any unused EB 1 numbers 
EB 3 Skilled / Professional / Other Workers 40,040 + any unused EB 1 and 2 numbers 
EB 4 Certain Special Immigrants 9,940 
EB 5 Entrepreneurs / Job Creation 9,940 
  Source: U.S. Department of State Visa Bulletin 
 
The first category is available to those who can prove they are aliens of 
international or exceptional renown (skilled or not). The second category is available for 
those with advanced degrees (at least a Master’s). The third category is available for 
those with either no degree or a Bachelor’s Degree. The fourth is for those in religious 
occupations (skilled or not). As such, because none of these categories encompass all 
skilled workers exclusively (either in their entirety or without the addition of other 
workers), analysis of immigrant visas in the United States will not be made in this study.  
Aside from the above mentioned immigrant visas available for family and 
employment purposes, nonimmigrant visas are also available for applicants who wish to 
enter the United States for a temporary period of time for work or pleasure. Within the 
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category of nonimmigrant visas, Congress has delineated a variety of visas, known by 
practitioners in the field as an “alphabet soup”, that are available to a host of various 
candidates. These visas are alphabetically and numerically assigned from the letters A 
through V, and within many of these categories there is further numerical delineation, 
such as A-1 and A-2, for various subcategories of visas for a total of 82 in all. Applicants 
for most nonimmigrant visas must justify to the satisfaction of the consular officer at the 
time of the visa application that they do not have any intention of immigrating to the 
United States permanently
24
.  
There are some nonimmigrant visas
25
 that individuals with a Bachelor’s Degree 
utilize, but none that specifically are reserved for skilled workers. For example, while the 
O-1 visa is available for those foreign nationals who can provide evidence that they are of 
extraordinary renown, it is available for both skilled and unskilled workers. It typically 
encompasses researchers, as well as actors, performers, and sports personalities. In real 
world terms, British soccer player David Beckham and Spanish and L.A. Laker 
basketball player Pau Gasol both likely entered the United States on an O-1 visa. Of all of 
the nonimmigrant visas, only one, the H-1B visa, is available exclusively to skilled 
workers.  Together with the O-1, the H-1B comprises the all stars of all potential 
immigrants. Because the H-1B is the only visa exclusive to skilled workers, however, 
congressional action on only the H-1B visa will be the exclusive focus of study in this 
paper.  
 
                                               
24 There are three exceptions to this requirement. The H-1B, E, and L visas and in some cases the O-1 are 
known as dual intent visas and allow the applicant to have the intention to permanently immigrate to the 
United States. This will be discussed in more detail below.  
25 For example, the L-1, E-1 or E-2, TN, and O-1 visas.  
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The H-1B Visa 
The original H-1 visa was created by the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. It 
was available to foreign nationals who were “of distinguished merit and ability and who 
[were] coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary services of an 
exceptional nature requiring such merit and ability.” In 1970, Congress removed the 
requirement that the stay be “temporary”, making the H-1 and later the H-1B a dual intent 
visa. In 1989, Congress bifurcated the H-1 into the H-1A and H-1B categories, with the 
H-1A solely for nurses and the H-1B for all other specialty occupations.  
The H-1B visa as it exists today was created by the Immigration Act of 1990. The 
prior H-1B visa category, as mentioned above, was reserved for applicants with 
distinguished merit and/or ability. Prior to the 1990 Act, there was no nonimmigrant visa 
category available exclusively for skilled workers. At that time the information 
technology (IT) industry was emerging, shortages in the healthcare fields were beginning 
to emerge for the first time, and Congress was suddenly faced with a new lobby in 
support of some type of visa to accommodate these shortages with qualified foreign 
workers. The Act redefined the H-1B as a category for “specialty occupation” workers as 
those with a minimum of a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent in work experience. As 
such, the evaluation of the H-1B visa and legislation on the H-1B visa in this study will 
begin in 1990 and continue to the present.  
Currently, the H-1B visa is available to foreign skilled workers with a minimum 
of a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent and a sponsoring United States employer for 
work in a skilled occupation. It is employer specific and is only valid as long as the 
foreign national is employed by the sponsoring employer. It is the most popular method 
22 
 
for employment based immigration into the United States. The H-1B visa is available for 
an initial period of up to three years and is renewable for an additional period of three 
years, for a total of six years of eligibility
26
. As mentioned above, nonimmigrant visas are 
available only for a temporary period and the applicant must provide evidence to the 
consular officer issuing the visa that the applicant does not have the intention to 
permanently immigrate to the United States. The H-1B visa, however, is a dual intent 
visa
27
. As a dual intent visa, it is one of only three nonimmigrant visas that allow the 
foreign worker to have the intention at the onset of the application process of immigrating 
permanently to the United States. As such, applicants for the H-1B visa do not bear the 
burden of proving their intention to remain in the United States on a temporary basis. 
Additionally, H-1B visa holders can safely file applications for legal permanent status 
while traveling abroad and/or filing for extensions of their current H-1B status. 
Arguments in favor of skilled immigration include the fact that skilled immigrants 
promote economic growth and American stature in the international market for science, 
research, and technology (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). Additionally, as skilled workers 
they typically are paid wages sufficient to pay taxes in the middle and higher tax 
brackets, and as a result, they typically do not seek governmental assistance (Gimpel and 
Edwards 1999).  
Others however, argue that foreign workers create the effect of displacing 
American workers by providing cheap labor. The framework for this research, created by 
Harry Johnson’s (1967) work on the effects of immigrants on the native population, put 
forth the gains from trade argument that if immigrants provide an aggregate bundle of 
                                               
26 There are some exceptions that allow for eligibility beyond the six year maximum. These exceptions will 
be discussed later in the chapter.  
27 The dual intent nature of the H-1B visa was established in the Immigration Act of 1990.  
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labor and capital that differs from the labor and capital that the native population 
possesses, then the native population will benefit and gain from the inflow of immigrants.  
Since Johnson’s (1967) argument, studies have largely shown that that there is 
very little evidence that immigration affects the wages of American workers (Bean et al. 
1988; Borjas 1990; Borjas 1994; Butcher and Card 1991; Simon 1989; Sorensen et al. 
1992). Additionally, the H-1B visa has a requirement that the employer attest to pay the 
foreign employee at least the prevailing wage as set forth by the United States 
Department of Labor. The prevailing wage is the average wage paid to United States 
citizens in a particular county for any particular job position. Employers found violating 
this requirement can be fined heavily by the Department of Labor and may be banned 
from hiring foreign workers in the future. In practice, the Department of Labor has 
steadily increased their audits of H-1B sponsoring employers since the mid 2000s.  
In addition to contributing to the American economy, immigrants in some highly 
skilled sectors have also been instrumental in filling desperately needed shortages in the 
U.S. labor market, particularly in the engineering and health care fields (Rumbaut 1994). 
Specifically, physicians and nurses have filled shortages in Health Professional Shortage 
Areas (HPSAs) and Medically Underserved Areas (MUAs) as designed by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services by providing much needed medical 
care to uninsured, poor, and Medicare/Medicaid populations in rural and inner-city 
hospitals.  
The Process of Immigrating to the U.S. and Obtaining an H-1B Visa 
 As mentioned previously, there are two main methods of legal entry into the 
United States, either through a nonimmigrant or immigrant visa. To enter the United 
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States for the first time, applicants must apply outside of the United States at a United 
States consulate for either a temporary or permanent visa. If they are granted a permanent 
visa, or an immigrant visa, they are allowed entry into the United States as legal 
permanent residents. If they are granted a temporary visa, or a nonimmigrant visa, they 
will eventually need an immigrant visa in order to remain in the United States 
permanently. On a practical level, for many, the ultimate goal is United States 
citizenship
28
. Regardless of method of entry, applicants must typically
29
 hold legal 
permanent resident status for at least five years plus meet a six month residency 
requirement prior to filing an application for citizenship.  
 The H-1B is a nonimmigrant visa. The process of obtaining an H-1B visa is far 
from easy. Let us follow the experiences of Dr. Singh
30
, a cardiovascular surgeon and 
researcher from India, in order to illustrate the process. Dr. Singh wishes to immigrate to 
the United States to practice medicine because he believes he will be able to maximize on 
the research and medical facilities in the United States and further his own research on a 
new noninvasive surgical method for treating heart disease. Dr. Singh contacts an 
immigration attorney in the United States and learns that in order to practice patient care 
in the United States, he must first complete a residency or fellowship program in the 
United States
31
.  
 Dr. Singh completes all of the requirements set forth by the Educational 
Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG), the organization that assesses 
                                               
28 The terms citizenship and naturalization are used interchangeably in this study.  
29 An exception is made for spouses of United States citizens, who must hold legal permanent resident 
status for two years before being eligible for citizenship.  
30 Dr. Singh is a fictional person. His story is a combination of the real life experiences of several actual 
personal former clients. Any resemblance to any one specific individual is purely coincidental.  
31 An exception does exist for physicians of extreme renown who will be employed at a public university.  
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whether foreign medical graduates are ready to enter residency or fellowship programs 
and certifies their credentials. He obtains ECFMG certification and applies for the 
National Residency Match Program. He is matched in an excellent surgery residency at 
the University of Miami. Dr. Singh applies for and is granted a J-1 visa
32
 to complete his 
residency and moves to Miami. He completes one year of the program and applies for a 
cardiovascular surgery fellowship at Johns Hopkins. Because of his credentials, talent, 
and experience, Dr. Singh is accepted into the program and moves to Maryland.  
In his last year of fellowship, Dr. Singh calls his immigration attorney to let her 
know that he is interested in practicing medicine in the United States upon completion of 
his fellowship. She tells Dr. Singh that he will need to find an employer who is willing to 
sponsor him for a J-1 waiver and an H-1B visa
33
. As it is his last year in his fellowship 
program, Dr. Singh is constantly being contacted by physician recruiters. Upon the 
advice of his attorney, he begins asking if the companies will sponsor a J-1 waiver and H-
1B visa. Due to a severe physician shortage in the United States, most potential 
employers will sponsor and H-1B. Dr. Singh secures an employment agreement with a 
private physician’s group in Boston, Massachusetts and the employer contacts their 
immigration attorney to begin the H-1B paperwork.  
                                               
32 There are two visas available for foreign medical graduates to complete a residency/fellowship training 
program in the United States, the J-1, which requires a two year home residency requirement upon 
completion, or the H-1B which requires that the applicant have completed all three steps of the USMLE 
exam. Like nearly half of all foreign medical graduates, Dr. Singh has not completed step 3 of USMLE, 
and as such, must complete his program on the J-1 visa.  
33 The J-1 visa carries with it a two year home residency requirement for foreign medical graduates who 
complete a residency/fellowship. Congress created a waiver of this requirement for physicians who agree to 
work and receive approval to work in a facility located in a medical shortage area as designated by the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services. The waiver does not provide any legal status. 
Upon approval of the waiver, Dr. Singh can apply for an H-1B visa to actually give him legal status to stay 
and work.  
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Dr. Singh was able to secure a sponsoring employer because he was regularly 
courted by head hunters searching for employees with his qualifications. Some H-1B 
applicants may be intercompany transfers from a United States’ company office abroad. 
Others are students in the United States in either undergraduate or graduate programs that 
are able to secure jobs through campus career centers or through their own post 
graduation internships
34
.  
Upon approval of the J-1 waiver, the first step of the H-1B application process 
requires Dr. Singh’s potential employer to file a Labor Condition Application with the 
United States Department of Labor, attesting to pay the foreign employee at least the 
prevailing wage (discussed above), that the foreign worker will not adversely affect the 
working conditions of employees similarly employed, that there is not a strike, lockout, 
or work stoppage in the course of a labor dispute at the time the application is filed, and 
that notice of the filing will be given to current employees through a bargaining 
representative or physical posting at the work site.  
 Upon the Department of Labor’s certification, the employer will need to file an 
application for H-1B status with USCIS. All costs associated with the H-1B application 
must be paid by the employer, including both government filing fees and legal fees. Upon 
approval, Dr. Singh may either apply for a visa at a United States consulate abroad, or 
since he is currently in the United States on a different status, he may request that USCIS 
change his status to H-1B.  
 Upon securing H-1B status, the process is far from over for Dr. Singh. Since he 
wants to remain in the United States permanently, he will need to begin the process for 
                                               
34 The F-1 student visa allows one year of Optional Practical Training (OPT) with a U.S. employer 
following graduation of an undergraduate or graduate program in the U.S.  
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legal permanent residence, which is extremely time consuming and costly. Depending on 
the type of application he decides to pursue, his employer will likely have to sponsor his 
green card application and pay all costs (government and legal) associated with the 
application. In the best case scenario, Dr. Singh will be looking at least at an additional 
four to five years
35
 and several thousand dollars before he actually has his green card in 
hand. Once he is awarded the green card, he will have another five year wait before he 
can file an application for naturalization.  
 This lack of efficacy and efficiency of this process to permanent residence makes 
it exceedingly difficult, time consuming, and expensive for both the foreign national and 
the potential employer. Without permanent residence status, foreign nationals are not 
eligible for various programs, including federal grant money, home mortgages, and 
business travel outside the United States in certain circumstances. As such, without grant 
funding, Dr. Singh’s plans to patent a new noninvasive surgical method for treating heart 
disease are likely to be on hold for another five years until he can secure a green card.  
Change of Status to H-1B from Another Visa Category 
Foreign nationals can either obtain an H-1B visa at a United States consulate 
abroad, or, if they are already in the United States on a different visa category, they can 
change status from their previous visa category to the H-1B as our friend Dr. Singh did. 
The data in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 provide a good illustration of the number of applications 
received for H-1Bs, including new petitions for a change of status inside the United 
States, new petitions for consular processing, and extension applications. As Tables 2.3 
and 2.4 illustrate, approximately 260,000 applications were filed on average each year 
                                               
35 Because Dr. Singh has obtained a waiver, he must wait three years before he is eligible to apply for 
permanent residence. Applicants on H-1B without the waiver can apply at any time.  
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between 2001 and 2009. Approximately 120,000 of these applications were for new 
employment, and for these, nearly 63,000 or over one half of all new applications filed 
were for a change of status from a different visa category to the H-1B. 
 
Table 2.3 Percentage H-1B Petitions Approved by Type, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009 
           
 
FY 
2001 
FY 
2002 
FY 
2003 
FY 
2004 
FY 
2005 
FY 
2006 
FY 
2007 
FY 
2008 
FY 
2009 
Aver
age 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
Initial 
Employme
nt 61 52 48 45 44 40 43 40 40 
45.8
9 
  FN 
outside 
U.S. 35 18 19 21 20 21 22 20 16 
21.3
3 
  FN inside 
U.S. 26 34 29 24 23 19 21 19 25 
24.4
4 
Extension 39 48 52 55 56 60 57 60 60 
54.1
1 
           Source: USCIS Characteristics of Specialty Occupation Workers (H-1B): Fiscal Years 
2004, 2008, 2009 
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Table 2.4 Total Number of H-1B Petitions Approved by Type, Fiscal Years 2001 to 
2009 
           
 
FY 
2001 
FY 
2002 
FY 
2003 
FY 
2004 
FY 
2005 
FY 
2006 
FY 
2007 
FY 
2008 
FY 
2009 
Aver
age 
Total 
331,
206 
197,
537 
217,
340 
287,
418 
267,
131 
270,
981 
281,
444 
276,
252 
214,
271 
260,
398 
Initial 
Employme
nt 
201,
079 
103,
584 
105,
314 
130,
497 
116,
927 
109,
614 
120,
031 
109,
335 
86,3
00 
120,
298 
  FN 
outside 
U.S. 
115,
759 
36,4
94 
41,8
95 
60,2
71 
54,6
35 
57,2
64 
60,7
85 
55,8
93 
33,2
83 
57,3
64 
  FN inside 
U.S. 
85,3
20 
67,0
90 
63,4
19 
70,2
26 
62,2
92 
52,3
50 
59,2
46 
53,4
42 
53,0
17 
62,9
34 
Extension 
130,
127 
93,9
53 
112,
026 
156,
921 
150,
204 
161,
367 
161,
413 
166,
917 
127,
971 
140,
100 
           Source: USCIS Characteristics of Specialty Occupation Workers (H-1B): Fiscal Years 
2004, 2008, 2009 
 
 While USCIS does not keep data on the types of visas that foreign nationals have 
changed status from, some inferences about the prior visa status of H-1B applicants can 
be made. According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Characteristics of 
Specialty Occupation Workers (H-1B) Fiscal Year 2004 Report, in fiscal years 2003 and 
2004, applicants in four occupational categories comprised 66 percent of all initial 
applications. These four categories included computer related occupations, occupations in 
architecture, engineering, and surveying, occupations in education, and occupations in 
administrative specializations. Foreign nationals in these occupational categories do not 
have an alternative employment category available to them. As such, it can be inferred 
that if these applicants were already in the United States at the time of their application, 
they were likely here on either a student visa (F-1) or a visitor visa (B-1). However, 
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because visitor visas are only valid for a period of up to six months at a time and a visitor 
wanting to change status to the H-1B category would need to find an employer and go 
through all of the H-1B application steps prior to their visitor visa expiring, it is unlikely 
that many applicants are changing status from a visitor visa. As such, it can be logically 
assumed that the majority of H-1B applicants change status from student visas (F-1).  
Congressional Changes to the H-1B Visa: Passed Legislation  
As mentioned above, the H-1B visa as it exists today was created by the 
Immigration Act of 1990. The new H-1B visa was designed for applicants in a “specialty 
occupation”, which was defined as an occupation requiring “theoretical and practical 
application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and attainment of a bachelor’s or 
higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the 
occupation in the United States”36. It has a six year period of total eligibility and a 
requirement for approval of a Labor Condition Application by the United States 
Department of Labor (discussed above).  
Congress also set an annual cap of 65,000 on the number of H-1B visas available 
each fiscal year with the Immigration Act of 1990. Since then, Congress has over the 
years increased and decreased the annual cap through various pieces of legislation (See 
Table 2.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
36 INA Section 205(c)(2) 
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Table 2.5 Timeline of H-1B Legislation 
   
Year Legislation Provisions 
1990 S.358 Created the current H-1B visa. 
  Immigration Act of 1990 Created an annual cap of 65,000 on H-1B visas. 
    Requirement that employer obtain LCA certification from 
U.S. Dept. of Labor. 
1998 H.R.4328 
ACWIA / Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 
Increased the cap to 115,000 in 1999 and 2000, to 107,500 
in 2001, and back to 65,000 in 2002.  
    Created new filing fee of $500 for initial applications to be 
earmarked for job training, low-income scholarships, grants 
for mathematics, engineering, and/or science enrichment 
courses.  
    New requirements for employers who become H-1B 
dependent. 
    Provisions to protect U.S. workers from layoffs.  
    Changes in enforcement and penalties.  
2000 H.R.5362 / Pub. L. 106-311 Increased the $500 filing fee to $1000. 
2000 S.2045 
AC-21 / Kids 2000 Act 
Increased the cap to 195,000 for 2001-2003. 
    Created extensions beyond the 6 year period of eligibility for 
applicants with a filed immigrant visa application but no 
available visa number. 
    Allowed for portability. 
    Created cap exemptions for higher education and research 
institutions and their affiliates. 
2000 H.R.3767 
Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act 
Created exemption from filing an amendment application 
when the employer engages in corporate restructuring. 
2002 H.R.2215 
21st Century DOJ Appropriations Authorization Act 
Created additional extensions beyond the 6 year period for 
applicants who have filed a labor certification application 
365 days prior to the end of their 6 year H-1B eligibility. 
    Banned displacement of U.S. workers. 
    Established prevailing wage requirement for employers. 
2004 H.R.4818 Set new compliance standards. 
  H-1B Visa Reform Act / Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2005 
Created a new anti-fraud filing fee of $500. 
    Reinstated and increased the previously sunset job training 
and scholarship fee to $1500 for employers with at least 25 
employees and $750 for fewer than 25 employees.  
    Created an additional new cap of 20,000 for applicants with 
a Master's degree from a U.S. educational institution. 
    Instituted procedures for a Dept. of Labor audit 
investigation. 
    Changed the fee structure for job training, low income 
scholarships, and grants.  
2004 S.2302 Created cap exemption for physicians with an approved J-1 
waiver who agree to work in a federally designated medical 
shortage area for 3 years through the Conrad 30 program. 
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The 1990 cap of 65,000 was not actually reached until 1997 when it was hit for 
the first time since its creation. When the cap was reached, various pieces of H-1B related 
legislation were introduced and passed by the United States Congress to either increase or 
decrease the annual cap between 1998 until 2004. In 1998, Congress passed the 
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA). Among 
other things, the Act increased the annual cap of 65,000 on the number of H-1B 
nonimmigrant visas available per fiscal year that was passed in the Immigration Act of 
1990 to 115,000 available visas for the fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The cap would then 
decrease to 107,500 in 2001 and decrease again in 2002 by reverting to the original 
65,000. 
ACWIA also created a new filing fee of $500 for initial applications to be 
earmarked for job training, low-income scholarships, grants for mathematics, 
engineering, or science enrichment courses. It created provisions to protect U.S. workers 
from layoff and for employers who become H-1B dependent. ACWIA also made changes 
in enforcement and penalties for employers who violate the law. This legislation was 
extremely important because the 65,000 cap was hit for the first time prior to the end of 
the 1997 fiscal year and in 1998, the cap was hit within the first two months, according to 
a report by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO)
37
. As a result, employers 
were unable to get the amount of skilled workers they needed in order to successfully run 
their businesses. It was passed in an attempt to remedy the shortcomings of the 
immigration system at the time and allow businesses and corporations to hire more 
skilled foreign employees.  
                                               
37http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03883.pdf 
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In 2000, three pieces legislation were passed by Congress. First, Congress passed 
a single bill to increase the previous $500 filing fee for job training and scholarships to 
$1000. Another minor act, the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, included a provision 
that created an exemption from filing an amendment application when the employer 
engages in corporate restructuring. 
 Congress also passed during this period the American Competitiveness in the 
Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC-21). AC-21 was introduced and passed by the 
Senate as a reaction to the business sector’s need for more H-1B nonimmigrant visa 
numbers. The Act retroactively increased the previously apportioned cap numbers 
allocated in ACWIA to the number of H-1B visas that was actually issued the prior 2000 
fiscal year
38
 and prospectively increased the cap to 195,000 in fiscal years 2001, 2002, 
and 2003.  
AC-21 also created exemptions from the annual cap for  institutions of higher 
education as defined by section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1001(a)), nonprofit entities related to or affiliated with a nonprofit educational entity as 
defined by section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)), and 
nonprofit or governmental research organizations as defined by 8 CFR 214(h)(19)(iii)(C). 
It also allowed for H-1B extensions beyond the six year maximum mentioned above for 
foreign nationals with a pending immigrant visa application who cannot file an 
adjustment of status application for a green card due to a lack of immigrant visa 
availability when the annual immigrant visa quota had been met. AC-21 also provided 
portability provisions allowing H-1B employees wanting to change employers to be 
                                               
38 In 2000, USCIS actually issued more H-1B visas than Congress had allotted. As a result, Congress 
retroactively passed AC-21 to cover the visas that were issued beyond the cap.  
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eligible to port and change employers once an application is filed with USCIS, rather 
than having to wait several months for an approval. It also instituted new government 
filing fees to be paid by the sponsoring employer to go towards public programs, 
including educational grants, low income scholarships, programs to provide technical 
training skills, crime prevention, and computer education. 
 As mentioned above, the H-1B visa was available for a maximum of six years. 
Congress created an exception in AC-21 for foreign nationals who were unable to obtain 
a green card due to the annual per country quota. Attached as a short rider to the 21
st
 
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act of 2002, H.R. 2215 
extended H-1B status beyond the previously apportioned six year maximum for foreign 
nationals who had filed either an application for labor certification (the first of a series of 
applications for legal permanent residence) at least 365 days prior to the end of the six 
year period, or an application for an immigrant visa. This extension was available even 
for foreign nationals with a visa number available because the annual immigrant visa 
quota for their home country had not been met. Essentially, this exception allowed for 
indefinite visa extensions without requiring a foreign national to become a legal 
permanent resident. Additionally, it established the prevailing wage requirement for 
employers and banned the displacement of United States workers for H-1B foreign 
nationals.  
The H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004 (H.R. 4818) was attached as an amendment 
to the Omnibus Spending Bill passed by the House. The significance of H.R. 4818 was 
that it set forth compliance standards for the H-1B visa, reinstituted the previously sunset 
filing fee for job training and scholarships to $1500, created a new $500 Fraud 
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Prevention and Detection fee for initial applications filed by employers per foreign 
worker, and more importantly created a second cap and exemption from the annual 
65,000 cap for up to 20,000 foreign nations who have obtained at least a Master’s Degree 
from an educational institution in the United States.  In effect, this cleared 20,000 from 
the annual cap and raised the cap to 85,000.  
Finally, S.2302 was the last piece of successful H-1B legislation passed during 
this era. It was created to supplement the previously approved Conrad 30 program (aptly 
named after bill drafter Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND)) which allowed physicians who 
entered the United States on a J-1 waiver to complete a medical residency/fellowship 
training program with a two year home residency requirement to obtain a waiver if they 
agree to work in a federally designated medical shortage area for a period of three years 
(as our friend Dr. Singh did). The Conrad 30 program requires that the physician obtain 
an H-1B visa in order to complete this three year obligation. S.2302 (also introduced by 
Senator Conrad) created a cap exemption for these physicians.   
Failed Legislation 
 From 2005 to 2008, USCIS saw more applications for H-1B visas than ever 
before. The federal fiscal year begins on October 1 each year and per USCIS regulation, 
applications for H-1B visas can be filed up to 180 days prior to the employee’s start date. 
Because the fiscal year begins on October 1, this is the earliest an employee’s start date 
can be. As such, applications for H-1B visas can be filed as early as April 1 for each 
fiscal year (180 days before October 1). Beginning in 2004 through 2009, the annual cap 
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was hit earlier and earlier until 2007 when the 2008 fiscal year cap was actually hit on the 
first day applications were accepted
39
 (See Table 2.6).  
 
Table 2.6 The H-1B Cap 
   
FY 
Date H-1B Cap Was 
Reached 
2005 October 1, 2004 
2006 August 10, 2005 
2007 May 26, 2006 
2008 April 3, 2007 
2009 April 7, 2008 
2010 December 21, 2009 
2011 January 26, 2011 
2012 November 23, 2011 
2013 June 11, 2012 
   Source: USCIS  
 
During this period, twenty nine pieces of H-1B legislation were introduced in the 
House and the Senate. Each one would have increased the annual H-1B cap in order to 
remedy the severe shortage felt by the business sector. Every single one of these bills 
failed. This sustained failure was extraordinary considering that salience among the 
business sector was extremely high during this period with Congress hearing testimony 
from the likes of Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates and other large Fortune 100 CEOs 
urging Congress to either increase or remove the H-1B cap entirely.  
                                               
39 Per USCIS regulation, if USCIS receives a sufficient number of applications to reach the H-1B cap on 
the first business day applications can be filed, applications will be received for two consecutive business 
days and a random lottery will select the appropriate number of applications to fulfill the annual cap. As 
such, the annual cap was actually hit on the first day in both the 2008 and 2009 fiscal years.  
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Interestingly, each of these 29 bills was introduced as stand-alone pieces of H-1B 
legislation or part of a larger immigration related bill. Not a single provision was 
introduced as a rider to a non-immigration related bill as was the primary method of 
success in the prior period of 1998 to 2004. The large majority of these bills died in the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and in the House Judiciary Committee, Immigration and 
Claims Subcommittee, and the Immigration, Citizenship, Refugee, Border Security, and 
International Law Subcommittee.  
During this period, from 2006 to 2007, the Republicans were in control of the 
House and Senate, and in 2008, the Democrats were in control of the House and Senate. 
From 2006 to 2007, the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee was James 
Sensenbrenner (a Republican) and the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee was 
Arlen Specter (a Republican). Of the bills that were introduced, there was a split in 
introductions from both members of the Republican and Democratic Parties. With this 
bipartisan split in introductions, it is unusual that not a single bill was able to be 
compromised on and passed. This lack of congressional support will be further discussed 
in the analysis chapters.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I provided a brief historical overview of congressional 
policymaking on immigration generally in order to provide a context for understanding 
legislation on the H-1B visa. Early immigration policy was relatively closed with a 
preference for white Europeans. Throughout the twentieth century, policy gradually 
became more liberal as Congress opened immigration across the board to various areas of 
the world, and created a variety of different visa categories.  
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 I also outlined the requirements for the H-1B visa and congressional changes to it 
since its creation in 1990. I then provided a brief overview of some of the legislation that 
was attempted and failed. Chapter six will examine these specific congressional 
phenomena in more detail in order to understand why the wave of H-1B cap policy was 
abruptly over. In the next chapter, I will examine some of these issues and highlight the 
theoretical underpinnings of congressional behavior. I will begin with a review of the 
literature, followed by an review of the main congressional models, and examine the 
traditional cues and influences utilized and felt by members of Congress in both a general 
sense and more specifically when dealing with immigration legislation.   
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In chapter two, I gave a brief introduction into the politics associated with H-1B 
visa legislation in Congress. Here, I will outline the theories and policy models that are 
relevant to this discussion. As the most extensively studied institution in the world, 
theory on Congress and congressional behavior is numerous and has been well debated, 
but has also grown muddled over time. Additionally, because the macro environment is 
constantly changing, one model cannot accurately explain legislative behavior over a 
period of time. Therefore, a longitudinal analysis of legislation over time will need to use 
a variety of different theories and models to explain congressional behavior.  
The ensuing analysis will attempt to explain congressional behavior on the H-1B 
visa since 1990. The theories and models relevant to this analysis include the following: 
the macro political environment (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1988); member goals 
(Mayhew 1974; Sulkin 2005; Sinclair 2007); policy substance (Sulkin 2005; Carmines 
and Stimson 1980; 1989); polarization (McCarthy; Poole; and Rosenthal 2006); pivotal 
politics (Krehbiel 1998); party politics (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 2007); unorthodox 
lawmaking (Sinclair 2007); and bargaining failure (Gilmour 1995).  
 While these are just a snapshot of all of the congressional models, they still 
encompass a wide range of models and theories for one policy issue. This is the case 
largely because while the issue of skilled worker immigration has remained the same, the 
politics both within and outside of Congress have changed dramatically in the past twenty 
years since the H-1B visa has been in existence.  
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The Substance of the Analysis 
 Congress was last successful with comprehensive immigration reform with the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Passed by a Republican controlled Senate 
and Democratic controlled House and signed into law by Republican President Reagan, 
the bill signaled the last true comprehensive immigration related bipartisan compromise. 
 Four years later, the Immigration Act of 1990 was introduced by Democratic 
Senator Edward Kennedy and was passed by a Democratic controlled Senate and House 
and signed by Republican President George H.W. Bush. While not a true comprehensive 
bill in the traditional sense
40
, the bill made significant changes to immigration policy, 
changing both the number and type of immigrants granted entry into the United States.  
 The Immigration Act of 1990 had several functions. First, it created the Diversity 
Visa Lottery Program, which is essentially a lottery system that allows up to a 
predetermined number of “winners” per country to be eligible for legal permanent 
residency in the United States. It was designed to grant legal permanent residence to 
foreign nationals from countries that historically have a small percentage of emigrants to 
the United States through other, more traditional legal means.  
 The Act also created the current preference system in place for employment based 
immigrant visas, and increased the number of immigrant visas issued per year in both the 
family and employment categories. Congress has established an annual quota for the 
number of immigrant visas/legal permanent resident applications granted each year per 
country. When and if that quota is reached each fiscal year, all additional applications are 
rolled over and are adjudicated first in the next fiscal year. The quota is updated each 
                                               
40 The bill focuses on nonimmigrant and immigrant visa categories and some enforcement issues but does 
not address illegal immigration.  
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month by the Department of State in their monthly visa bulletin. As an example, in the 
May 2012 Department of State Visa Bulletin, categories for foreign nationals with 
applications pending based on employment requiring at least a Bachelor’s Degree or its 
equivalent in work experience were backlogged to 2007 for nationals of India and China. 
What this essentially means is that there were more applications filed than the annual 
fiscal cap of visa numbers available so the numbers have simply rolled forward for five 
years (2007 to 2012). Each month, the Department of State assesses how many 
applications are approved (based on how many immigrant visas are issued) and issues a 
new priority date.  
The Act also created several new nonimmigrant visa categories, including the H-
1B (which we now know are for skilled workers), O-1 (for aliens with extraordinary 
ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics), P (for athletes or 
entertainers), Q (for international cultural exchange programs), and R (for aliens in 
religious occupations) visas. Additionally, it set forth a series of new administrative 
requirements for naturalization, changed some enforcement provisions for criminal 
aliens, and revised the grounds for exclusion and deportation, as well as a number of 
other miscellaneous immigration related provisions.  
 The 1986 and 1990 Acts mark the beginnings of the effect that polarization had 
on immigration related (and particularly for H-1B related) legislation within Congress. 
As we will see, 1990 was the last major immigration success story for Congress. With 
regard to legislation on the H-1B visa (the focus of this study) after 1990, we had a series 
of bills that for the most part failed when introduced on their own unless they were 
narrow in scope or passed through the use of riders until 2004, followed by a stalemate 
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period between 2006 and 2008 when legislation was introduced but failed at every 
instance, culminating in a lack of any legislation introduced post-2008. So while 
Congress attempted to change the H-1B process, their efforts were stymied by a series of 
initial failures, which were overcome by some unorthodox lawmaking practices for a 
short period, only to be followed by a period where risk adverse members resisted even 
those previously successful unorthodox practices. Why was Congress successful (to some 
degree) pre-2004 and not after? This chapter will lay the theoretical framework for the 
ensuing analysis.  
Previous Literature 
While there are a myriad of policy models and theories attempting to understand 
Congress and congressional behavior, this discussion will be confined to the literature 
that is relevant to the analysis at hand, specifically those studies dealing with: the macro 
political environment (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1988); member goals (Mayhew 1974; 
Sulkin 2005; Sinclair 2007); policy substance (Sulkin 2005; Carmines and Stimson 1980; 
1989); polarization (McCarthy; Poole; and Rosenthal 2006); pivotal politics (Krehbiel 
1998); party politics (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 2007); unorthodox lawmaking (Sinclair 
2007); and bargaining failure (Gilmour 1995).  
The Macro Environment  
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) argue that legislators are impacted by the 
larger macro political environment. Their theoretical framework, the advocacy coalition 
model of policy change, resulted out of a need for an alternative to the stages approach 
and incorporates the role of external forces on the policy process. It begins with three 
“foundation stones:” a macro-level assumption that specialists create policy within a 
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policy subsystem and are influenced by the broader political and socioeconomic system; 
a micro-level individual model; and a meso-level where actors are aggregated into 
advocacy coalitions based on their expertise and areas of specialization. The model 
assumes that actors will form advocacy coalitions with others with similar policy core 
beliefs to achieve common policy objectives.  
With regard to this aggregate level, Jacobson (2004) argues that the economy, 
presidential approval rating, and partisan control in Congress are the most important 
macro-level factors in explaining the macro political environment. As a result, 
congressional performance is dependent upon how members win their seats and how they 
maintain their seats. Therefore, because Congress is internally affected by the macro 
political climate, when policies become unattractive, legislators become risk averse to 
signing on to such legislation.  
Member and Constituent Preferences 
The classical early rational choice applications of Congress including Mayhew 
(1974) and Fenno (1978), examine various congressional goals. According to Mayhew 
(1974), congressional members are first and foremost concerned with reelection. To 
achieve reelection, a member should engage in advertising, credit claiming, and position 
taking. These actions are easily attainable through the organization of Congress, 
including congressional offices, the committee structure, and parties.  
Building on Mayhew’s (1974) research, Fenno (1978) and others outline a variety 
of congressional goals, but argue that reelection is of foremost importance for members 
because it is necessary for legislators to attain any other goals. To attain these additional 
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goals, according to Fenno (1978), legislators must first cultivate trust among their 
constituencies. That trust in turn allows them to justify their congressional decisions.  
These other congressional goals can include constituent preferences and 
individual member goals. Yet because, as we learned above, Congress is internally 
affected by the macro political climate, when policies become unattractive, legislators 
become risk averse to signing on to such legislation. When this occurs, members can use 
unorthodox practices to circumnavigate the traditional legislative process to realize some 
of their individual or constituent policy goals. In certain cases and at certain times, some 
legislation becomes too risky and legislators become completely risk averse, preferring 
not to have their names attached to certain types of legislation.  
 More recently, following the reelection camp, Sulkin’s (2005) uptake theory is 
based on strategic motivation theory and posits that legislators adjust their legislative 
agenda based on criticisms of their own legislative history from their previous election 
challenger. She looks at how past electoral experiences influence congressional behavior 
and her theory is that winning legislators regularly take up their previous challenger’s 
priority issues from previous campaigns and act on them during their new term.  
 This essentially follows Zaller’s (1992) logic that voter decisions are made from 
the most recent information available to a particular voter. Because legislators are 
concerned with achieving their individual policy goals and achieving influence in 
Congress (Fenno 1974), they are primarily concerned with reelection because without 
reelection, those goals cannot be realized (Mayhew 1974). As a result, legislators must 
constantly be forward thinkers (Arnold 1990) and engage in uptake in order to, at the 
very least, create the appearance that have shifted their policy attention to issues the 
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public may be concerned with. As a result, constituents may recognize and reward this 
responsive behavior in a future election (Fiorina 1981). 
Sulkin (2005) also argues that the substance of the policy is also increasingly 
important for reelection goals. Mayhew (2004) and Fenno (1978) found that legislators 
behave differently when issues are either nationally or locally salient to their constituents. 
A highly salient issue/policy is “one that affects a large number of people in a significant 
way” (Gormley 1986: 598). Issues can be highly salient within a particular member’s 
constituency, but perhaps not necessarily salient to the public at large (Gormley 1986).  
Therefore, H-1B legislation that increases the number of skilled H-1B workers 
could be highly salient to the business sector needing to employ foreign skilled workers, 
but low in salience or even hostile by the general public who are not concerned with the 
number of foreign skilled workers. Further, issue salience can change and become more 
or less salient if an underlying problem within the issue worsens or improves. For 
example, immigration as a general matter can also be salient to the general public during 
times of high unemployment and/or national security. The more salient an issue, 
therefore, the more involved Congress will likely be (Mayhew 2004; Fenno 1978).  
Additionally, Carmines and Stimson (1989; 1980) stress the distinction between 
“easy” and “hard” issues. “Easy” issues are those that tend to generate a visceral gut 
reaction on the part of the public. They tend to be symbolic rather than technical, address 
policy ends rather than means, and are issues that have been on the policy agenda for an 
extended period of time. The public tends to be familiar with these types of issues. A 
common easy issue is crime. Hard issues, on the other hand, are more complex and 
nuanced and require a much higher level of political sophistication and sophisticated 
46 
 
decision making. Examples include social security and government sponsored health 
care.  
The public has largely been introduced to immigration as an easy issue in the 
context of border security and illegal immigration issues through the media and other 
outlets. As a result, immigration generally has become an emotional and easy issue that 
the public over time has become largely adverse to. On the other hand, the H-1B visa is a 
very complex issue with so many nuances that it requires very sophisticated knowledge 
of both the policies and the economic reasons underlying it. As a result, we  have this 
complex hard issue trapped within a larger easy issue that carries with it high level of 
negative public opinion.  
Having established this relatively odd juxtaposition between immigration policy 
generally and the H-1B visa specifically, I turn back to the issue of salience. Because 
immigration has been presented to the public as a border security type issue over time, as 
a relatively small segment of immigration policy, it is highly unlikely that most members 
of Congress, much less the general public, are very familiar with the relatively complex 
regulations that regulate the H-1B visa.  
However, because the business and corporate sector, which is a large portion of 
the United States economy, does rely on H-1B skilled workers to keep their businesses 
both operational and successful, it can be said that when H-1B visa numbers are no 
longer available and the corporate sector suddenly is faced with decreased production, the 
issue of H-1B numbers suddenly becomes extremely salient with both the business sector 
and consequently with Congress. As a result, it seems clear that as an increase in demand 
for skilled foreign workers in a particular year occurs, the issue of H-1B legislation 
47 
 
becomes more salient and the more involved Congress, and particularly the Republican 
members of Congress, is likely to be. On the flip side, a decrease in demand for foreign 
workers should make the issue of H-1B legislation less salient and Congress less 
involved.  
In sum, salience helps define the stakeholders and the incentives facing 
legislators. If an issue is highly salient, then Congress will likely take the time to 
understand the issue and make careful decisions. If an issue is highly technical or 
complex and low in salience, then there should logically be less incentive to spend lots of 
energy on the matter, based on rational choice theory. As a result, high salience can 
compensate for low information or technical settings.   
 Additionally, the complexity of congressional processes allows policy makers to 
manipulate rules and procedures to their advantage to pass legislation that may be 
inconsistent with the broader political environment. As such, if the political environment, 
as is hypothesized here, is such that members are unlikely to vote in favor of any 
immigration related bill, policy goals of individual members may still be achieved by less 
orthodox ways. 
Polarization  
 Earlier analyses on congressional behavior focused on a time when ideology 
across party lines did not diverge to the degree that they do today. As a result, a relatively 
new literature has emerged dealing with the issue of partisanship and the increased 
polarization of the parties. As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, there are a 
variety of models and theories explaining congressional behavior, yet each only captures 
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a snap shot of behavior within a broader longitudinal dynamic that consists of a polarized 
Congress with very few median members.  
 According to McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006: 1), “in the middle of the 
twentieth century, the Democrats and the Republicans danced almost cheek to cheek in 
their courtship of the political middle”. Since the 1970s, however, McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal (2006: 1) argue that “the parties have deserted the center of the floor in favor 
of the wings” and that politics have become more divisive. They define polarization as “a 
separation of politics into liberal and conservative camps” and note two consecutive 
polarizing phenomena: the vanishing moderates and the fact that the two parties have 
pulled apart and clustered as conservatives or liberals (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 
2006: 3).  
 Analyzing individual roll call voting patterns of members in the House and 
Senate, they found that the median legislative position of each party has diverged sharply 
since the mid 1970s (Poole and Rosenthal 1984; McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). 
Said differently, they showed that that in both chambers Republicans and Democrats 
have become either more conservative or more liberal and moderates have slowly begun 
to vanish since in the 1970s. Additionally, they showed that while members are becoming 
more partisan, the parties themselves are becoming more homogenous.  
  McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) attribute this change largely to economic 
and social changes. They argue that polarization occurred because Republicans in the 
North and South moved sharply to the right after realignment in the 1960s and in 
response, the remaining Northern Democrats moved further to the left than Democrats 
had been in the 1960s. As a result, individual members have become increasingly more 
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liberal or conservative within their respective parties. Additionally, they also argue that 
income inequality has worked hand in hand in the increase in polarization, Essentially, 
they claim that as income inequality has increased, people at the top devote more time 
and money to supporting the party that does not emphasize redistribution. This party, 
which has become the Republican Party, over time generates policies that either increases 
inequality or blocks policies that would increase redistribution. Over time, this works to 
divide the two parties further apart.  
 While McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) found that income inequality was 
one of the root causes of polarization, Galston and Nivola (2006) point to four root causes 
of polarization: historical transformations, the changing role of religion, the media, and 
the electoral nature of the national legislative branch. First, regional realignment of the 
parties in the 1960s as a consequence of the civil rights movement and particularly the 
1965 Voting Rights Act which mobilized black voters and sent scores of white 
conservatives into the arms of the Republican Party resulted in a dramatic change in 
politics. The Republican Party became the white, conservative party throughout the South 
and West. The Democratic Party lost their conservative southern base, and as a result, 
were forced to turn to an alternate constituency – the Northeast and later California 
(Black and Black 2002). After realignment, a series of political events further delineated 
party divisions, including Roe v. Wade (1973), the Vietnam War, and East-West tensions 
during the Cold War (Galston 2004; Sinclair 2006).  
 With regard to religion, observance and political preference have been found to be 
correlated. The more one attends church, the more likely they are to identify with 
conservatives. Additionally, the media has also intensified partisanship by focusing on 
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feuds between players in order to maintain viewership (Galson and Nivola 2006; 
Hamilton 2006). 
  Finally, with regard to congressional elections, competitive districts have over 
time diminished. As a result, on a national level, because districts have become one party 
districts, candidates have no incentive to appeal to voters outside of their party.  
 It cannot be stressed enough how much of an impact polarization has had on the 
legislative branch. Although Congress is a well-bound institution, it is still a permeable 
institution and is often affected by external events and forces. Thus, polarization has 
changed congressional behavior in a number of ways. According to McCarthy, Poole, 
and Rosenthal (2006), polarization increases gridlock, and major legislation is successful 
less frequently (a finding Sinclair also makes in her unorthodox lawmaking argument – 
see below). While they examine legislation within the context of income redistribution, 
the ensuing analysis will attempt to explain how polarization has affected policymaking 
on the H-1B visa specifically.  
 This brings us full circle. Congress was able to use less orthodox ways 
successfully for a period of time until a series of macro-level factors made members risk 
averse to even using riders to realize their policy goals. Meanwhile, all of this was 
occurring within the context of increased party polarization. The following chapters will 
attempt to understand how polarization affected legislation and what changes in the 
macro environment occurred to make legislators so adverse to even introducing this type 
of legislation in order to attempt to explain this shift in legislative support for H-1B visas. 
This will be done using four of the above mentioned congressional models: pivotal 
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politics, party models, unorthodox policymaking, and stalemate. The literature on each 
will be outlined in turn below.  
Pivotal Politics – The Median Voter 
 Krehbiel’s (1998) pivot politics model goes beyond the traditional divided 
government argument to explain why gridlock occurs in Congress and how legislation 
can pass over gridlock. Krehbiel (1998) argues that gridlock occurs for a variety of 
reasons, including moderate status quo policies, supermajority procedures, heterogeneous 
preferences, and partisanship. Therefore, in order for policy change to occur, both 
moderate policy proposals and moderate members are needed. As a result, policy change 
is incremental and passed only through the use of supermajorities.  
 The argument is Senate centric and while legislation must pass both chambers to 
be successful, the same institutional constraints do not exist in the House. As a result, 
Krehbiel shows us why successful legislation has become so difficult in the Senate (and 
consequently in Congress) as successful legislation must have more than a just a 
minimum winning coalition of a majority. 
 The argument is also an institutional one in that Krehbiel argues that institutions 
matter in a way that can undermine democratic norms such as majority rule. This follows 
Riker’s (1980: 445) classic argument that the political system in which institutions 
operate lack equilibria, and as a result, outcomes result not only from institutions and 
individual tastes, but also from legislative “political skill and artistry… in order to exploit 
the disequilibrium of tastes for their own advantage”.   
 Returning to the claim that supermajorities are needed to pass legislation, prior to 
Rule 22, any member within the Senate could file a motion for extended debate, or 
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filibuster. Since the Senate’s adoption of Rule 22 in 1917, the filibuster can be terminated 
and the motion at hand brought to a vote through the use of cloture. To invoke cloture, a 
senator must file a cloture petition while a filibuster motion is pending, which requires 
the signatures of 16 other senators. In two days, a cloture vote will be brought before the 
full Senate. It requires a supermajority, or 3/5 of the Senate in order to be invoked. Once 
cloture is invoked, the original pending motion will be brought to a vote after the time 
stipulated in the cloture motion.  
 The effect of cloture is this. While the original motion may require only a simple 
majority, in order to overcome filibuster in the Senate a supermajority is necessary. This 
means the pivotal player becomes the filibuster pivot rather than the median voter.  
 Looking at the relationship between cloture and roll call votes, Binder and Smith 
(1997) found that votes on cloture were votes on the actual legislation on which cloture 
was being sought, rather than procedural votes on the length of debate. Within the context 
of pivotal politics, when cloture makes it more difficult for senators to change 
unattractive policies relative to alternative policies, they will “lash out” against the 
filibuster (Krehbiel 1998: 96).   
 If there are enough moderates to refuse cloture, then these moderates have the 
power to water the proposal down and over towards their side of the policy space. Using 
a specific example, if there are enough Republicans in the Senate to refuse to invoke 
cloture, then Democrats will need to move their policy more towards the right to create a 
more moderate policy that Republicans will be happy with or fear gridlock (which would 
also occur in the absence of moderates).  
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Party Models  
 The traditional theory on responsible party government (Schattschneider 1942) 
holds that the various parties have both different and well-defined platforms. Citizens 
elect a unified government, the majority party attempts to enact and implement policies 
within their platforms, and policy preferences are realized. This model proved to be 
insufficient in explaining legislative politics in the postwar era and the conditional party 
government theory was born (Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995), which requires a homogenous 
majority that is distinct from the minority party (Aldrich 1991; Rohde 1995).  
 The theory on conditional party government (Rohde 1991) is more concerned 
with individual member preferences. Specifically, party responsibility exists when 
member preferences are homogenous within the party, meaning party leaders will support 
the legislation amid widespread agreement within the majority party. Rohde’s (1991) 
argument was that party leadership in the House is strongest with the presence of three 
interdependent factors: (1) homogenous party membership; (2) institutional leverage; and 
(3) a strong leader.  
 Rohde argued that institutional reforms in the House in the 1970s and increased 
partisanship in the 1980s are related and the variation in intraparty homogeneity and 
interparty heterogeneity shapes the level of influence that party leaders have. When 
parties are unified internally and there is a gap between the party medians (or the medians 
have disappeared as they do by the 2000s), members suddenly have agreement on the 
party agenda and this empowers party leaders. When these conditions are not present, 
party leaders are not extended the same degree of authority, and policy making power 
tends to shift to the committees. 
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 Party theories generally argue that legislators play two games simultaneously: 
lawmaking within the legislature and reelection within their constituencies (Key 1964; 
Sorauf 1964; Cox and McCubbins 2007; and Aldrich 1995). These two games have been 
linked together within the concepts of brand names (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991) and 
collective dilemmas (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 2007; Rohde 
1991; Aldrich 1995). 
 The literature on brand names theorizes that parties are organized in order to 
provide information to the electorate. The party becomes akin to a brand name, and the 
reputation of one actor of the brand (or party) spills over to the whole brand line (party). 
The voter, in turn, can gauge the characteristics of a lesser known actor of a brand/party 
simply by knowing which brand/party it belongs to. With regard to collective dilemmas, 
Cox and McCubbins’s (2007) cartel theory tells us that parties are designed to solve the 
collective action problems faced by individual members who cannot obtain their policy 
goals on their own.  
Recent literature has also indicated that parties have become increasingly 
important in sorting ideologies and providing cues for legislators (Cox and McCubbins 
2007; Rohde 1991). Additionally, parties provide individual voters with cues that help 
legislators in their reelection goals. Over time, the role of parties has become more 
important and parties serve an even greater role in agenda setting and organizing 
committees (Kingdon 1984; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007). Essentially, this literature 
has found an inverse relationship between parties and committees.  
 Immigration policy, as discussed in chapter two, has largely been made on the 
congressional level and Congress has been active in maintaining their exclusive 
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jurisdiction over immigration policymaking. Therefore, in order to make policy, 
legislators are required to amass and understand a great deal of information about current 
immigration law and the needs of various interests. Since the average legislator would 
have to invest a tremendous amount of time in understanding the complicated nuances of 
immigration law and policy (and every other subject area they legislate on), studies have 
shown that legislators instead turn to parties to provide them with “cues” on how to vote 
(Campbell et al. 1980).  
At the level of implementation, however, immigration has become an extremely 
complicated policy area with overlap among agencies, a myriad of complex visa 
categories, and the distinction between enforcement and entry. As such, following the 
logic of Campbell et al. (1980), it can be expected that the average legislator does not 
understand the nuances of every piece of immigration policy that comes through the 
floor, particularly a niche segment of immigration policy such as skilled worker 
nonimmigrant visa policy. Therefore, parties are necessary to not only provide cues but to 
organize parties as well.  
 The importance of party organization is the thesis of Cox and McCubbins’ (2005; 
2007) works on the House of Representatives. Following in the tradition of Rohde 
(1991), they provide the seminal work on parties through their work studying the House. 
They argue that lawmaking in the House is predicated by collective efforts that are 
difficult due to individual member and constituent policy goals. As a result, parties 
organize the House in order to solve these collective action problems on the part of 
individual members. Essentially, parties act as market cartels, organizing individual 
members in an attempt to create collective benefits for the party as a whole. Additionally, 
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the majority party has the ability to control the policy agenda, allowing a greater 
likelihood of bill passage for the policy goals of individual members. These institutional 
arrangements have become more constricting for legislators over time, and as a result, we 
have seen legislators utilize some unorthodox practices (Sinclair 2007) which will be 
described in the next section.  
 While their findings are important, a major shortcoming to this, and many of the 
congressional studies, is that they focus on explaining decision making within the 
House
41
. Yet as Krehbiel (1998) shows us, policy making in the Senate is vastly different, 
particularly due to institutional systems in place such as filibuster and cloture. As 
legislation is not produced in just one chamber but requires identical versions of the same 
bill to pass both chambers in order to become law, a study of both chambers is necessary 
in order to fully explain congressional behavior. As a result, these studies miss the mark 
to some degree in explaining policymaking and congressional behavior.  
 That said, these studies still have an important place in the literature as they do 
show us, as we have seen, that parties are important in Congress. They are able to 
organize members, provide them with cues, and make the leadership’s job easier. As a 
consequence, since the 1970s, party polarization has been increasing in both chambers 
(see Figure 5.2). This has resulted in an increase in gridlock and a steady decrease in 
bipartisan legislation (McCarthy; Poole; and Rosenthal 2006). The movement within 
Congress began with the modern conservative movement that shifted the Republican 
Party to the right (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 
2004). This, followed by a change in income distribution among the voting population, 
polarized campaign contributions by economic elites, and polarization among the 
                                               
41 Other studies focus solely on the Senate. 
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electorate
42
 along economic lines (the higher income voters are more likely to align with 
Republicans while the lower income groups are less likely to participate in voting due to 
immigration levels and incarceration) which has resulted in a decreased demand for 
income redistribution. This decrease in the number of moderates has made it more 
difficult for legislation to pass. Party polarization and its effect on policymaking will be 
discussed in greater detail in forthcoming chapters.  
Unorthodox Policymaking 
 As noted previously, Sinclair (2007) makes the argument that Congress no longer 
follows the traditional textbook lawmaking process. She outlines these changes in 
policymaking over time by comparing the 1970 Clean Air Act with the 1990 Clean Air 
Act. The 1970 Act, for example, was introduced in both respective House and Senate 
committees, and then proceeded to a vote on the floor where it passed. In 1990, however, 
the bill was introduced in three different House committees and then went to the floor 
where a series of compromises through informal processes occurred. In the Senate, the 
bill was introduced in committee, went to the floor where a series of informal 
compromises occurred, followed by filibuster before a vote. Sinclair (2007) argues that 
the 1970 process is not likely to ever occur again as most bills today are now passed 
through short cut procedures for small bills and a variety of once unorthodox practices 
and procedures for major legislation.  
 These unorthodox practices and procedures include the increase in usage of larger 
omnibus bills, the use of multiple committees for the same piece of legislation, more 
complex and restrictive rules tailored to deal with problems associated with a particular 
                                               
42 This remains hotly contested within the literature. See Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008 and DiMaggio, 
Evans, and Bryson (1996).  
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bill in the House; and in the Senate, the fact that bills are subject to greater floor 
amendments (many irrelevant to the bill at issue), and filibuster threats and cloture votes 
are much more routine. 
 Additionally, Congress is certainly affected by the macro political climate. When 
policies become unattractive, legislators become risk averse to signing on to such 
legislation. Recently, however, Sinclair (2007) argues that there are opportunities for 
members to circumnavigate the traditional legislative process in order to realize some of 
their individual or constituent policy goals through the use of riders. Yet even with these 
Sinclairian opportunities, in certain cases and at certain times, some legislation becomes 
too risky and legislators prefer not to have their names attached to certain pieces of 
legislation. This is where Congress finds itself after 2004 and particularly after 2008 
when no legislation is introduced.  
 According to Sinclair, however, these unorthodox practices have become so 
routine that they are actually no longer unorthodox. While Sinclair does not tell us why 
the legislative process has changed over time, largely because there is no agreement 
among scholars as to why this change occurred (Cooper 1981; Gamm and Shepsle 1989), 
polarization does appear to play a role in this as well. In a different work, she does make 
the argument that polarization and the “ideological gulf” between the parties in both the 
Senate and the House (which she terms “hyperpartisan”) has accelerated unorthodox 
lawmaking (Sinclair 2006). The role of polarization will be discussed further in chapter 
seven.  
 As a result of these new and previously unorthodox practices, consequences are 
such that major legislation has a better chance at passage than non-major legislation. 
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Similarly, members are less specialized today and face greater information problems than 
before. Additionally, in the Senate, the supermajority requirement has made coalition 
building more difficult and gridlock more likely.   
Stalemate 
 The bargaining failure or stalemate argument is a rational choice game theory 
model that claims that failure occurs when a zone of agreement exists between two 
parties but one side deliberately chooses to avoid that zone. The defecting side avoids 
compromise in an attempt to seek some other type of political gain that they believe will 
ultimately be preferable in the long run. Gilmour (1995) calls this the “accepting half a 
loaf” argument where the defector feels that accepting half of a loaf today may keep them 
from obtaining the whole loaf (which is their ultimate preference) at a later date.  
 Gilmour (1995) argues that it is common for supporters of a comprehensive 
reform measure to oppose piecemeal measures because they fear that in accepting a 
smaller portion of a policy, they risk not getting the comprehensive measure passed at a 
later date. In fact, Gilmour (1995) argues that passing piecemeal legislation actually does 
make it harder to pass comprehensive legislation. Therefore, rather than pass piecemeal 
legislation, supporters will simply wait until they can gain control in both chambers and 
the presidency. Figure 3.1 below illustrates this policy strategy.  
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Figure 3.1 Strategic Disagreement 
 
Before Election and Comprehensive Reform 
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Q = Status Quo 
P = President’s Position 
X = most extreme proposal that can win 
b = alternatives that can beat Q 
 
Source: Adapted from Gilmour (1995: 46) 
 
 It is worth recalling here that following Krehbiel (1996; 1998), in order for policy 
change to occur, both moderate policy proposals and moderate members are needed. As a 
result, policy change is incremental and typically passed only through the use of 
supermajorities. Therefore, in order for legislation to pass, the majority party would 
simply need to shift the legislation to the position of the median legislator. In 2006, for 
example, when Republicans controlled both chambers, but failed to meet the threshold 
for cloture with only 55 Republicans, we would expect the median legislator to be center 
right, and in 2007 and 2008 when Democrats controlled both chambers but the Senate 
with only 51 and 55 Democrats respectively, we would expect the median legislator to be 
center left and policy to shift accordingly. This however did not happen. In each instance, 
the parties remained firm in their positions and no shifting of policy occurred. Instead, 
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with contemporary increasing levels of polarization, no policy space remains for 
individuals to use Sinclairan tactics and the consequence has been gridlock. 
Macro-Level Factors  
Public Opinion 
With regard to public opinion and elections, Arnold (1990) argues that Congress 
is partly manipulated by coalition leaders, voters, and free agents. They enact legislation 
based on general interests, concentrated interests, and geographic interests. Assuming 
that legislators are most concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1974; Jacobson and Kernell 
1983), he argues that when Congress enacts legislation for concentrated or geographic 
interests, they do so as a result of strong lobbies and reelection goals. Legislators, 
according to Arnold (1990: 8) “choose among the paired alternatives presented to them in 
part by estimating the electoral consequences of being associated with each option.” And 
while voters may not know about each legislator’s policy positions, these positions can be 
used against a candidate in future elections (Kingdon 1989; Sulkin 2005). Voter 
preferences are typically gauged by either punishment or reward of an individual 
candidate or party (Fiorina 1981).  
 Arnold’s (1990) model assumes that voters are more concerned with outcomes 
rather than the policy itself. Actors in the political process (voters, legislators, and 
coalition leaders) make four separate decisions: (1) citizens establish policy preferences 
by evaluating policy proposals and effects; (2) they choose among candidates by 
evaluating their policy positions and connections with policy effects; (3) legislators 
choose among policy proposals by establishing voters’ potential policy preferences and 
establishing the likelihood that they will incorporate these preferences into their vote 
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choice in a future election; and (4) coalition leaders adopt strategies for enacting their 
policy proposals by anticipating how the legislators will act.  
 In the literature, public opinion is typically viewed in the context of salience. 
Salience refers to the importance that voters place on a particular issue (Berelson et al.; 
1954; Behr and Iyengar; 1985). Salient issues are those that voters are most likely pay 
attention to by way of legislative behavior or through the media (Brody 1991). The more 
salient an issue, the more likely Congress will act on it. Typically, Congress will respond 
in a manner consistent with public opinion because legislators are first and foremost 
concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1974; Jacobson and Kernell 1983).  
 For the most part of U.S. history, however, Congress acted in direct opposition to 
public opinion on immigration and as a result, public opinion and actual policy on 
immigration did not converge. With the exception of a brief humanitarian exception 
following the second World War, public policy has tended to be more restrictionist on 
matters dealing with immigration, while Congress has tended to exhibit a more liberal 
policy since the 1940s (Simon 1989; Epenshade and Hempstead 1996; Kane et al. 1984; 
Pear 1986; Day 1990).  
Yet Muller (1996) hypothesizes that immigration policy becomes salient and 
captures public opinion when three factors converge: (1) in areas where and when 
immigration is high; (2) at times and in places where the public is uneasy about the 
economy; and (3) when the public begins to question the potential contribution of 
immigrants and views them more of a burden than a benefit. Upon aggregation, Gimpel 
and Edwards (1999) claim that immigration still is not a salient political issue unless the 
economy is so bad that immigrants are blamed. As such, I hypothesize that in the wake of 
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the recent economic recession, Congress has become more receptive to public opinion, a 
new key variable in explaining failure of immigration bill passage (which will be 
discussed independently below).   
Earlier I outlined Carmines and Stimson’s (1980; 1989) “easy” and “hard” issue 
distinction. Remember that easy issues are those that generate a gut reaction on the part 
of the public. Hard issues, on the other hand, require much more political sophistication 
and knowledge and tend to be much more nuanced and complex.  
Immigration as a general issue has over time been presented to the public through 
the media and other outlets in the context of border security and illegal immigration 
issues. As a result, I hypothesize that it has become an emotional and easy issue that the 
public is largely adverse to. On the other hand, the H-1B visa is a very complex issue 
with so many nuances that it requires very sophisticated knowledge of both the policies 
and the economic reasons underlying it. As a result, we have this complex hard issue 
trapped within a larger easy issue that most are familiar with and adverse to at the macro-
level and we have spillover effects from issues pertaining to illegal immigration, 
unskilled labor, and border security issues seeping into policy dealing with skilled foreign 
workers, a completely separate policy area dealing more with economics and business 
than border security.  
Economic Conditions 
 Studies on immigration policy often begin with a more general conceptualization 
of migration as a social global phenomenon (Zolberg 2006). As a social phenomenon, 
migration theorizing typically touches on political science, political economy, sociology, 
and anthropology. While migration is the social act of an individual moving from one 
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sovereign state to another, it also impacts the social, political, and economic fabrics of 
both the losing and receiving states within both domestic and international systems and 
markets. 
 In industrialized capitalist states, such as the United States, immigrants have long 
been viewed as a class of labor. This classification has resulted in animosity towards 
immigrant workers as they are viewed as competing for jobs with domestic workers. 
Economic studies of immigrant labor have traditionally been reviewed in a Marxist 
framework (Zolberg 2006; Castles and Kossack 1985; Petras 1981). Additionally, studies 
abound on the debate on whether immigrants are, on average, contributing members of 
society through consumption and taxation or are simply free riders.  
 Using organization theory, Freeman (1995) argues that immigration policies tend 
to be both expansionist and inclusive because policymakers tend to be more responsive to 
organized interest than individual members of the public who are anti-immigration. This 
results in policies that are more liberal than the public opinion of the median voter.  
 He creates a political economic model of policymaking for liberal democracies, 
including the United States with the units of analysis being the individual voters, 
organized groups, and state actors. He argues that immigration policy in liberal 
democracies relies more on organized interest than public opinion because it is in 
politician’s best “electoral interest” to cater to interest groups because while public 
opinion is restrictionist, it is not “well articulated” (Freeman 1995: 886-887).  As a result, 
policymakers in the United States would be expected to align with business interests 
when making immigration policy dealing with the employment side of immigration
43
.  
                                               
43 While studies on congressional behavior typically do include an analysis on interest group pressure, it is 
impossible to disaggregate the amount of group pressure attributed to immigration versus other areas. For 
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As the traditional textbook Congress has changed dramatically, there are other 
factors that can impact congressional behavior on immigration policy as well. For 
example, the state of the national and international economy can affect domestic 
immigration policy. In a positive growth or status quo economy, voters are less likely to 
be concerned with increased immigration and effects on employment opportunities. In 
times of weak economic growth and high levels of unemployment, however, constituents 
are less likely to be tolerant of any type of immigration policy increasing the number of 
foreign nationals competing for jobs.  
While the H-1B visa is designed to fill a market void of skilled workers in any 
given field, voters typically view any increase in immigrants as direct competition for 
jobs (Foner 1964; Higham 1985; Olzak 1992; Passel and Fix 1994; Pomper 1993; Citrin, 
Green, Muste, and Wong 1997). As a result, I hypothesize that the recent economic 
recession starting in 2007 contributed in a shift in legislative support for H-1B legislation.  
Media 
The media plays a strong role in policy, specifically in providing information, 
whether objective or not, to the public. It has been shown that the media plays a stronger 
role in salient issues and less of a role in complex issues (Gormley 1986; Eshbaugh-Soha 
2006; Epstein and Segal 2000). Additionally, Mazur (1981) has shown that when the 
media increases their coverage of technical issues, public support typically decreases.  
Immigration has been a salient issue for many years now, particularly with the 
increase in undocumented immigration and the complex solutions proposed by elites. As 
                                                                                                                                            
example, if company X contributes Y amount in campaign contributions to member Z, it is impossible to 
disaggregate how much of that contribution is attributed to immigration, and how much is attributed to 
other political aspects, i.e. tax incentives, various regulatory changes, etc. Therefore, this study will not 
examine the impact interest groups have on H-1B policy.  
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a result, the media has certainly been very involved in issues surrounding undocumented 
immigration. Following Mazur’s (1981) logic, public support for immigration generally 
should have decreased due to the complex nature of immigration legislature.  
Additionally, however, the issue of skilled workers and the visa options is a much 
more complicated issue that has largely been left untouched by the media. Not only has 
the media as a whole neglected to distinguish between the differences between skilled 
and unskilled workers, it has also neglected to distinguish between the various policies 
and goals that legislators have for skilled workers. As such, the public as a whole is 
relatively ignorant to both the general differences that exist between skilled and unskilled 
immigrants, as well as the legal immigration differences. Based this lack of distinction 
and attention, I hypothesize that the media is responsible for creating a spillover effect 
from their constant coverage of unskilled and undocumented immigration and issues 
stemming from those issues that has resulted over time in creating negative public 
opinion towards immigration, immigration related issues, and immigration related 
legislation as a whole.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I outlined the literature, theory, and policy models dealing with 
migration, immigration policy, and congressional behavior. Specifically, because the 
congressional literature is extensive and attempts to explain numerous phenomena within 
the legislative branch, I outlined those theories and policy models most relevant to this 
discussion.  
Additionally, I provided the framework for my analysis. Because the macro 
environment is constantly changing, one model cannot accurately explain legislative 
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behavior over a period of time and a longitudinal analysis of legislation over time such as 
this one will need a variety of different theories and models to explain congressional 
behavior. Specifically, my longitudinal analysis will be broken into four time periods and 
use four congressional models to explain these periods of congressional behavior. These 
include: pivotal politics (Krehbiel 1998); party politics (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 
2007); unorthodox lawmaking (Sinclair 2007); and bargaining failure (Gilmour 1995). In 
the next chapter, I will outline and develop my hypotheses and discuss my methodology 
for the remaining analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 The previous chapter provided a literature review of the relevant studies on 
congressional behavior and policymaking, as well as the foundation of my theory and 
hypotheses. In this chapter I will outline and develop my hypotheses and set the stage for 
the forthcoming analysis. In order to do that, it might be helpful here to provide a quick 
recap of the legislative history on the H-1B visa program. In 1997, the H-1B cap was hit 
for the first time since the creation of the current H-1B visa program in 1990. Since 1997, 
seven pieces of legislation were able to be realized into policy, through the use of stand-
alone legislation and riders until 2004. During that same period, twenty-nine other pieces 
of legislation were introduced in either the House or Senate as stand-alone pieces of 
legislation. Many of these policy proposals were in some way actually realized as policy 
through the seven successful pieces of legislation.  
In 2005, Congress was silent on legislating on the H-1B visa. In early 2006, 
however, the House introduced a bill to increase the H-1B cap, followed by the 
introduction of comprehensive immigration reform in the Senate just a week later. A 
series of sixteen total bills during the period from 2006 to 2008 were introduced in either 
the House or Senate dealing with increasing the H-1B cap in one way or another. Each of 
these bills was introduced individually and consequently each failed. After 2008, no 
legislation has been introduced to date.  
Research Design 
 While polarization increased during this period, the traditional internal and 
external factors surrounding Congress typically used to explain shifts in congressional 
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behavior remained the same between the time Congress was able to pass legislation on 
the H-1B visa and when it could not. Partisanship did not change from 2001 through 
2006 as both chambers were controlled by the Republican Party as was the President. 
According to the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics
44
, the 
unemployment rate remained steady throughout this period. It was at 4.0 percent in 2000, 
increasing to 5.5 percent in 2004 and then falling to 4.6 percent by 2006 where it 
remained until increasing again in 2008 to 5.8 percent. Additionally, according to the 
U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis
45
, the real GDP (based on 
chained 2005 dollars) also remained steady during this period, increasing slightly in each 
year between 1998 until leveling in 2008 and beginning to fall in 2009. Therefore, we 
have both a political climate that does not change and an economic climate that actually 
appears to be improving through this period of stalled legislation. This leads to the 
following research questions: 
 1) What factors explain congressional policy making within the context of skilled 
 worker (H-1B) immigration?  
 2) Why did Congress stop using alternative methods (i.e. riders) to pass positive 
 H-1B legislation?  
 3) Why did even minor changes to the H-1B program that were successful as 
 stand-alone pieces of legislation pre-2004 fail after 2004?  
 4) Is the U.S. experience unique? How does it compare to legislation in Canada 
 and Australia?  
                                               
44 http://www.bls.gov/cps/prev_yrs.htm/ 
45 http://www.bea.gov/ 
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Traditionally, studies on Congress, congressional behavior, and policymaking 
have been conducted using quantitative statistical methods. Due to the institutional nature 
of Congress, when a bill is decided by roll call votes, a tally of these votes is available 
through the Library of Congress’s THOMAS website. This allows for neat statistical 
analyses on stand-alone pieces of legislation, as well as on individual congressional 
members.   
There are, however, some limitations to this type of quantitative study on 
Congress. Obviously it necessitates that the researcher have the roll call votes for each 
piece of legislation he intends to analyze. Additionally, while this type of analysis does 
allow for some sophisticated statistical methods, which has increasingly become expected 
in this discipline, it does not allow a researcher to analyze member or party views on 
issues and/or the substance of policymaking. Looking only at roll call votes only allows 
the researcher to analyze the end result, or passage or failure of a bill, when other factors 
may be just as important to the end result. 
I will begin the analysis by demonstrating the change in legislative support over 
time. I will then explain why this change has occurred using public opinion data from 
Gallup, as well as data from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. After explaining 
why the change in legislative support over time has occurred, the next step in the analysis 
is explaining how proponents of H-1B legislation have used institutional procedures to 
obtain favorable outcomes in terms of bill passage looking at both individual sponsorship 
and party support for each bill. Finally, I will analyze the literature and legislative 
outcomes in Canada and Australia and compare their recent experiences with that in the 
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United States. Below I outline my data sources, followed by my hypotheses for the 
ensuing analysis.  
Data 
 This study is a qualitative study on congressional behavior due largely to the fact 
that individual roll call votes do not exist for each of the bills I will be examining. In fact, 
roll call votes only exist for five out of a total 36 bills. Given the small number of 
observations, a statistical examination of roll call voting would not provide any predictive 
findings. Instead, I will look at data provided by the Library of Congress’s THOMAS 
website on each piece of legislation, including the names and parties of bill sponsors and 
co-sponsors, as well as the text of floor debate within the congressional record in order to 
determine legislative intent and preferences during this period.  
I decided to select only those bills that made (or purported to make) positive 
changes to the H-1B program. This includes legislation that would increase the annual 
cap, create exemptions from the cap that essentially would increase the cap, or legislation 
that would make the application process easier for U.S. employers. While there were a 
handful of bills introduced during this time period to either decrease the annual cap or 
eliminate the visa category entirely, little movement occurred with the exception of some 
limited debate on the floor in opposition to positive legislation on the H-1B
46
. 
Additionally, I am attempting to understand under what context Congress is able to pass 
legislation to increase the number of skilled workers within the market, rather than 
decrease them. I also chose not to include other extraneous pieces of legislation that were 
neither positive nor negative, such as the Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and 
Singapore and Chile, which simply carved out a number of cap numbers for nationals of 
                                               
46 Four bills were introduced in 1997, 2001, 2003, and 2005. None of them came out of committee.  
72 
 
Singapore and Chile. It did not affect the cap numbers in any way. Numbers not used by 
nationals of Singapore and Chile are recaptured that year by individuals from other 
countries.  
 While the general trend in polarization has been an increase over time, there are 
some major increases that coincide with the patterns of congressional behavior on H-1B 
legislation. To illustrate the change in polarization over time and compare it with those 
patterns, I use McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal’s (2006) own statistical measure, termed 
NOMINATE, which  scores members directly from roll call voting records using all 
recorded votes. They use individual roll call votes for all members and examine when 
and which members vote with other members and how often. One example they provide 
looks at the voting patterns among Senators Specter, Clinton, and Frist. They argue that if 
Specter votes with Clinton and Frist more frequently than Clinton and Frist vote together, 
then Specter is the moderate. Using this algorithm over millions of individual roll call 
votes made by thousands of Senators and Representatives on tens of thousands of roll 
calls over time allowed them to develop precise measures of each member’s position and 
use that to measure polarization over time with the higher the score, the higher the level 
of polarization. Because it includes all recorded votes over time, it provides the most 
comprehensive measure for changes in polarization over time. 
 In addition to data on the legislation itself and on polarization, I will also use a 
variety of other data sources to explain how changes in the macro political and economic 
climate affected congressional behavior. This will include public opinion data from 
Gallup, media data from the Vanderbilt Television News Archives, and data on Latino 
voting patterns from the Pew Research Center.  
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Finally, as stated above, this analysis will seek to ascertain whether this is a 
uniquely American phenomenon. In so doing, I will analyze the literature and legislation 
in Canada and Australia in the penultimate chapter in order to provide a comparative 
analysis. These three countries share similar colonial histories and relied to a large extent 
on immigration to populate their countries at one point. As such, Canada, Australia and 
the U.S. have historically been the largest immigrant receiving countries in the world. Yet 
some important differences in the immigration policies of these three countries exist. In 
Canada and Australia, for example, skilled worker immigration has been much less 
restricted by their respective Parliaments than in the United States. It will be interesting 
to ascertain whether different institutional structures tempered by some similar and some 
different macro-level conditions yield similar or different outcomes in these countries.  
Hypotheses 
My hypotheses are rooted in the easy versus hard issue dynamic discussed in the 
previous chapter. Largely, I hypothesize that H-1B bills have failed to pass on their own 
in the past ten to fifteen years as a result of party polarization and that individual 
legislators have responded to this by using alternative tactics to further their policy goals. 
I also hypothesize that in addition to this polarization, macro-level factors such as public 
opinion, the economic downturn, and the media have all resulted in legislators becoming 
adverse to H-1B legislation over time. I hypothesize that the macro environment became 
less accepting of immigration related legislation over time, with the tipping point being 
the introduction and failure of comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 and 2007. As a 
result, members who previously may have supported H-1B legislation found themselves 
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risk averse in supporting any immigration related legislation. My primary hypotheses are 
as follows:  
 1) Party polarization has over time made it more difficult for this type of 
 legislation to pass.  
 2) The increase in the Latino voting population has changed the dynamics of 
 legislative politics on the subject of immigration generally.  
 3) Changes at the macro-level over time have resulted in less congressional 
 support for the H-1B program and the 2006 failure of comprehensive immigration 
 reform (CIR) was the tipping point for this shift in policy.  
 4) Because these changes are unique in nature to the U.S., I expect a more open 
 policy in Canada and Australia.  
 With regard to the comparative section of the analysis, as mentioned previously, a 
number of historical and cultural similarities among these three countries combined with 
relatively similar economic conditions (with the United States obviously having a larger 
labor base and economy due to a larger domestic population) could result in an 
expectation that such similar states would have similar policies when it comes to 
immigration policy. Specifically with regard to foreign skilled labor policy, one could 
expect to find similar policies or at least relatively unrestrictive policies across these three 
states. Additionally, however, the sheer size of the United States labor force and the great 
labor shortages in many highly skilled fields could result in an expectation that the U.S. 
should have a more liberal and open policy. Instead, however I hypothesize that the 
spillover effect of undocumented immigration, and the increased polarization over time 
combined with the institutional arrangements in place within the legislative branch are 
75 
 
unique phenomena to the United States which I hypothesize should result in the United 
States having a more restrictive skilled immigrant worker immigration policy. As a result, 
it will be interesting to ascertain how policies compare or differ in these countries.  
Conclusion 
Up to now, I have provided an introductory background into immigration law in 
the United States generally, a more thorough background into legislative policy on skilled 
worker immigration, provided a literature review on Congressional behavior, and 
outlined my theory and hypotheses. I have also provided an overview of the methods to 
be used in the forthcoming analysis. In the following four chapters, I will begin the 
analysis of the data collected as set forth here in an attempt to answer my research 
questions. 
The pattern of legislative behavior on the H-1B visa is very neat. The original 
legislation was passed in 1990. From 1998 to 2004, legislation was introduced and passed 
both individually and through the use of riders, and from 2006 to date legislation was 
only introduced individually and each failed. Chapters five through eight will be broken 
down into these various periods of time and will analyze the context in which legislation 
is either successful or unsuccessful and attempt to explain why.   
Chapters five and six will illustrate how the more traditional models of 
congressional behavior can be used to explain legislative behavior on the H-1B visa and 
why legislation either was or was not successful. Chapter five will examine the 
Immigration Act of 1990, the original piece of legislation that created the H-1B skilled 
worker visa within the context of pivotal politics. Chapter six will look at the legislation 
that was passed individually between 1998 and 2004 through party models. Chapters 
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seven and eight will delve into the lesser known and more niche models of congressional 
models. Chapter seven will explain how the institutional nature of Congress has changed 
and how this changed affected the success and failure of legislation in the context of 
unorthodox practices. Chapter eight will use congressional stalemate theory to explain the 
failure of all H-1B related legislation post-2004. Finally, chapter nine will compare the 
U.S. phenomenon to that of Canada and Australia.  
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CHAPTER 5 
PIVOTAL POLITICS 
 Thus far, I have examined both the history of immigration policy generally as 
well as the history of the H-1B visa and the politics surrounding it. As we have seen, 
support for the H-1B program has steadily waned in Congress over time. In this and the 
next three chapters, I will look at why this shift in support occurred and argue that no one 
model of congressional behavior adequately describes legislative behavior relevant to this 
issue. Rather, I will show that over time, a variety of congressional models must be used 
to explain congressional behavior on the H-1B visa. Each captures different strategies 
that are shaped by changes in the broader political environment and the internal dynamics 
of Congress.  
 As I showed in chapter two, immigration policy generally has not changed much 
since the Immigration Act of 1990 and neither has policy on skilled worker immigration. 
The current immigration system still closely resembles the 1952 Immigration and 
Nationality Act. After 1952, major legislative changes to immigration policy were limited 
to the Acts of 1965, 1986, and again in 1990. With regard to the H-1B, today it still 
remains nearly identical to the 1990 program with the exception of some additional 
government filing fees and some cap exemptions. As such, post 1990 there are just a few 
minor tweaks to the initially created H-1B as the scope of this legislation slowly 
decreases over time, but no major legislation on either the H-1B/skilled labor specifically 
or on immigration policy generally is successful.  
 Although the current nonimmigrant skilled visa policy has not changed, the 
politics in Congress have changed over time. Party polarization has increased over time, 
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making it more difficult for members to realize their individual and/or constituents’ goals 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Nivola and Brady 2006; 2008).  Additionally, 
since immigration reform has been rendered impossible since 1986, members of the 
Democratic Party are increasingly more willing to sacrifice other types of immigration 
reform (including not only comprehensive reform but also the Dream Act) in an attempt 
(albeit failed) to get total comprehensive immigration reform (more on this in chapter 
eight).  
 I begin this analysis with the assumption that both parties have an incentive to 
pass positive legislation on foreign skilled workers, specifically the H-1B visa. 
Traditionally, the cost of immigration has divided elites along party lines (Gimpel and 
Edwards 1999). Because Democrats were the New Deal party and favored civil rights 
legislation and first generation immigrants were working class individuals who lived in 
Northern urban areas, they easily identified with the Democratic Party
47
, making them a 
significant constituency base for the Party. In the 1950s and 1960s, conservative 
Republicans and Southern Democrats began to voice opposition to immigration based on 
Cold War fears. Additionally, the 1965 Act resulted in an inflow of Hispanic and Asian 
immigrants, resulting in an expansion of the welfare state that Republicans had opposed 
since the New Deal. This led to clear cleavages over time on partisan attitudes towards 
immigration.  
 As mentioned, traditionally, Democrats have generally been pro-immigration 
while Republicans, on the other hand, have tended to oppose positive immigration related 
legislation. Instead, they tend to favor tighter borders and increased enforcement 
                                               
47 The exception here being Southern Democrats who operated in a region without much immigration, and 
did not support broad immigration policy like their Northern counterparts.  
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measures. Again, however, the subject matter of the legislation makes a difference in the 
traditional partisan cleavage on immigration. Republicans, have historically been the 
party of business (Huntington 1950; Miller and Schofield 2008). Many are donor 
beneficiaries of larger corporations who coincidentally are in great need of foreign skilled 
workers. As a result, while Republicans tend to oppose general immigration policy, 
supporting measures that make hiring foreign skilled workers easier is consistent with 
their party platform.  
 Table 5.1 below outlines the various years in which H-1B legislation was 
introduced, the partisan makeup of both chambers as well as the president and his party, 
whether legislation passed, and which congressional paradigm best explains the political 
phenomenon occurring during that particular congressional term. Additionally, the table 
includes Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE polarization measure which estimates the 
distance between the two parties in each chamber for each year. This measure will be 
described in greater detail later in this chapter and in the following three chapters. 
Remember that the greater the score, the greater the amount of polarization within a 
chamber in a given year. The following analysis will delve deeper into each of the H-1B 
pieces of legislation in order to better explain the context in which legislation is able to 
pass as well as when it fails.  
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Table 5.1 Internal Factors in the Years H-1B Legislation is Introduced  
 
               Control     Polarization* 
Year Type Pass? S H Pres Paradigm S H 
1990 
Immig-
ration Y D-55 D-260 Bush (R)  
Pivotal 
Politics 0.622 0.645 
1997 
Stand 
Alone N R-55 R-228 
Clinton 
(D) 
Party 
Models 0.755 0.857 
1998 Rider Y R-55 R-228 
Clinton 
(D) 
Unorthodo
x Politics 0.755 0.857 
1998 
Stand 
Alone N R-55 R-228 
Clinton 
(D) 
Party 
Models 0.755 0.857 
1999 
Stand 
Alone N R-55 R-223 
Clinton 
(D) 
Party 
Models 0.734 0.878 
2000 
Stand 
Alone N R-55 R-223 
Clinton 
(D) 
Party 
Models 0.734 0.878 
2000 
Stand 
Alone Y R-55 R-223 
Clinton 
(D) 
Party 
Models 0.734 0.878 
2001 
Stand 
Alone N 
D-
51** R-221 Bush (R)  
Party 
Models 0.745 0.91 
2002 Rider Y D-51 R-221 Bush (R)  
Unorthodo
x Politics 0.745 0.91 
2004 Rider Y R-51 R-299 Bush (R)  
Unorthodo
x Politics 0.731 0.938 
2004 
Stand 
Alone Y R-51 R-299 Bush (R)  
Party 
Models 0.731 0.938 
2006 
Stand 
Alone N R-55 R-232 Bush (R)  
Bargaining 
Failure 0.776 0.972 
2007 
Stand 
Alone N D-51 D-233 Bush (R)  
Bargaining 
Failure 0.787 0.982 
2008 
Stand 
Alone N D-55 D-233 Bush (R)  
Bargaining 
Failure 0.787 0.982 
         * Source: Poole and Rosenthal, Polarization America, www.voteview.com 
 **The Senate was split in half until May 24, 2001 when James Jeffords (R-VT) became 
an independent and subsequently switched to the Democratic Party effective June 6, 
2001, giving the Democrats a slight majority.  
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The Immigration Act of 1990  
As mentioned, the H-1B visa as it exists today was created by the Immigration 
Act of 1990. The prior H-1B visa category was reserved for applicants with distinguished 
merit and/or ability. Prior to the 1990 Act, there was no nonimmigrant visa category 
available for skilled workers. By 1990, the information technology (IT) industry was 
emerging, shortages in the healthcare fields began to emerge for the first time, and 
Congress was suddenly faced with a new lobby in support of some type of visa to 
accommodate these shortages with qualified foreign workers. The Act redefined the H-
1B as a category for “specialty occupation” workers, and defined them as those with a 
minimum of a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent in work experience. As such, the 
evaluation of the H-1B visa and legislation on the H-1B visa in this study will begin in 
1990 and continue to the present.  
 As indicated in Table 5.1, the 1990 Immigration Act was passed in a Democratic 
controlled Senate and House with a Republican president, one of the types of divided 
government. There has been a debate in the literature over whether divided government 
causes gridlock. The widespread claim within the literature and the media has been that 
divided government is the main cause for gridlock (Cutler 1989). Mayhew (1991), 
however, argued there was not much difference between divided or unified control when 
it came to gridlock. These theories of divided and unified government were tested again 
in 1992 when Clinton was elected president and the Democrats maintained their 
majorities in both chambers yet gridlock still occurred (Krehbiel 1996).  
 As a result, Krehbiel (1998) examined gridlock in the context of institutional 
variables rather than partisan makeup. According to Krehbiel’s (1998) pivot politics 
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theory, gridlock occurs for a variety of reasons, including moderate status quo policies, 
supermajority procedures such as cloture and the presidential veto, heterogeneous 
preferences, and partisanship. Because some of these institutional tactics such as cloture 
and the presidential veto require moderate members to overcome gridlock, in order for 
policy change to occur, both moderate policy proposals and moderate members are 
needed. As a result, policy change is incremental and passed only through the use of 
supermajorities. Obviously this is a Senate focused study and discounts any lawmaking in 
the House. Regardless, because passage is required in both chambers, Krehbiel’s game 
theoretic model is necessary in explaining how legislation passes in the Senate and why it 
often fails.  
 The cloture rule is one of the more recent institutional changes that distinguishes 
policymaking in the Senate from the House. Prior to Rule 22, any member within the 
Senate could file a motion for extended debate, or filibuster. Since the Senate’s adoption 
of Rule 22 in 1917, the filibuster can be terminated and the motion at hand brought to a 
vote through the use of cloture. To invoke cloture, a senator must file a cloture petition 
while a filibuster motion is pending, which requires the signatures of 16 other senators. 
Then, a cloture vote will be brought before the full Senate within two days. To be 
invoked, it requires a supermajority
48
, or 3/5 of the Senate. Once cloture is invoked, the 
original pending motion will be brought to a vote after the time stipulated in the cloture 
motion.  
 Krehbiel argues that because 60 members are required to invoke cloture, 60 
members are needed in a coalition to enact legislation. Using Mayhew’s (1991) dataset of 
                                               
48 Since 1975, three-fifths of membership is required to invoke cloture. Cloture from 1917 to 1975 required 
only two-thirds of those present and voting. 
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major successful legislation, Krehbiel found that between 1947 and 1994, the average 
coalition size was 81.9 percent.  
 In Krehbiel’s game theoretic model, the pivot is an exogenous institutional 
element. A player/member is pivotal when his support is necessary for the passage of 
legislation. Pre-cloture, the pivot was the median voter or the veto pivot (the member 
needed to pass legislation or override a presidential veto, respectively). Post-cloture, the 
filibuster pivot determines the outcome of legislation because without the support of the 
filibuster pivot (the 60 percent member), cloture cannot be invoked, and without cloture, 
a final vote on the legislation cannot occur. Therefore because cloture requires 60 percent 
of the voting membership, the filibuster pivot is the 60
th
 percentile.  
 The effect of cloture is that while the original motion may require only a simple 
majority, in order to overcome filibuster in the Senate a supermajority is necessary. Pre-
cloture the pivotal player was the medial voter. Post-cloture, however, the pivotal player 
moves either left or right (left if the majority is liberal and right is the majority is 
conservative) and is the filibuster pivot rather than the median voter. The cloture vote is 
largely important because it has been argued that the cloture vote amounted to a vote on 
the actual legislation on which cloture was being sought, rather than a procedural vote on 
the length of debate (Binder and Smith 1997). Within the context of pivotal politics, 
when cloture makes it more difficult for senators to change unattractive policies relative 
to alternative policies, they “lash out” against the filibuster (Krehbiel 1998: 96).   
 Additionally, Sinclair (2006: 190-191) has shown that as the frequency of 
filibusters and cloture votes has increased, so too has polarization. The increase in 
filibusters and cloture votes begins in the 1970s and continues throughout the 2002. 
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Similarly, polarization began in the mid-1970s and polarization along partisan and 
ideological lines increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s.   
 If, however, there are enough moderates to refuse cloture, then these moderates 
have the power to water down the proposal and move it towards their side of the policy 
space. Using a specific example, if there are enough Republicans in the Senate to refuse 
to invoke cloture, then Democrats will need to move their policy more towards the right 
to create a more moderate policy that Republicans will prefer over the status quo or 
Democrats will need to fear gridlock (which would also occur in the absence of 
moderates). Figure 5.1 provides this spatial diagram. 
 
Figure 5.1 Pivotal Politics Spatial Model 
   3/5   1/2   
  q  b*     …b’’’       b”  b’   b 
 
Liberal   f     m     Conservative 
 
Source: Adapted from Krehbiel (1998) 
 
In Figure 5.1, Congress is majority conservative, f denotes the filibuster pivot and 
m denotes the median voter. The filibuster pivot is the legislator whose ideal legislative 
point and all points to his left make up exactly or just more than 3/5 of the legislature. 
Therefore, in order for legislation to pass (b*), conservatives will need to dilute the 
legislation (b) to the point where f (and the 59 members to his right) prefers the 
legislation over the status quo and the legislation is still right of the status quo.  
Turning back to the legislation at hand, the Immigration Act of 1990 was 
introduced by Senate Democratic veteran and Chair of the Senate Committee on Labor 
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and Human Resource, Edward “Ted” Kennedy as Senate Bill 358 in February 1989. The 
Act was a bipartisan effort cosponsored by Democratic Senators Christopher Dodd of 
Connecticut and Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, and Republican Senators 
Alfonse D’Amato of New York and Alan Simpson of Wyoming.  
 It made a number of changes to the immigration system and arguably is the 
closest Congress has come to comprehensive immigration reform since 1986. The Act set 
permanent annual worldwide limits on immigration in the family based, employment 
based, and diversity immigration categories beginning in 1995. It also set a ceiling per 
country in each immigrant category, excepting spouses and minor children. It delineated 
categories within the family based and employment based categories, with annual 
numerical caps of each category. It also made changes to a variety of nonimmigrant visa 
categories including the H, created the diversity visa program, and the O, P, Q, and R 
visas
49
. It created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program, a new system and 
requirements for naturalization, as well as added additional enforcement provisions.  
With a measure such as the Immigration Act of 1990, the expectation is that the 
status quo was slightly liberal, much like the spatial model in Figure 5.1. With 
Democratic control of both chambers and a Republican President, in order for legislation 
to pass, the legislation (b) would have to be diluted until f (and the 59 members to his 
right) prefers the legislation over the status quo and the legislation is still right of the 
status quo.  
                                               
49 The H visa, as we know, if a temporary worker and trainee visa. The O visa is available to aliens with 
extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. The P is available for athletes or 
entertainers for a specific performance, for a reciprocal exchange program, or a culturally unique program. 
The Q is available for international cultural exchange programs and the R is for aliens in religious 
occupations.  
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The legislation as explained above was sufficiently liberal while still maintaining 
some conservative aspects, such as the H-1B provisions. The bill was introduced by a 
Democrat and co-sponsored by two Democrats and two Republicans. Thus far we have a 
bipartisan effort.  
It was passed in the Senate by a supermajority of 89 to 8 and in the House by 264 
to 118. With an 89 vote in the Senate, the bill clearly overcame the required 60 votes in 
order to overcome cloture. Of the 89 yea votes in the Senate, 51 were Democrats and 38 
were Republicans. Nay votes in the Senate came largely from conservative Republicans, 
including Jesse Helms (R-NC), Trent Lott (R-MS), Bill Roth (R-DE),  Warren Rudman 
(R-NH), William Armstrong (R-CO), as well as three Democrats including Dale 
Bumpers (D-AR), Robert Byrd (D-WV), and Jim Exon (D-NE). In the House, the 264 
yea votes were comprised of 171 Democrats and 93 Republicans and the 118 nay votes 
were comprised of 64 Republicans and 54 Democrats. In sum, the 1990 Act was a clear 
bipartisan effort. While Kennedy did not have 60 Democratic Senators, there were greater 
numbers of moderate Republicans (as we will see below). As a result, with 89 yea votes 
Senator Kennedy clearly had true bipartisan support and well above the 60 votes needed 
for cloture.  
 Because polarization has been increasing in both chambers since the 1970s (see 
Figure 5.2 below), gridlock has been more rampant and bipartisan legislation has been 
steadily decreasing (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Figure 5.2 shows Poole and 
Rosenthal’s illustration of party polarization from 1879 to 2011. The graph provides their 
data estimates for the distance for each individual member in each chamber in each year 
which they use to estimate the distance between the two parties in each chamber for each 
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year. Looking at roll call voting over time, they show that polarization declined in both 
the House and Senate beginning in the early 1890s until the Second World War and then 
steadily began to increase beginning in the 1970s.  
 Looking at Poole and Rosenthal’s party polarization data (Figure 5.2), it is evident 
that beginning in about 1969, party polarization has steadily increased and the distance 
between the parties has steadily increased since the mid 1990s. In the 1990s particularly 
in the House, we see a significant spike in polarization. Sinclair (2006) attributes this 
spike to Gingrich’s Republican Revolution in 1994. During this period there only one 
major, albeit slight, decrease in the mid 2000s when Republicans regained control in 
2004. Over time, however, they argue (as is evident from the Figure) that the median 
member has slowly diminished and as a result it has become much more difficult for 
legislation to pass. These dates are extremely consistent with the dates on H-1B 
legislation where legislation was successful through 1990, and after that both the scope 
and number of successful legislation began to decrease (as polarization was increasing) 
until eventually no legislation was successful.  
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 Source: Poole and Rosenthal, Polarization America, www.voteview.com 
 
Conclusion  
 With the Immigration Act of 1990, both chambers exhibited complete bipartisan 
passage, a phenomenon that according to Krehbiel requires a pivotal actor or moderates.  
As we will see in future chapters, however, this increase in party polarization will result 
in the failure of H-1B related legislation.  
 If we could have stopped time in 1990, this analysis would have been for naught 
as legislation could have continued in a similar fashion. The way in which the 
Immigration Act of 1990 passed was in a completely textbook example and illustrated 
bicameralism in its purest form. Since then, increased polarization of parties has led to 
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new groups entering the political arena and tilting the balance of power in several key 
states.  
 After 1990, the 1994 midterm election resulted in a Republican takeover of 
Congress and the net gain of 54 seats in the House and eight seats in the Senate for 
Republicans. The takeover gave the Republican Party their first majority in the House in 
over forty years. In the subsequent 1996, 1998, and 2000 elections, Republicans 
maintained control of the House and Senate. It was not until 2006 when Democrats 
regained control of the House and Senate
50
.  
 Additionally, the realignment along ideological lines that occurred, with median 
members being replaced by ideologues who positioned themselves at either ideological 
pole also significantly changed the manner in which legislation passed (Sinclair 2006; 
Theriault 2003; McDonald and Grofman 1999; Sinclair 1982). As we will see in chapters 
six, seven, and eight, this new balance of power changed the way in which legislation on 
the H-1B visa was passed in Congress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
50 For a brief period in 2001, Republicans held a majority when James Jeffords (R-VT) became an 
independent on May 24, 2001, splitting the Senate in half with neither party holding a majority until 
Jeffords subsequently switched to the Democratic Party effective June 6, 2001, giving the Democrats a 
slight majority. 
90 
 
CHAPTER 6  
PARTY MATTERS 
 In the last chapter, I outlined how Krehbiel’s (1998) pivotal politics model 
explained the success of the original 1990 bill that created the H-1B visa as it exists 
today. As we have seen, however, the relative success enjoyed by the pro-immigration 
camp was short lived. After a series of successful immigration policies throughout the 
larger part of the twentieth century, this all came to a halt after 1990.  
 After 1990, there were a total of 34 pieces of positive H-1B legislation introduced 
in both chambers between 1998 and 2004. Of these, seven pieces of legislation passed 
that were designed to increase the annual cap, increase a government filing fee, or create 
a cap exemption. Of these seven bills, three were attached as riders to larger pieces of 
omnibus or appropriations legislation. The remaining four either were stand-alone pieces 
of legislation or attached to a larger immigration bill and made relatively trivial changes 
to the H-1B program. These bills will be examined in turn below and as will be shown, 
we are not just concerned with the number of bills that were passed, but also the scope of 
the legislation. By definition, the party bills have a much smaller scope, as will be shown 
below. The only substantive pieces of successful legislation were those that were only 
able to pass through the use of riders. Those will be discussed in chapter seven. 
Recent literature has indicated that parties have become increasingly important in 
sorting ideologies and providing cues for legislators (Cox and McCubbins 2007; Rohde 
1991). This has been particularly enhanced by party polarization since the 1970s. 
Additionally, parties provide individual voters with cues that help legislators in their 
reelection goals. Over time, the role of parties has become more important and parties 
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serve an even greater role in agenda setting and organizing committees (Kingdon 1984; 
Cox and McCubbins 2005; 2007). Essentially, this literature has found an inverse 
relationship between parties and committees.  The limitation here, as mentioned before in 
chapter three, is that these studies focus on politics within the House only. As legislation 
must make it through both chambers in identical form in order to pass, a model 
explaining legislative behavior for both chambers is necessary, particularly considering 
recent cloture changes in the Senate as discussed in the previous chapter.  
 Additionally, institutions are framed in the literature largely in terms of party 
politics. Specifically, when member preferences are homogenous within the party, party 
leaders will support the legislation. Rohde (1991) argues that a series of House reforms 
by liberal Democrats in the 1970s allowed party leaders to push legislation through that a 
majority of House Democrats supported. Essentially, his argument is that party leadership 
in the House is strongest with the presence of three factors: (1) homogenous party 
membership; (2) institutional leverage; and (3) a strong leader.  
 Following in the tradition of Rohde (1991), Cox and McCubbins (2005; 2007) 
provide the seminal work on institutions through their work studying the House. They 
argue that lawmaking in the House is predicated by collective efforts that are difficult due 
to individual member and constituent policy goals. As a result, parties organize the House 
in order to solve these collective action problems on the part of individual members. 
Essentially, parties act as market cartels, organizing individual members in an attempt to 
create collective benefits for the party as a whole. Additionally, the majority party has the 
ability to control the policy agenda, allowing a greater likelihood of bill passage for the 
policy goals of individual members and/or their constituencies.  
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 While parties were able to solve some collective action problems, another 
problem began to take shape within Congress. Over time, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 
(2006) argue that since the 1970s, politics have become more divisive largely due to 
income inequality. As a result, individual members have become increasingly more 
liberal or conservative within their respective parties, a phenomenon referred to as 
polarization. With the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, members began 
polarizing within their parties to a greater degree. Because of this polarization, we see 
some trepidation within the Republican camp as members have become much more 
conservative and less supportive of general immigration measures. This trepidation, 
however, has been countered with a constituent base of big business that needs H-1Bs in 
order to successful run their businesses. As such, as Republicans have congressional 
control during this period the party is able to get some legislation passed.  
 Across the board, however, their efforts are minor as two of the three successful 
pieces of legislation during this period are relatively trivial. That third piece of legislation 
(S.2045) was, of all of the passed legislation, the most significant piece of H-1B 
legislation yet still minor when considering it did nothing to meet an ever increasing 
demand for more cap numbers.  
 For the past 35 years or so, the parties have as McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 
(2006: 1) claim, “deserted the center of the floor in favor of the wings”. Analyzing 
individual roll call voting patterns of members in the House and Senate, they found that 
the median legislative position of each party has diverged sharply since the mid 1970s 
(Poole and Rosenthal 1984; McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Said differently, they 
showed that that in both chambers Republicans and Democrats have become either more 
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conservative or more liberal and moderates have slowly begun to vanish since in the 
1970s. Additionally, they showed that while members are becoming more partisan, the 
parties themselves are becoming more homogenous.  
 Therefore, the theoretical expectation here is that the parties should organize 
individual members in order to realize individual and party goals through legislation. 
However, as members have increasingly clustered around either the conservative or 
liberal poles and our moderates have slowly been replaced by ideologues (Mann and 
Ornstein 2012) and as both the numbers of filibusters and cloture votes have increased 
(Sinclair 2006) in concert with polarization, this polarization over time has resulted in the 
death of the pivot. As a result, rather than having a continuum of members across the 
board from left to right (liberal to conservative) we now have clusters of conservatives 
and liberals with very few moderates to temper legislation and bring the two poles 
together. Therefore, bills that are successful are party driven bills.  
 We can particularly see this phenomenon occurring with our H-1B legislation. 
After 1990, the legislation that passed on its own was relatively minor and few and far 
between. As we will see, the scope of legislation begins to decrease over time, and the 
success of these bills is predicated on party support.  
 It is worth noting here that typically, roll call votes are necessary in order to prove 
that legislation is predicated on party based support. Because I do not have roll call votes 
on this legislation, proving party based support is extremely difficult. As a result, I am 
forced to use the only data available to me, which is sponsorship and co-sponsorship of 
legislation, as well as relying on the above listed literature which indicates that legislation 
was predominately passed through party based support during my timeframe. The 
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following section will examine this legislation within the context of party politics and 
polarization.  
Successful Legislation 
H.R.5362 
 H.R.5362 was a small two section bill passed in 2000 that that simply 
reauthorized
51
 and increased the $500 filing fee established to fund training and education 
programs by the National Science Foundation and the Department of Labor to $1000 and 
created an exemption of that fee for nonprofit primary and secondary educational 
institutions. It was sponsored by David Dreier (R-CA), and cosponsored by John 
Moakley (D- MA). In 2000, Republicans controlled the Senate with 55 members and the 
House with 223 members. It was passed through unanimous consent in both chambers 
and as such, we do not have actual roll call votes to ascertain votes along partisan lines. 
Since Republicans had control of both chambers, the bill did very little to change the 
program and was sponsored by a Republican member, it could reasonably be asserted that 
voting along party lines likely occurred.  
S.2045 
 Called AC-21 and also passed in 2000, S.2045 increased the H-1B cap to 195,000 
for fiscal years 2001 to 2003. It created exemptions from the annual cap for institutions of 
higher education as defined by section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
U.S.C. 1001(a)), nonprofit entities related to or affiliated with a nonprofit educational 
entity as defined by section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1001(a)), and nonprofit or governmental research organizations as defined by 8 CFR 
                                               
51 The training fee of $500 was originally passed in the ACWIA in 1998 as was set to sunset October 1, 
2001.  
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214(h)(19)(iii)(C). It allowed employees to change employers upon the filing of a change 
of employer application while the application is pending for a period of up to 240 days. 
This change was significant in that it allowed a subsequent employer to begin employing 
the foreign national upon just the filing of the application for a period of up to 240 days, 
rather than having to wait several months for an approval
52
. Additionally, it created 
extensions beyond the six years of eligibility initially allocated in the 1990 Act for 
applicants who have filed an immigrant visa application but do not have a visa number 
available to become permanent residents.  
 The bill also included a provision on crime provisions and computer education for 
kids. It was sponsored by Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) and designed to ensure proper 
training of American workers in order to both increase diversity in the high tech industry 
and lessen the need for foreign workers. 
 To illustrate the importance of AC-21, let us use our friend Dr. Singh from 
chapter two as an example. As a reminder, Dr. Singh is a cardiovascular surgeon and 
researcher from India who obtained an employment agreement with a private physician’s 
group. Let’s call this group the XYZ Group. XYZ files an H-1B application on behalf of 
Dr. Singh for the initial 3 year period and the application is approved. Dr. Singh works 
for XYZ for two years and is approached by the ABC Group who is desperate for a 
cardiovascular surgeon of Dr. Singh’s caliber and they offer to pay him an extra $100,000 
in salary. Dr. Singh signs a new employment agreement with ABC Group who promptly 
files a change of employer H-1B application with USCIS. Once the application is 
receipted into the system by USCIS, Dr. Singh is free to change employers and begin 
                                               
52 A request for premium processing of an H-1B application is typically available. It requires a government 
filing fee of an additional $1000 for a response within 15 calendar days. AC-21 saves employers that fee as 
well.  
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work with ABC for a period of up to 240 days while the application is pending. This 
saves both ABC and Dr. Singh several months of having to wait on an approval and the 
possibility of early termination by XYZ if he provides notice too soon which would 
require him to leave the U.S. and consular process the H-1B visa which could result in 
another several months of having to wait on security checks once his H-1B is approved
53
.  
 Now let us pretend that Dr. Singh works for ABC for an additional two years and 
he decides he likes the company and would like to stay there for the foreseeable future. 
He asks the CEO if they would consider sponsoring a green card application for him. 
ABC really likes Dr. Singh and would like to keep him for the foreseeable future as well 
so the CEO decides they will sponsor Dr. Singh’s green card application. The CEO 
contacts an immigration attorney and begins the process. The attorney files the labor 
certification application before the end of his fifth year on H-1B and it takes about 
another year and a half before the applications are approved. Because Dr. Singh is from 
India, however, there is a backlog on green card availability (see chapter two for an 
explanation of visa numbers) so he is not eligible for a green card until the numbers 
become current. At this point, Dr. Singh has already been on his H-1B for five and a half 
years out of the statutorily allowed six years.  
 Thanks to AC-21, because Dr. Singh has filed an immigrant visa application but 
does not have a visa number available to him, he is eligible for an extension beyond the 
                                               
53 For applicants outside of the United States, the employer still files the H-1B application with USCIS. 
Once the application is approved, the foreign national must actually obtain a visa from a U.S. consulate 
abroad before they can enter the U.S. Waiting times for visas and countries vary, but the H-1B carries with 
it a lengthy FBI security check which will certainly delay Dr. Singh’s process even longer.  
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six year period. As such, ABC can continue filing three year extensions on behalf of Dr. 
Singh until his visa number becomes current, which can take up to five to ten years
54
.  
 AC-21 was introduced by Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and cosponsored by 24 Senators: 
Spencer Abraham (R-MI), John Ashcroft (R-MO), Robert Bennett (R-UT), Sam 
Brownback (R-KS), Jim Bunning (R-KY), Paul Coverdell (R-GA), Mike DeWine (R-
OH), John Edwards (R-NC), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Slade Gorton (R-WA), Bob 
Graham (D-FL), Phil Gramm (R-TX), Rod Grams (R-MN), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), Jesse 
Helms (R-NC), Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Trent Lott (R-MS), Connie Mack (R-FL), 
Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Don Nickles (R-OK), Gordon Smith (R-OR), Arlen Specter 
(R-PA), George Voinovich (R-OH), John Warner (R-VA). We have clear partisan 
support here as 21 of the 24 Senators represented the Republican Party. Additionally, 
AC-21 passed with near unanimity. In the Senate it passed 96-1 with 54 Republicans and 
42 Democrats voting yay and Ernest Hollings (D-SC) casting the sole nay vote, and 
passed by voice vote in the House. The level of bipartisan support for this legislation at 
least in the Senate in 2000 is staggering. Unfortunately, we cannot gauge the level of 
support in the House for this legislation as it passed with a voice vote.  
 Based on prior partisan support, the expectation is that when Republicans sponsor 
an immigration bill, we can expect that Democrats will support is as well. However, 
when the Democrats sponsor a bill, there is a greater expectation that party voting will 
occur simply due to the subject matter of the bill. The more liberal the provisions are, the 
less likely it is that Republicans will sign on. With increased polarization and fewer 
                                               
54 It could take less or more time, depending on the number of applicants in any given year as well as prior 
years.  
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median members, polarized members are more likely to vote along party lines as median 
members are not available to temper the legislation.  
H.R.3767 
 Part of an immigration related bill, H.R.3767 made an extremely minor change to 
the H-1B program. This provision of the bill allowed employers engaging in corporate 
restructuring to have an exemption from having to refile an H-1B application. Remember 
that the H-1B is employer specific so whenever an employer changes, a new application 
must be filed with USCIS. This provision allows companies that are simply engaging in 
corporate shuffling to maintain the same H-1B approval without having to pay the several 
thousands of dollars in government filing fees and legal fees.  
 H.R.3767 was sponsored by Lamar Smith (R-TX) and cosponsored by twelve 
Representatives: Ken Bentsen (D-TX), Shelley Berkley (D-NV), Charles Canady (R-FL), 
Barney Frank (D-MA), Elton Gallegly (R-CA), Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), Sheila Jackson-
Lee (D-TX), William Jefferson (D-LA), Matthew Martinez (D-CA), Bill McCollum (R-
FL), Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), and Joe Scarborough (R-FL). Again it passed by 
unanimous consent in the Senate and by Voice Vote in the House, although we can 
ascertain that among the cosponsors were seven Democrats and five Republicans.  
S.2302 
 Finally, the last piece of successful H-1B legislation was a short, one section bill 
that simply created an exemption from the annual cap for physicians with an approved J-
1 waiver who agree to work and obtain a sponsoring employer in a federally designated 
medical shortage area by the Department of Health and Human Services through the 
Conrad 30 program.  
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 Remember from the plight of our friend Dr. Singh in chapter two that there are 
two visas available for foreign medical graduates to complete a residency/fellowship 
training program in the United States: the J-1, which requires a two year home residency 
requirement upon completion, or the H-1B which requires that the applicant have 
completed all three steps of the USMLE exam. Like nearly half of all foreign medical 
graduates, Dr. Singh had not completed step 3 of USMLE, and had to complete his 
program on the J-1 visa. The J-1 visa carries with it a two year home residency 
requirement for foreign medical graduates who complete a residency/fellowship.  
 The original Conrad 20 program (now termed the Conrad 30 program) was 
created by Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) and passed as an amendment to the Immigration 
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994. It gave each of the 50 states 20 (the 
number has subsequently been increased to 30) waivers of this home residency 
requirement to grant to physicians who agree to work and receive approval to work in a 
facility located in a medical shortage area as designated by the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services for a period of three years. The waiver does not provide 
any legal status. Upon approval of the waiver, Dr. Singh had to apply for an H-1B visa to 
actually give him legal status to stay and work.  
 The bill was introduced (as would be expected) by Kent Conrad and cosponsored 
by Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), Sam Brownback (R-KS), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Thad 
Cochran (R-MS), Mike DeWine (R-OH), John Ensign (R-NV), Russell Feingold (D-WI), 
Chuck Hagel (R-NE), James Jeffords (I-VT), Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Herb Kohl (D-
WI), Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), Patty Murray (D-WA), Benjamin Nelson (D-NE), and 
Charles Schumer (D-NY). The bill was cosponsored by nine Democrats, four 
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Republicans, and one Independent. It passed by unanimous consent in the Senate and by 
a staggering 407 to 4 in the House. While there is bipartisan support, the scope of the 
legislation here is obviously much smaller than prior legislation and other attempted 
legislation that fails.  
 Additionally, this really is an extension of already existing legislation that 
requires a J-1 physician to complete three years of service in a medical shortage area on 
an H-1B visa. Congress has already authorized the H-1B for these foreign nationals yet 
the annual cap could, and in practice, was limiting their ability to do so. As such, S.2302 
simply granted these physicians a waiver from the cap in order to provide the medical 
services Congress had already authorized them to do at a time when median members 
still existed.  
 With each of these successful bills, we have Republican control of both chambers. 
With AC-21, we have individual roll call votes in the Senate that indicate that all voting 
Republicans in the Senate voted yay. While we do not have individual roll call votes for 
any of the remaining bills to ascertain voting along party lines, I expect that when 
Republican support is high, Democratic support will also be high due to traditional and 
historical support on immigration legislation. When, however, Democratic support is 
high, party voting is much more likely. Therefore, we can reasonably assume based on 
the levels of increased polarization and realignment that these are party driven bills.  
Failed Legislation 
 My hypothesis is that as polarization increases, H-1B legislation is more likely to 
fail. After 1990, a total of 34 bills are introduced and only 7 passed. Through 2004, a 
number of the provisions in these failed bills were included in the legislation that did 
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pass, although as we will see below, it becomes harder and harder for legislation to pass 
over time until eventually legislation is not able to pass at all (see chapter eight).   
 Following the creation of the H-1B visa program, the H-1B cap was not hit until 
1997. Thus, beginning in 1997 and through the last piece of successful legislation in 
2004, 13 additional pieces of legislation were also introduced dealing with the H-1B visa 
and all failed (see Table 6.1 below). These were all introduced as stand-alone pieces of 
legislation. However, most of the provisions included in this legislation were eventually 
passed through riders (see chapter seven) or passed individually.  
  Table 6.1 below indicates the unsuccessful legislation that was introduced in 
either chamber between the period of 1997 and 2001. As the table indicates, 13 pieces of 
legislation were introduced during the period of time when the parties were able to get 
some legislation was passed, either individually or through the use of alternative 
methods.  
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 Table 6.1 Timeline of Unsuccessful H-1B Legislation (Pre-CIR) 
    Year Legislation Key Provisions Bill Sponsor 
1997 H.R.3736 Increase cap Lamar Smith (R-TX) 
1998 S.1723 Increase cap/enforcement Spencer Abraham (R-MI) 
1999 H.R.2698 Increase cap/exemption David Dreier (R-CA) 
1999 H.R.3508 New cap for high skilled David Wu (D-OR) 
1999 S.1440 Increase cap/exemption Phil Gramm (R-TX) 
2000 H.R.3814 Increase cap/fee Lamar Smith (R-TX) 
2000 H.R.3983 Increase cap/fee David Dreier (R-CA) 
2000 H.R.4200 Increase cap/fee Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) 
2000 H.R.4227 Increase cap Lamar Smith (R-TX) 
2000 H.R.5625 Cap exemption Christopher Cox (R-CA) 
2001 H.R.2809 Increase cap/exemption Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) 
2001 H.R.2984 Accurate cap computing Robert Andrews (D-NJ) 
2001 S.1342 Increase cap for rural areas Byron Dorgan (D-ND) 
    I + C Sc: Immigration and Claims Subcommittee 
 Tech Sc: Technology Subcommittee 
    Source: THOMAS (Library of Congress) 
  
 In the 105
th
 Congress, two pieces of legislation were introduced. H.R.3736 and 
S.1723 proposed increasing the cap for fiscal years 1998 to 2000 and 2001 respectively, 
as well as changing enforcement and penalties for fraud. These provisions were 
ultimately passed as a rider to an omnibus bill in 1998 and will be discussed in the next 
chapter. In the 106
th
 Congress, seven pieces of legislation were introduced. Of these 
seven, the only provisions not included in the passed legislation included a cap exemption 
for foreign nationals with a Master’s Degree from a U.S. institution (this was ultimately 
passed in 2004), creating a new cap for the highly skilled, reserving 10,000 of the annual 
cap for nonprofit organizations (a variation of this was passed in AC-21 in 2000), and 
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creating a cap exemption for employers who make a scholarship contribution and are 
employing a highly skilled foreign national.  
 Finally, three pieces of legislation were introduced in the 107
th
 Congress in 2001. 
None of these provisions found themselves in passable legislation. H.R.2809 would have 
provided a cap exemption for locally owned hospitals located in federally designated 
shortage areas and similarly S.1342 would have carved out cap numbers for employers 
located in rural areas. H.R.2984 would have changed numerical computation procedures 
in order to make sure computation of the cap numbers was accurate in order to prevent 
any foreign national from being counted twice against the cap.   
Conclusion 
 Polarization has resulted in making the leadership’s jobs easier by providing them 
with more tools to work the party’s agenda, particularly in the House which is where Cox 
and McCubbins focus their attention and research. Additionally, while party polarization 
has increased over time, the scope of legislation has decreased. Through the early part of 
the 2000s, this is how H-1B related legislation was able to pass. Legislation, however, is 
not solely passed through the House. In the Senate, cloture makes it much more difficult 
for the parties to further their agendas. They have to be much more concerned with 
overcoming the 60 vote requisite for invoking cloture, meaning concessions must be 
made or risk losing legislation. The increase of party polarization, however, has made it 
more difficult for the members to succumb to alternative proposals from a competing 
party. This is where Cox and McCubbins’ model fails.  
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 Prior to 1980, the Democratic Party regularly had a majority of over 60 in the 
Senate
55
. Since 1977, however, neither party has been able to have a 60 member majority 
purely based on party. Therefore, in no congressional term between 1997 and 2008, did 
either party have a 60 member majority. So now that the parties cannot get to 60 when a 
bill gets to the Senate, it either dies or gets substantially watered down because a 
mismatch currently exists in the Senate that previously did not. 
 As a result, the stage is set for members to try alternative tactics to try to get their 
goals realized. In this chapter, I examined legislation that was able to pass on its own 
without any additional interference or manipulation on the part of individual members. 
For the most part, this legislation made trivial changes to the H-1B program and the 
scope was small. During this same period, however, not all H-1B legislation was able to 
pass on its own and members were reduced to using some newer and alternative methods 
in order to get their policy goals realized. These alternative methods will be discussed in 
the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
55 The Democratic party had a member majority of over 60 in the 86th through 90th and 94th through 95th 
congressional terms (1961-1968 and 1975-1978).  
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CHAPTER 7  
UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 
 As we know, the scope of H-1B legislation has become smaller and smaller over 
time. Additionally, a number of external and internal changes such as cloture and the 
increase of polarization throughout Congress have resulted in a shift from the relative 
(albeit small) success that members were able to realize throughout the last 1990s and 
early 2000s. While these internal and external changes have occurred, the goals have 
remained intact as members and their constituents still needed positive changes to the H-
1B program, particularly with regard to increased cap numbers. Therefore, because 
members were unsuccessful in getting legislation passed in the traditional manner, they 
needed to find alternative methods in order to get their goals realized.  
 As institutional arrangements have become more constricting for legislators over 
time, Sinclair (2007) argued that Congress no longer follows the textbook process 
described by countless political scientists, historians, and even the media over the past 
several decades. She outlines these changes in policymaking over time by comparing the 
1970 Clean Air Act with the 1990 Clean Air Act. The 1970 Act, for example, was 
introduced in both respective House and Senate committees, and then followed to a vote 
on the floor where it passed. In 1990, however, the bill was introduced in three different 
House committees and then went to the floor where a series of compromises through 
informal processes occurred. In the Senate, the bill was introduced in committee, went to 
the floor where a series of informal compromises occurred, followed by filibuster before 
a vote. Sinclair (2007) argues that the 1970 process is not likely to ever occur again as 
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most bills today are now passed through short cut procedures for small bills and a variety 
of once unorthodox practices and procedures for major legislation.  
 These unorthodox practices and procedures include the increase in usage of larger 
omnibus bills, the use of multiple committees for the same piece of legislation, more 
complex and restrictive rules tailored to deal with problems associated with a particular 
bill in the House, and in the Senate, bills are subject to greater floor amendments (many 
irrelevant to the bill at issue), and filibuster threats and cloture votes are much more 
routine. This is a significant departure from prior literature on the manner in which the 
textbook Congress makes policy.  
 Additionally, Congress is certainly affected by the macro political climate. When 
policies become unattractive, legislators become risk averse to signing on to such 
legislation. Erikson, McKuen, and Stimson (2006), for example, argue that public 
preferences influence congressional policy. However, in the face of negative macro 
factors, there are Sinclairian (2007) opportunities to circumnavigate the traditional 
legislative process and legislators can realize some of their individual or constituent 
policy goals with little public notice through other methods such as riders. In certain 
cases and at certain times, however, some legislation becomes too risky and legislators 
prefer not to have their names attached to certain pieces of legislation.  
 The increased use of riders and other unorthodox practices is a departure from 
traditional policymaking. Traditionally, we expect legislation to pass in a majoritarian 
institution when one party has a majority and the legislation favors that majority’s 
position. Recently, however, members have had to resort to “unorthodox” measures in 
order to get legislation passed in a Congress that has institutional measures in place, such 
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as the filibuster, that just one member can use to easily halt the progress of any piece of 
legislation.  
 As a result, members have become increasingly receptive to using riders to realize 
their policy goals, particularly when polarization has made it more difficult for legislation 
to pass on its own. Riders allow members the ability to pass legislation without 
specifically having to vote on the rider itself. Instead, they are able to return to their 
districts and shy away from the vote on the rider by claiming to have voted on the whole 
bill, or rather the bill that was, for example, a must pass appropriations bill. Specifically, 
while members might have an incentive to reform the H-1B program, they may not want 
to have their names attached to that legislation, particularly if they have a contested seat. 
Because individual votes on riders are not transparent, there is an incentive to shift to this 
mode of passage.  
 During the 1998 to 2004 period, various members were successful in attaching 
legislation as riders to larger bills likely to pass bipartisan muster in both chambers. As 
with the stand-alone legislation, Congress is still driven by various internal and external 
factors limiting their ability to pass any significant changes to the H-1B visa program. As 
a result, the scope of legislation over time remains small. The three bills listed below are 
examples of members attempting to use these unorthodox Sinclarian tactics in an attempt 
to realize their individual and/or constituents’ goals.  
 As a side note, before getting to these bills, it should be noted that there are 
various methodological issues with studying riders. There is not a lot of information on 
riders within the congressional record, and this information is actually difficult to find. 
The congressional record only keeps data on floor amendments during floor debate so it 
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is not possible to ascertain if riders were attempted through another method during 
committee debate. Therefore, with regard to H-1B riders, I could not ascertain whether 
there were any unsuccessful attempts to attach a rider, but only when riders were 
successfully attached to a must pass bill. Additionally, the only information typically 
available on any given rider is the sponsor and any members who speak in favor or 
against the attachment of a rider.  
 As a side note, there are no individual votes on the riders themselves so it is 
impossible to ascertain the level of support for a given rider. Instead, the votes on a piece 
of legislation are votes on the larger bill itself that the rider is attached to. Consequently, 
as I mentioned earlier, this is precisely why members like to use riders. Now that I have 
briefly outlined these methodologically problems, let us turn now to examining the riders 
that were attempted and passed as part of larger, non-immigration related legislation.  
H.R.4328  
In 1998, Congress passed the American Competitiveness and Workforce 
Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA). It increased the annual cap of 65,000 on the number 
of H-1B nonimmigrant visas available per fiscal year that was passed in the Immigration 
Act of 1990 to 115,000 available visas for the fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The cap would 
then decrease to 107,500 in 2001 and revert to the original 65,000 in 2002. 
ACWIA also created a new filing fee of $500 for initial applications to be 
earmarked for job training, low-income scholarships, grants for mathematics, 
engineering, or science enrichment courses. It created provisions to protect U.S. workers 
from layoff and for employers who become H-1B dependent. ACWIA also made changes 
in enforcement and penalties for employers who violate the law.  
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This legislation was important because the 65,000 cap was hit for the first time 
prior to the end of the 1997 fiscal year and in 1998, the cap was hit within the first two 
months, according to a report by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO)
56
. 
As a result, employers were unable to get the skilled workers they needed in order to 
successfully run their businesses. It was passed in an attempt to remedy the shortcomings 
of the immigration system at the time and allow businesses and corporations to hire more 
skilled foreign employees.  
The bill was a compromise amendment bringing together H.R.3736 which was 
introduced by Lamar Smith (R-TX) and S.1723 which was introduced by Spencer 
Abraham (R-MI). Together they proposed increasing the cap for fiscal years 1998 to 
2000 and 2001 respectively, as well as changing enforcement and penalties for fraud. 
Together with House and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairmen Henry Hyde (R-IL) and 
Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Smith and Abraham created a workable compromise between the 
House and Senate bills. These provisions were ultimately passed as a rider to the 
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998.  
H.R.2215 
 Attached as a rider to the 21
st
 Century Department of Justice Appropriations 
Authorization Act, H.R.2215 established the prevailing wage requirement for employers. 
The prevailing wage is the average wage paid to United States citizens in a particular 
county for any particular occupation and is compiled by the United States Department of 
Labor. Employers found violating this requirement can be fined heavily by the 
Department of Labor and may be banned from hiring foreign workers in the future. In 
practice, the Department of Labor has steadily increased their audits of H-1B sponsoring 
                                               
56http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03883.pdf 
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employers since the mid 2000s. The rider also created additional extensions beyond the 
six year period of eligibility for applicants who have begun the green card process and 
filed a labor certification application 365 days prior to the end of their six years of H-1B 
eligibility. 
 Using Dr. Singh again as an example, assume that visa numbers are currently 
available for nationals of India. Remember that Dr. Singh began the immigration visa 
process after his fourth year on H-1B and his labor certification application was filed 
before his fifth year of H-1B eligibility. H.R.2215 would allow the ABC Group to file 
one year extensions for Dr. Singh indefinitely until his green card is approved
57
.  
 This provision was included in the conference report through the work of Senators 
Ted Kennedy (D-MA), the Chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee of the Judiciary 
Committee, and Sam Brownback (R-KS). Additionally, a speech in support of the 
measure (and other immigration measures) by Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) helped 
gain widespread support for approval of the slight modification to previously existing 
law.  
H.R.4818  
After hearing from the American Immigration Lawyers Association, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and Intel 
Corporation to determine the importance of the H-1B visa to the U.S. economy, Ted 
Kennedy, Chair of the Committee on the Judiciary attached the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 
                                               
57 Upon the filing of an adjustment of status (or more commonly termed green card) application, an 
applicant for a green card is granted legal stay and can apply for authorization to travel outside the U.S. and 
work authorization. As a result, many do not maintain a valid underlying nonimmigrant visa. However, it is 
recommended that green card applicants maintain a dual intent nonimmigrant visa during this period in the 
event that the green card is denied. Otherwise, the foreign national will have no legal basis to remain in the 
U.S. and will have to leave immediately upon denial and start the H-1B process anew and obtain a visa at a 
U.S. consulate before being able to reenter the U.S., a process that can take up to a year or longer if the 
applicant is outside of the U.S.  
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2004 as an amendment to the Omnibus Spending Bill passed by the House. The 
significance of H.R. 4818 was that it set forth compliance standards for the H-1B visa, 
reinstituted and increased the previously sunset filing fee for job training and scholarships 
to $1500, created a new $500 Fraud Prevention and Detection fee for initial applications 
filed by employers per foreign worker. This portion of the Act was originally introduced 
in the Senate by Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) and later supported by Senators Frank 
Lautenberg (D-NJ), and Joe Lieberman (D-CT). 
More importantly, however, the Act created a second cap and exemption from the 
annual 65,000 cap for up to 20,000 foreign nationals who have obtained at least a 
Master’s Degree from an educational institution in the United States58.  In effect, this 
cleared 20,000 from the annual cap and raised the cap permanently to 85,000. 
Conclusion 
 In chapter seven, I examined legislation that was able to pass through party 
models without any manipulation on the part of individual models between 1998 and 
2004. For the most part, this legislation made trivial changes to the H-1B program and 
the scope was small. During this same period, however, not all H-1B legislation was able 
to pass on its own and members were reduced to using some newer and alternative 
methods in order to get their policy goals realized.  
This chapter looked at some of these alternative ways that legislators were able to 
get legislation passed that served their constituents’ interests. As was shown, most of the 
provisions of the introduced legislation were able to pass either individually or through 
                                               
58 In the event the Master’s cap is hit first, an applicant with a Master’s Degree from a U.S. institution can 
still apply for an H-1B through the general 65,000 cap.  
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the use of alternative methods such as amendments and additions to the conference report 
(riders) by senior ranking members.  
The increase in polarization is clearly impacting the success of H-1B legislation. 
As I have shown thus far, as polarization increased, it has become more difficult for this 
legislation to pass and as a result, members have been forced to use Sinclairian methods 
in order to get their goals realized.  
The meat of this analysis will be in the next chapter, which will shift gears and 
look at the legislation that failed and attempt to explain why members stopped using 
Sinclarian tactics to get legislation passed and why 2004 marked the end of positive H-1B 
legislation while demand for these visas remained high.  
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CHAPTER 8  
STALEMATE 
 The previous three chapters examined how individual members and coalitions 
within Congress were able to pass positive legislation on the H-1B visa. As we have seen, 
however, after 2004, fourteen pieces of legislation were introduced in either chamber and 
each of these failed. Additionally, for the first time since the creation of the H-1B 
program individual legislators failed to use Sinclairian tactics and not a single piece of 
legislation was attempted as an amendment to a larger piece of non-immigration related 
legislation
59
. This chapter will attempt to explain why. My hypothesis is that a variety of 
changes in macro-level variables resulted in a Congress risk averse to any immigration 
related legislation.  
 After the last piece of positive legislation passed in 2004, there was a two year 
moratorium on H-1B legislation introduced in either chamber. In 2006, legislation picked 
back up again and 14 pieces of legislation were introduced as stand-alone bills between 
2006 and 2008. Interestingly, during this period, not a single bill passed and not a single 
legislator attempted to attach any of these provisions onto a larger must pass omnibus or 
appropriations bill as an amendment during floor debate on those bills. Of these bills, all 
would have either directly increased the annual cap or created a new cap (thus increasing 
the total cap) for the highly skilled foreign nationals. After 2008, another moratorium on 
H-1B legislation begins and until May 2012, not a single piece of positive H-1B related 
legislation has been introduced in either chamber.  
                                               
59 Congress through the Library of Congress (THOMAS) only keeps data on floor amendments during floor 
debate. As such, it is not possible to ascertain whether riders were attempted during committee debate. 
Regardless, assuming for the sake of argument that riders were attempted at the committee level, the fact 
that they are no longer able to come out of committee debate onto the floor is still telling of a shift in 
support for this type of legislation.  
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 As Table 6.1 indicated, 13 pieces of legislation were introduced during the period 
of time when some legislation was passed through 2004. This legislation included either 
trivial changes to the program through stand-alone legislation or through the use of riders. 
In 2004, Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) introduced comprehensive 
immigration reform (H.R.3918) for the first time since 1986
60
. After 2004 and the 
introduction of comprehensive immigration reform in the House, a two year moratorium 
existed when neither H-1B related legislation nor comprehensive immigration reform was 
introduced, and consequently none was passed. In early 2006, however, Representative 
Thomas Allen (D-ME) introduced for the first time in two years a measure to increase the 
current H-1B cap (See Table 8.1). One week later, Senator Arlen Spector (D-PA) 
introduced comprehensive reform in the Senate with a provision to also increase the H-
1B cap. For the first time in nearly twenty years comprehensive immigration reform 
passed in the Senate with a vote of 62-36.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
60 In 1994, Senator Alan Simpson introduced S.1884 titled Comprehensive Immigration and Asylum 
Reform Act of 1994. While given the comprehensive reform title, the text of the act was not truly a 
comprehensive reform measure. Rather it focused solely on border control and asylum reform and had no 
provisions for dealing with undocumented immigrants.  
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Table 8.1 Timeline of Unsuccessful H-1B Legislation (Post-CIR) 
    Year Legislation Key Provisions Bill Sponsor 
2006 H.R.5058 Increase cap Thomas Allen (D-ME) 
2006 S.2611 Increase cap (CIR) Arlen Specter (D-PA) 
2006 S.2691/H.R.5744 Increase cap/exemption 
John Cornyn (R-TX) / John 
Shadegg (R-AZ) 
2007 S.1083/H.R.1930 Increase cap/exemption 
John Cornyn (R-TX) / John 
Shadegg (R-AZ) 
2007 S.1092 Increase cap/exemption Chuck Hagel (R-NE) 
2007 S.1348 Increase cap/exemption/CIR Harry Reid (D-NV) 
2007 S.1351 Increase cap Judd Gregg (R-NH) 
2007 S.1397 Increase cap/exemption Joe Lieberman (D-CT) 
2007 H.R.1645 Increase cap/exemption Luis Gutierrez (D-IL) 
2007 H.R.1758 New cap for high skilled David Wu (D-OR) 
2008 H.R.5630 Increase cap/exemption Gabrielle Giffords (D-AZ) 
2008 H.R.5642 Increase cap Lamar Smith (R-TX) 
2008 H.R.7184 Cap exemption  Jeff Flake (R-AZ) 
2008 S.2839 Increase cap/fee Ted Kennedy (D-MA) 
    E, T, + Sc: Environment, Technology, and Standards Subcommittee 
ERC, P, + R Sc: Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response Subcommittee 
I, C, R, B, IL Sc: Immigration, Citizenship, Refugee, Border Security, and International 
Law Subcommittee 
    Source: THOMAS (Library of Congress) 
  
 Yet this success was short lived. Comprehensive reform failed both in 2006 and 
2007, and as a consequence, H-1B reform was swept up with that failure. What explained 
this shift in support? Cox and McCubbins (2005) argue that Congress views legislative 
changes within the context of the status quo. The legislative median is to the right in a 
Republican controlled Congress and to the left in a Democratic controlled Congress. So 
when Republicans control Congress we expect polices that sit to the left of the median to 
be blocked or at the very least fail.   
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 Legislation that failed between 2006 and 2008 was introduced in unified Congress 
controlled by Republicans in 2006 (with a Republican President) and controlled by 
Democrats in 2007 and 2008 (see Table 5.1), a scenario very similar to the period 
between 1997 and 2000 and 2004 when the Republicans controlled both chambers and 
legislation was still able to pass. Additionally, in each of these years the presidency was 
held by a Republican who actively was in support of comprehensive immigration reform. 
In 2006, President Bush not only addressed comprehensive immigration reform but urged 
Congress to come up with a bipartisan solution in 25 various national addresses and 34 
times in 2007
61
. In one such address to the nation in May 2006, he indicated that he 
supported comprehensive reform that accomplished five objectives: border security, 
creating a temporary worker program, holding employers accountable for the workers 
they hire, dealing with illegal immigrants in a manner other than amnesty, and honoring 
the American melting pot through assimilating immigrants into American culture. In 
urging Congress, Bush argued that “An immigration reform bill needs to be 
comprehensive, because all elements of this problem must be addressed together, or none 
of them will be solved at all”.  
 In 2006 the median is to the right and from 2007 to 2008 to the left. In 2006, only 
one piece of legislation actually passed in the Senate and none passed in the House. 
Using Figures 8.1 and 8.2 to illustrate what occurred, the expectation here (per Cox and 
McCubbins) is that Republicans in 2006 would have blocked legislation that was too far 
left of the median (m), or essentially any legislation that included comprehensive reform 
and/or amnesty (Figure 8.1), and Democrats would have blocked legislation that was too 
far right of the median in 2007 and 2008 (Figure 8.2).  
                                               
61 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/immigration/archive.html 
117 
 
Figure 8.1 2006 Expected Spatial Model under Republican Control  
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Figure 8.2 2007 and 2008 Expected Spatial Model under Democratic Control  
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 In practice, this did not happen. The legislation that was introduced (with the 
exception of the two pieces of comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 and 2007) 
should have appealed to a bipartisan audience, and in 1990, would have. Since members 
were not able to pass legislation on their own and had to resort to Sinclairian tactics, the 
expectation is that this should have continued throughout the 2000s. However, here we 
have a situation where the legislation fell in line with the median legislative voter (and 
even the median filibuster voter), but some outside influence kept him from voting yay. I 
argue that the broader macro political and economic climate shifted politics from 
Sinclarian tactics and caused this stalemate. The following section will outline and 
analyze each of these macro factors in turn in order to explain why the stalemate 
occurred.   
The Latino Vote  
 Between 1980 and 2000, the number of Latinos registering and voting in the 
United States more than doubled. Geographically, Latinos have been concentrated in the 
states with more than half of the required electoral votes needed to win the presidential 
118 
 
election, particularly California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois. Additionally, the 
Latino vote in the 2000 election has been shown to have been particularly important in 
Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, and Oregon, swing states where elections were decided 
by less than six percentage points.  
 According to a 2007 Pew Hispanic Center Report
62
, a majority or 57 percent of 
Latino registered voters affiliate themselves with the Democratic Party, 23 percent with 
the Republican Party, leaving 34 percent independents. This percentage is up from 33 
percent in 1999. In a 2010 Pew study
63
, voter preference among Latinos for Congress is 
heavily slanted in favor of the Democratic Party. In this study, 65 percent or two-thirds of 
all Latino registered voters indicated they planned to support a Democratic candidate 
compared to 22 percent for Republican candidates in their local districts. Compared to all 
registered voters, 47 percent indicated a preference for a Democratic candidate and 44 
percent for a Republican candidate. Additionally, the survey also revealed that party 
identification remains high among the Democratic Party for Latinos. Nearly two-thirds, 
or 62 percent of Latino registered voters indicated they identify with or lean towards the 
Democratic Party while only a quarter or 25 percent indicated the same for the 
Republican Party.  
 Additionally, over time, support for the Democratic Party has increased by 
Latinos, and conversely support has decreased for the Republican Party. As Table 8.2 
indicates, over time, a greater percentage of Latinos have consistently identified 
themselves with the Democratic Party than the Republican Party. This gap narrowed in 
2006 and then widened again in 2007. 
                                               
62 https://latinamericanstudies.org/~latinam2/latinos/latino-vote-08.pdf 
63 http://www.pewhispanic.org/2010/10/05/latinos-and-the-2010-elections-strong-support-for-democrats-
weak-voter-motivation/ 
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Table 8.2 Partisanship (%) of Latino 
Registered Voters 
   Year Republican Democrat 
1999 25 58 
2002 25 56 
2004 28 55 
2006 28 49 
2007 23 57 
   Source: Taylor, Paul and Richard Fry. 2007. 
"Hispanics and the 2008 Election: A Swing 
Vote? Pew Hispanic Center.  
 
 This new factor can explain the recent mobilization on the part of the Republican 
Party in the mid 2000s to pass comprehensive immigration reform and why Bush was 
largely in support of such a measure, particularly surrounding the 2004 reelection. 
Essentially, whoever could claim credit for comprehensive immigration reform would get 
the big prize of the Latino vote in the next election. 
Reelection Concerns 
 As the Democrats have already been largely successful in obtaining the Latino 
voting base, they have little incentive to bargain. Additionally, a younger voting base is 
emerging that is less hostile to immigrants than previous generations that also support the 
Democratic Party. Beginning with Kevin Phillips’ (1969) The Emerging Republican 
Majority, many have predicted the end or fall of one party’s hegemony and the rise of 
another’s. In reality, from 1932 to 1968, New Deal Democrats held a majority, followed 
by a period of transition with Republicans holding a majority from 1980 to 1992. Most 
recently, Judis and Teixeira (2002) argued that changes in work (including a new 
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immigrant workforce), values, and geography in the 2000s would lead to an “emerging 
Democratic majority”.  
 Similarly, Matthew Dowd, former chief campaign strategist to President Bush, 
feared that a generational divide would soon put an end to the Republican majority. 
Looking at exit polls from the 2004 election, he noticed that younger voters favor 
Democrats in strong numbers because they favor gay marriage and school funding, are 
more positive towards immigration, and less hostile to Social Security cuts and military 
cuts than the Republican Party platform projects. Writing to other top Bush aides just 
after Bush was reelected in 2004, he argued that a new Republican majority was not 
emerging, but rather that younger voters “don’t think the Republican Party thinks like 
them”64.    
 Ultimately, comprehensive immigration reform failed in 2006
65
, and in each 
subsequent year in which it was introduced. There are a variety of reasons that can 
explain its failure.  First and foremost, as members have become increasingly more 
partisan, the parties have also over time become more and more ideologically 
homogonous (McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Fiorina and Levndusky 2008). As a 
result, concerns for reelection beginning in 2004 and continuing in 2008 and 2010 after 
the economic recession and the rise of the base may be one reason. Additionally, the 
economic downturn can explain the post 2008 moratorium when not a single piece of 
positive H-1B related legislation has been introduced as members became risk averse to 
having their name attached to any legislation that might in any way be perceived as 
taking jobs away from Americans.  
                                               
64 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/the-generation-gap-is-
back.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss 
65 The House was unable to pass a similar reform package.  
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 Various studies have shown that politicians have increasingly become more 
concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1974; Ornstein and Mann 2000). This obsession with 
reelection has been manifested in what Sidney Blumenthal (1982) termed the “permanent 
campaign” cited by Heclo (2000) here he suggests is “a nonstop process seeking to 
manipulate sources of public approval to engage in the act of governing itself” where 
campaigning and governing occurs simultaneously in a continuous loop.  According to 
Heclo (2000), six trends have caused this loop: the changing role of political parties 
which are weaker in organization and mobilization but stronger in ideology and social 
distinctiveness, the expansion of interest group politics, new communications technology, 
political technologies, the need for political money, and the higher stakes in activist 
government.  
 Additionally, as reelection has increasingly become more important, Republicans 
have become much more fearful of their own base. Since 2008, moderate Republican 
incumbents have been repeatedly replaced by more conservative Tea Party backed 
candidates. According to Mann and Ornstein (2012), the parties (particularly the 
Republicans) have become more ideological in a system that requires supermajority 
support in order to overcome filibuster in the Senate. As a result, moderates have become 
more fearful of their base as conservative Tea Party candidates have gained speed and 
attention from the base.    
 The importance of reelection and the permanent campaign members are engaged 
in also brings into play Sulkin’s (2005) uptake theory where she argues that legislators 
adjust their legislative agenda based on criticisms on their own legislative history from 
their prior election challenger. Essentially, she argues that winning legislators regularly 
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take up their previous challenger’s priority issues from previous campaigns and act on 
them during their new term. So if an incumbent is criticized by his opponent for his 
stance on immigration in a previous term, he will adjust his voting record in the future in 
order to keep that critique at bay during the next election. 
Media and Public Opinion 
 Recent reelection concerns based on the 2008 recession are manifested in the 
media and in public opinion. The Vanderbilt Television News Archive is the most 
complete archive of national television news from 1968 to the present. The Archive 
provides data on the number of times any given phrase was mentioned in a national news 
broadcast. It includes data from ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, PBS, FOX, MSNBC, CSPAN, 
CNBC, UNIV, and BLOOM. Between 2004 (the first introduction of comprehensive 
reform) and May 2012, the Vanderbilt Archives found 1,425 items where the title or 
abstract contained the word immigration, 379 mentions of immigration reform, and 13 
mentions of skilled worker immigration. Table 8.3 breaks down the number of times 
immigration was mentioned in a national news broadcast in the United States since the 
passage of the Immigration Act of 1990. 
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Table 8.3 Media Mention of Immigration and H-1B Post CIR 
      
Year Immigration 
Immigration 
Reform 
Skilled Worker 
Immigration 
  1990 33 2 1 
  1991 26 0 0 
  1992 12 1 0 
  1993 69 13 0 
  1994 118 8 0 
  1995 49 4 0 
  1996 94 18 0 
  1997 52 4 0 
  1998 26 2 0 
  1999 34 1 0 
  2000 116 0 0 
  2001 66 11 0 
  2002 51 4 0 
  2003 25 1 0 
  2004 99 39 6 
  2005 88 23 6 
  2006 465 130 1 
  2007 339 112 0 
  2008 65 11 0 
  2009 29 10 0 
  2010 245 23 0 
  2011 75 10 0 
  
      Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive 
   
  
 Looking at Table 8.3, we can see that the mention of immigration in the media 
has several punctuations throughout the 1990s and then increases steadily throughout the 
early 2000s. The 1990s punctuations can be explained by the World Trade Center 
bombing hearings in 1993, the introduction and passage of California Proposition 187, an 
initiative designed to keep undocumented immigrants from using state resources in 1994, 
and the passage of IIRAIRA in 1996.  
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 In 2000 the Elian Gonzalez case hit the media and all but a handful of these media 
stories revolved around young Elian directly or the issue of human trafficking. In 2003 
we hit a low point, but picked back up in 2004 with the introduction of comprehensive 
immigration reform and then 2006 occurred. With the introduction of comprehensive 
reform again in the Senate, the media rewarded us with 465 various mentions of 
immigration throughout the 2006 year and another 339 in 2007 when reform was 
reintroduced in both the House and Senate. Once talk of reform (and particularly amnesty 
died down), and the economic recession hit in 2008, we see a decrease in media speak on 
immigration for the next two years. We have another increase in 2010 due largely to the 
Arizona immigration bill SB 1070. Looking specifically at the number of times 
“immigration reform” has been mentioned in national media, we see a similar trend as 
well with significant punctuated increases in 2006 and 2007.  
 The effect the failure of comprehensive immigration reform had on H-1B 
legislation is staggering. After its introduction, an additional 12 pieces of legislation were 
introduced. Combined with the failure of comprehensive reform, which included an H-1B 
provision and the legislation introduced the week before, there was a total of 14 pieces of 
legislation that all failed as they were swept up by the failure of comprehensive 
immigration reform.   
 The effect of public opinion follows similar trends. Gallup has polled Americans 
on issues dealing with immigration for a number of years. As part of their poll, Gallup 
asks “in your view, should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or 
decreased?”. Their data since 2004 (see Table 8.4) provides a telling story.  
 
125 
 
Table 8.4 Gallup Poll Results (%): "In your view, should immigration  
be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" 
        Year Status Quo Increased Decreased No Opinion 
   2011 Jun 9-12 35 18 43 4 
   2010 Jul 8-11 34 17 45 4 
   2009 Jul 10-12 32 14 50 5 
   2008 Jun 5-Jul 6 39 18 39 3 
   2007 Jun 4-24 35 16 45 4 
   2006 Jun 8-25 42 17 39 2 
   2006 Apr 7-9 35 15 47 4 
   2005 Jun 6-25 34 16 46 4 
   2004 Jun 9-30 33 14 49 4 
   2003 Jun 12-18 37 13 47 3 
   2002 Sep 2-4 26 17 54 3 
   2002 Jun 3-9 36 12 49 3 
   2001 Oct 19-21 30 8 58 4 
   2001 Jun 11-17 42 14 41 3 
   2001 Mar 26-28 41 10 43 6 
   2000 Sep 11-13 41 13 38 8 
   1995 Jul 7-9 27 7 62 4 
   1995 Jun 5-6 24 7 65 4 
   1993 Jul 9-11 27 6 65 2 
   1986 Jun 19-23 35 7 49 9 
   1977 Mar 25-28 37 7 42 14 
   1965 Jun 24-29 39 7 33 20 
   
        Source: Gallup 
       
  
 Table 8.4 indicates that public opinion has remained relatively steady on 
immigration levels since the first introduction of comprehensive reform in 2004. While 
we have seen a shift in Americans being very anti-immigrant (over 60 percent) in the mid 
1990s, the trend throughout the 2000s on average, however, indicates that Americans still 
largely favor decreasing immigration levels as opposed to increasing them. Since 2000, 
for example, 14.5 percent of those polled favored increasing immigration levels, 
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compared to 45.8 percent in favor of decreasing them. The percentage of those favoring 
the status quo has remained steady over the course of the past 60 years which is not 
surprising on the one hand as legal immigration levels have not increased much over that 
period of time, but surprising on the other as illegal immigration levels have.  
 If we look specifically at the impact that comprehensive immigration reform had 
on public opinion, some interesting trends emerge. Table 8.5 provides data from a Gallup 
survey conducted in 2007 following the introduction of reform in 2006 and the 
subsequent debate, both in Congress and in the media. The results indicate that only a 
narrow majority of those polled were actively following the news on immigration reform 
and a majority of people were not fully informed on the issue. Of those that were actively 
following the issue, however, poll results indicate that the greater majority were strongly 
opposed to the proposed plan. 
 
Table 8.5 2007 Gallup Public Opinion (%) on CIR 
     
Party 
Following news about proposed 
bill very or somewhat closely Favor Oppose 
Don't know 
enough to 
say 
Republicans 63 15 30 58 
Independents 62 7 36 56 
Democrats 57 11 25 64 
     Source: Gallup 
     
 
 Political sophistication refers to the quantity and organization of one’s political 
cognitions (Luskin 1987). Within the political sophistication literature (Zaller 1992; 
Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Luskin 1987) is the claim that information flows from elites, 
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the media, and others to the mass public. Within the mass public, there are various 
considerations in determining whether one will actually consider the information, 
including one’s political sophistication and predispositions on a continuum with the 
highly aware most likely to receive the greatest amount of political messages and the 
least aware less likely to receive any message.  
 Additionally, those who are predisposed to favor a message are more likely to 
accept new messages that are consistent with their beliefs and vice versa. The expectation 
is that those who are politically sophisticated and aware on a given issue are more likely 
to have predispositions on that issue. Additionally, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 
(2002) found that when Congress debates and/or makes policy, the large majority of the 
voting public is unaware and unresponsive to it. There is, however, an attentive minority 
that makes demands on Congress and responds either favorably or unfavorably with their 
votes. As a result, public opinion typically refers to minority opinion. Therefore it is not 
surprising that while only a narrow majority of those polled were actively following the 
news on immigration reform, that the greater majority of them were strongly opposed to 
the proposed plan. 
 Additionally, trends concerning the media and changes in public opinion appear 
to be correlated. Looking at Tables 8.4 and 8.5, in the years when the media was most 
active in reporting on immigration and immigration reform, more people indicated that 
they preferred decreasing immigration levels over either the status quo or increasing 
immigration levels. It would be interesting to see if this was the case, however as I do not 
have individual roll call votes, this is not possible to ascertain.  
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 While there does appear to be some correlation between media mentions of 
immigration and public opinion, there does not seem to be a correlation with 
unemployment levels at least on a national scale. I would expect, however, that on a local 
level, the likelihood of correlation is greater with states with greater immigrant 
populations, particularly border states, showing a correlation among media mentions, 
public opinion, and local unemployment levels.  
 Additionally, based on the punctuation and number of times immigration is 
mentioned in the media from 2005 through 2007, it is evident that members responded in 
a risk adverse manner. As discussed previously, the H-1B has been swept up in the tide of 
the larger and easier issue of immigration and border security. Therefore, when the media 
reacts to the easy issue of immigration and public opinion follows in negative fashion, 
members can be expected to be risk averse to the harder issue of H-1B legislation even 
when it is relatively unrelated to the issues that the general public opposes.  
 As I mentioned in chapter three, Gimpel and Edwards (1999) argued that 
immigration is not salient unless the economy is so bad that immigrants are blamed, a 
situation that began to occur in the late 2000s. In addition, due to the easy versus hard 
issue distinction, the H-1B legislation gets swept up into the easy issue of immigration 
and suffers.  
 As a result, when Congress was faced with the decisions of either granting legal 
status to the estimated millions of illegal immigrants or increasing skilled immigrant 
numbers throughout the 2000s, they were met with the majority of the American public 
(nearly half) who favored decreasing immigrant numbers generally and less than 15 
percent who favored increasing them, as well as a majority who were against 
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comprehensive immigration reform. Therefore, I argue that Congress’s reluctance to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform amid low public support created a spillover of 
negative public support on skilled immigration, particularly within the Republican Party 
where increasing polarization resulted in far more conservative members.  
 Additionally, while members previously followed a variety of cartel party and 
unorthodox models to pass legislation, we begin to see a shift away from this trend in the 
mid-2000s following the introduction of comprehensive immigration reform in 2004 and 
again in 2006. Instead what we have now is stalemate, or the bargaining failure argument 
made by both Gilmour (1995) and Binder (2003). Therefore, I argue that members of the 
Democratic Party were also engaged in a new political strategy to continue to reap the 
benefits of the Latino vote.  
Bargaining Failure 
 Essentially, the bargaining failure argument is a rational choice game theory 
model that claims that failure occurs when a zone of agreement exists between two 
parties but one side deliberately chooses to avoid that zone. The defecting side avoids 
compromise in an attempt to seek some other type of political gain that they believe will 
ultimately be preferable in the long run. Gilmour (1995) calls this the “accepting half a 
loaf” argument where the defector feels that accepting half of a loaf today may keep them 
from obtaining the whole loaf (which is their ultimate preference) at a later date.  
 Remember that per Krehbiel (1996), in order for policy change to occur, both 
moderate policy proposals and moderate members are needed. As a result, policy change 
is incremental and typically passed only through the use of supermajorities. Therefore, in 
order for legislation to pass, the majority party would simply need to shift the legislation 
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to the position of the median legislator. In 2006, for example, when Republicans 
controlled both chambers, but failed to meet the threshold for cloture with only 55 
Republicans, we expect the median legislator to be center right, and in 2007 and 2008 
when Democrats controlled both chambers but the Senate with only 51 and 55 Democrats 
respectively, we expect the median legislator to be center left. Policies between the 
filibuster pivot and median voter should have passed. This however did not happen. In 
each instance, the parties remained firm in their positions and no shifting of policy 
occurred.  
 Let us examine why. Polarization has been found to result in gridlock in many 
instances. In our case, however, even in the face of polarization we clearly have a zone of 
agreement. Both Republicans and Democrats have an incentive to pass this kind of 
legislation and they been able to compromise on passing this type of legislation in the 
past. Therefore, we need to understand what changed.  
 Following Gilmour’s (1995) logic, we can expect that Democrats have been 
giving up their half of the loaf in an attempt to obtain comprehensive immigration 
reform. As Gilmour (1995) showed, supporters of comprehensive reform often oppose 
smaller piecemeal measures because it makes it harder for them to pass comprehensive 
legislation. So essentially, Democrats might give up their half of the loaf in the short run 
and work instead towards gaining bipartisan support or obtaining unified government so 
they can pass comprehensive immigration reform that will include some measure of H-
1B reform as well.  
In reality, the Democrats appear to be content to sacrifice reform on the H-1B in 
the short run and to simply wait for comprehensive reform. In no instance have they 
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attempted to couple the H-1B legislation with even Dream Act legislation. They want it 
all or nothing at all. On the other hand, Republicans are not willing to budge on other 
immigration issues. The alternatives provided by the Democrats have been too far left of 
their status quo position for them to compromise. Therefore, they prefer the status quo of 
65,000 visas for their business constituencies over passage of comprehensive reform (at 
least in the forms presented to them). Whether there will be long term ramifications for 
the Republican Party and individual members remains to be seen. Regardless, neither 
party is currently willing to get legislation on the H-1B passed through use of riders and 
the bargaining failure argument is the best explanation of why this is the case.  
 The dilemma members face here is whether they are shorting their constituents in 
the process. On the one hand, we have Democratic elected officials that are willing to 
hold off on passing piecemeal legislation in the hopes of pressuring Republican members 
to concede or wait until they have a majority to pass comprehensive reform. On the other 
hand, we have a Republican membership that over time has become much more 
conservative, and consequently more staunchly opposed to any amnesty type measures 
that the Democrats would like to see in a comprehensive reform package. 
  Politically, polarization has also increased since the demise of comprehensive 
immigration reform. Republicans have continued to move more to the right and as a 
result, Democrats know that if they give up on H-1B legislation, they will lose any 
leverage they have on getting a comprehensive reform package. As the Latino vote has 
become increasingly more important and as parties have become more internally 
consistent ideologically, Democrats now find themselves in a unique win-win position 
politically. As they have polarized on the left, they rely on big business to a lesser extent 
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when it comes to reelection than Republicans. Therefore, they do not lose much sleep 
when H-1B legislation fails. Additionally, many have found that polarization contributes 
to gridlock by incentivizing “blame game” politics (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006: 
194; Gilmour 1995; Groseclose and McCarty 2000). Therefore when comprehensive 
immigration reform fails, Democrats can blame the Republicans for failing to 
compromise, gaining votes from the Latino camp. This is evident in our case where 
Democrats have been able to use immigration as a wedge issue to split the Republican 
Party into conservative ideologues and those who are beholden to big business.  
Conclusion and Comments on the Future of the H-1B Program 
 In this chapter, I used the bargaining failure game theory model to explain why 
Congress was unable to pass any legislation after comprehensive immigration reform was 
introduced and failed, as well as why the introduction of H-1B legislation stopped after 
2008. Essentially, a number of macro-level factors, including the Latino vote, the 
economy, public opinion, and reelection concerns left members risk averse to this type of 
legislation.  
 Yet even in the midst of an economic recession, there is still a high demand for 
foreign skilled workers. As we saw in chapter two, the 65,000 cap on H-1B numbers fails 
to meet the demand each year. Even in the economic recession years of 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, and 2012, the cap was met each year prior to the end of the fiscal year (see 
Table 2.6). Most recently, the 2013 fiscal cap was reached on June 11, 2012. Thus, in the 
course of just ten weeks, all H-1B numbers were filled and employers will now have to 
wait another 18 months until October 1, 2013 before they can hire another foreign skilled 
worker in the 2014 fiscal year.  
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 The Silicon Valley Leadership Group, a business advocate coalition for Silicon 
Valley businesses, has been active in recent years in organizing lobbying trips and 
sending dozens of Bay Area executives to the Hill to lobby expanding both H-1B cap 
numbers and green card availability for skilled workers. Additionally, individual CEOs, 
Bill Gates for example, have been active in lobbying and testifying before Congress 
throughout the 2000s. Clearly, the business sector is not only in need of additional 
numbers but has been active in asking members for them as well.  
 There have been some rumblings of potential movement in the 112
th
 Congress to 
increase H-1B numbers again and/or make other changes to the immigration system 
generally to shuffle the current immigrant visa category to increase the green card visa 
numbers available in the employment sector and specifically the number of foreign 
skilled workers by decreasing (or completely eliminating) the diversity and family 
categories. As of May 2012, no actual legislation has been introduced in either chamber 
to change the H-1B program. However, Senate members Jerry Moran (R-KS) and Mark 
Warner (D-VA) have introduced legislation that would create a new visa category for 
skilled workers graduating with an advanced degree in a STEM field (science, 
technology, engineering, or mathematics) from a U.S. institution of higher education. 
Other legislation proposed in both chambers respectively by Senator John Cornyn (R-
TX) and Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA), would eliminate the existing diversity 
lottery program and allocate these green cards to advanced STEM graduates from a U.S. 
institution of higher education.  
 I anticipate that either there will need to be significant changes in the macro 
environment, specifically with regard to the economy, or one party will need to create 
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unification within both chambers and the presidency for any legislation to actually pass. 
This is not likely as the chances of getting to 60 members without moderates in the 
Senate (thanks to polarization) are slim. The Republicans already have an incentive to 
pass skilled worker legislation and the Democrats will likely have the numbers they need 
to pass comprehensive legislation with some changes to the skilled worker program as 
well.  
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CHAPTER 9 
IS THE U.S. EXPERIENCE UNIQUE?: 
 COMPARING THE U.S. TO CANADA
66
 AND AUSTRALIA 
Introduction   
 While debate looms about what the future of our immigration policy should be, 
the U.S. remains the world’s largest receiver of immigrants. According to a Brookings 
Institution study, there are currently 42 million immigrants in the United States, which 
translates into one in seven residents and one in six workers
67
. The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that in the international 
market, immigration to the U.S. accounts for 27 percent of the world’s permanent 
immigration flows and 23 percent of temporary labor immigration
68
.  
 Turning to the issue of skilled workers, a study by the Georgetown Center on 
Education and Workforce69 estimates that by 2018, the U.S. will have 2.8 million STEM 
jobs available. They further estimate that of these, 779,000 will require some level of 
graduate training and based on current education trends, only 555,200 U.S. workers will 
have the qualifications to fill these jobs. As a result, the immigration of skilled workers 
remains relevant and necessary to the U.S. economy.  
                                               
66 The Canadian province of Quebec has separate legislation and policies in place with regard to the 
immigration of skilled workers. This paper will examine only Canadian policy and disregard the nuances of 
Quebec’s policies.   
67 Audrey Singer, Immigrant Workers in the U.S. Labor Force, Brookings Institution, March 2012. 
Available at 
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/img/Immigrant_Workers_Brookings.pdf 
68
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) International Migration Outlook 
2011. Available at  http://www.wiso.uni-
hamburg.de/fileadmin/vwl/aussenhandel/internationalewirtschaftsbeziehungen/Haupt-
studium/Migration/WiSe2011_12/oecd_2011.pdf 
69 Carnevale, Anthony P., Nicole Smith, and Jeff Strohl. 2010. “Help Wanted: Projections of Jobs and their 
Education Requirements Through 2018.” The Georgetown Center on Education and the Workforce. Avail-
able at http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/FullReport.pdf 
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 The U.S. invites and grants visas to thousands of students to obtain post 
secondary education yet we have no program in place to allow, much less facilitate, them 
to stay and work after their education is complete. Table 9.1 provides a list of how many 
F-1 student visas and how many H70 visas have been issued each year since 1992 by the 
U.S. Department of State71.  
 
Table 9.1 Student and Worker Visas Issued Per Fiscal Year 
       Year Student Visa (F) Worker Visa (H) 
    1992 239,751 97,489 
    1993 231,903 86,357 
    1994 235,218 98,008 
    1995 235,218 114,370 
    1996 235,218 121,340 
    1997 288,582 161,278 
    1998 273,410 190,671 
    1999 285,435 246,814 
    2000 308,944 289,562 
    2001 319,517 348,995 
    2002 256,534 293,805 
    2003 235,580 286,930 
    2004 237,807 331,628 
    2005 255,993 317,493 
    2006 294,637 372,254 
    2007 320,548 424,371 
    2008 364,423 363,511 
    2009 353,798 278,168 
    2010 411,317 289,192 
    
       Source: U.S. Department of State 
   
                                               
70 The Department of State does not break down the H visa category into the various types of H visas that 
exist. Therefore, this statistic includes H-2A and H-2B visas as well. Regardless, the point remains the 
same. Exponentially more student visas are issued each year than temporary worker visas. 
71 While the visa category approval comes from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, the actual 
visa comes from the State Department.  
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 In most years (with the exception of 2001 to 2007, but keep in mind that cap 
numbers were increased through 2004), the number of student visas far outweighed the 
number of H visas issued. In 2010, the U.S. issued nearly a third more student visas than 
H visas. There is an argument here (that has also been made in the mass media by both 
politicians and media pundits) that the policy of educating people from around the world 
and then letting them return home is counterproductive.  
 The policies in Canada and Australia are, as will be shown in this chapter, more 
conducive to attracting and keeping the highly skilled. What accounts for these 
differences among these three countries, considering the fact that all three share similar 
colonial histories, similar needs to populate their countries with immigrants, and similar 
ethnic restrictive policies throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s? 
 Sharing similar colonial backgrounds and similar cultures, there is no shortage of 
studies comparing and contrasting the various political and social phenomena between 
and among the United States, Canada, and Australia. These historical and cultural 
similarities combined with relatively similar economic conditions (with the United States 
obviously having a larger labor base and economy due to a larger domestic population) 
could result in an expectation that such similar states would have similar policies when it 
comes to immigration policy. Specifically with regard to foreign skilled labor policy, one 
could expect to find similar policies or at least relatively unrestrictive policies across 
these three states. Additionally, the sheer size of the United States labor force and the 
great labor shortages in many highly skilled fields should expect one to predict that the 
United States would have a less restrictive skilled immigrant worker immigration policy 
than their counterparts.  
138 
 
In reality, Canada, Australia and the United States did have a shared skilled 
worker immigration policy until the mid-twentieth century. This policy was based on a 
preference for immigrants from states with “similar values and norms” (Somerville and 
Walsworth 2009: 149). As a result, most immigrants to the United States and Canada 
were from western and northern Europe.  
Additionally, Australia’s prewar immigration policy has been termed the “White 
Australia” policy72. This policy existed from the 1850s until 1949, and essentially 
restricted Chinese and Pacific Islander immigration to the island and preferred the 
immigration of white immigrants. Beginning in 1949, many non-white refugees were 
permitted to enter Australia and the Immigration Minister allowed these refugees to be 
admitted as immigrants, forever changing immigration policy. In 1957, non-Europeans 
with 15 years of Australian residence were permitted to become Australian citizens and 
in 1958, permanent residence status was opened up to non-Europeans. In 1966, the 
“White Australia” policy was officially abolished and non-European immigration began 
to increase. A series of laws were passed throughout the 1960s and 1970s in an attempt to 
reverse the “White Australia” policy. Australia’s current Migration Program allows for 
immigration regardless of ethnicity, culture, religion, or language.  
Canada in 1967, Australia in 1966, and the United States in 1965 dramatically 
changed their immigration policies as a result of various economic, social, and 
humanitarian goals. Since then, the policies of these countries have varied, especially 
with regard to their policies on skilled worker immigration. The United States has a much 
stricter policy of admission for foreign skilled workers than its Canadian and Australian 
counterparts. Additionally, the U.S. still largely favors family based immigration efforts 
                                               
72 http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/08abolition.htm 
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over employment based immigration as evidenced by the numbers allocated to each (see 
chapter two), a dramatic difference among these three countries.  
Comparing the Legislative Political Systems of Canada, Australia, and the U.S. 
  As majority white settler colonies of the former British Empire, the United 
States, Canada, and Australia all evolved into industrial, capitalist, self-governing federal 
states. Politically, Canada and Australia are both parliamentary plurality legislatures with 
merged executive and legislative branches on both federal and provincial levels. In 
Lijphart’s (1999) study of political institutions in 36 various democracies, both rank 
closely together. Australia’s political system is made up of one central federal level, six 
states, and two territories, and Canada has one central federal level, ten provinces, and 
three territories.  
 The Australian constitution borrowed heavily from the U.S. constitution. Both 
have a bicameral legislature, with specific legislative powers to the federal government 
and a preemption clause. Canada’s constitution also outlines specific powers for the 
federal government, with immigration being a concurrent power for the federal and 
provincial governments. The legislature in Canada is unicameral, however, at the 
provisional and territorial levels. The federal Senate is executive appointed and regionally 
based. Partisan makeup in Canada is made up of a multiparty system with three to five 
significant parties varying across jurisdictions. Australia has two major parties and 
various minor ones. Institutionally, Australia is the most formal and Canada traditionally 
has had much more informal procedures (Watts 2003).  
 Levels of party polarization have been low in both Canada and Australia over the 
same time period (Dalton 2008). And while party identification and loyalty has been an 
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important aspect of American politics, the same cannot be said for politics outside the 
U.S. (Harrop and Miller 1987). In Australia, the two major parties are the Labor Party 
(the left party) and the right Liberal/National Party. In Canada, the major parties include 
the moderate right Progressive Conservative Party, the centrist Liberal Party, and the 
moderately socialist New Democratic Party, the Green Party, and the Bloc Quebecois.  
 In both Canada and Australia, party discipline and disciplined voting has been 
extremely high in both legislatures (Depauw and Martin 2009). As we will see, this has 
allowed some significant positive and liberal changes to their skilled worker immigration 
programs. Yet in the U.S., while party discipline is high particularly in the era of 
polarization, institutional constraints have made legislation increasingly more difficult to 
pass.  
 With regard to immigration policy, both Canada and Australia’s immigration 
policy is determined by their respective Parliaments, or legislative branches much like in 
the United States. Over time, the legislature in Canada has enjoyed tripartisan support 
and Australia’s legislature has enjoyed bipartisan support on immigration measures 
(Hawkins 1991). In both Canada and Australia (and the U.S. to some degree), major 
institutional changes designed to increase migration numbers occurred after World War II 
(Walsh 2008).  The Australian government founded the Department of Immigration in 
1945, and in 1947 the Canadian Prime Minister outlined a new major immigration 
program. As a result, immigration increased over ten times in both countries.  In both 
instances, increased immigration was designed to bolster economic growth. Much like in 
the United States, restrictive ethnic immigration policies soon gave way to 
nondiscriminatory reforms in 1962 in Canada and 1973 in Australia.  
141 
 
 Canada’s Parliament has a Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower, and 
Immigration that exclusively examines relevant annual estimates of immigration, reports, 
and proposed policy changes (Hawkins 1991). Australia does not have its own standing 
committee on immigration. In the U.S. where the committee structure is more structured, 
immigration is typically handled by the House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and 
Enforcement and in the Senate in the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and 
Border Security (both under their respective Committees on the Judiciary) although 
legislation could be passed to a different committee at the Speaker or Majority Leader’s 
discretion.  
A Comparison of United States, Canadian, and Australian Skilled Worker Policy 
Canadian Policy  
 In Canada, both the federal and provincial governments have shared jurisdiction 
over immigration and immigration policy pursuant to Section 95 of the Constitution Act, 
1867. The Immigration Act of 1967 created the point system currently in place for 
adjudicating and granting status as a skilled economic immigrant. Consequently, Canada 
was the first country in the world to implement a point based immigrant system, and was 
followed shortly after by Australia. Other European states have recently also followed in 
Canada’s footsteps. In June 2002, Canada’s Immigration Act of 1967 was updated with 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Since 2002 and pursuant to the Department 
of Citizenship and Immigration Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (with the approval of the Governor in Council) 
has signed various agreements with the provinces and territories throughout Canada in 
order to facilitate the implementation of immigration policy. In 2008, the Citizenship and 
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Immigration Canada (CIC) was created to adjudicate applications for noncitizen 
admission into Canada.  
Due to the point system, Canadian immigration policy differs drastically from 
policy in the United States. The Canadian immigration system is divided into temporary 
travel for work or study, permanent immigration, and humanitarian asylum. Temporary 
travel for work visas can include both skilled and unskilled workers. Permanent 
immigration is available for skilled workers/professionals, investors/entrepreneurs/self-
employed, those who have recent work experience in Canada, and those who receive 
nominations from one of Canada’s provinces or territories.  
As such, skilled workers can obtain authorization to live and work in Canada 
either through temporary travel for work visas or by applying as a federal skilled worker. 
Applications for temporary travel for work typically require a labor market opinion by 
the Human Resources and Social Development Canada
73
 that the employer is authorized 
to hire a foreign worker for the position. Requirements include evidence of English 
language proficiency, and an offer of employment or one year of full time experience 
within the past ten years in one of the 29 major high demand occupations as determined 
by the Government of Canada. Because these visas area available for both skilled and 
nonskilled workers, they will not be analyzed here.   
Applications for permanent immigration as a skilled worker/professional are 
adjudicated based on a point system. The grid is comprised of various factors within the 
six selection factors. Points are awarded for education (up to 25 points), language 
                                               
73 Some exceptions to this requirement exist: jobs covered under international treaties, workers in specific 
occupations as listed in Canadian-Provincial/Territorial Immigration Agreements, entrepreneurs and intra-
company transferees, participants in exchange programs, co-op students, spouses/common-law 
partners/children of students and/or skilled workers, academics, students, religious workers, and/or 
refugees.  
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(English and/or French) abilities (up to 24 points), work experience (up to 21 points), age 
(up to 10 points), whether the employment has already been secured and arranged (up to 
10 points), adaptability (up to 10 points), and financial stability. Points are not necessary 
in all areas in order to achieve the minimum score for approval. Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada is responsible for setting the “pass” score and adjudicating the 
applications.  As of 2011, the “pass” score is a 67 out of a possible 100, and applicants 
with a score of at least 67 are eligible to immigrate as a permanent skilled worker upon a 
favorable determination by a Citizenship and Immigration Canada officer. Upon approval 
and entry into the country, the applicant (and any immediate family) is eligible for 
citizenship in as little as four years.  
Canada has shown a steady commitment to accepting skilled workers in their 
immigration policy. In 1985, the Canadian government increased the number of visas 
available to skilled workers by including work experience and employment related 
factors to the point system. In 1990, a five year Immigration Plan through 1995 was 
passed in an attempt to double immigration, and more specifically increase skilled 
matches to areas experiencing regional/national labor shortages.  
In 2008, Budget Bill C-50 was passed to slow the backlog of immigration 
applications from 6 years to only 6 to 12 months. Additionally, it was intended to align 
Canadian labor shortages with immigration applicants in order to provide employment 
opportunities for applicants wanting to immigrate to Canada, as well as fill labor 
shortages in the Canadian labor market. As an example, the government has developed 
occupation shortage lists that are updated every six months to make sure that immigrants 
are being utilized in sectors that Canadian nationals are not filling. 
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 Additionally in 2008, Canada’s Parliament granted their immigration minister a 
special regulatory tool called a “Ministerial Instruction” that allows him to make 
adjustments to immigration policies without having to consult with Parliament. 
According to a study by The Partnership for a New American Economy and the 
Partnership for New York City, this Ministerial Instruction has already been used by 
Minister Jason Kennedy to prioritize skilled workers. Specifically, he has recently 
requested that immigration agents evaluate immigration petitions submitted by those with 
skills in higher demand and leave the low skilled and low demand applications 
unprocessed. Recall that in the U.S., Congress maintains exclusive control over all 
immigration policy making and has not ceded this authority to any outside agency or 
individual.  
Additionally, on June 26, 2010, the Government of Canada passed legislation that 
dramatically changed the skilled worker program. Legislation implemented a cap of 
20,000 or 1,000 per occupation available per year for skilled workers. Exemptions to this 
cap, however, are available for applicants who have arranged their own employment and 
have a job offer with an employer in Canada. Therefore, in practice, it is not expected to 
hinder employment of foreign national to any great extent.  
Australian Policy 
 Australia’s immigration system is a hybrid of the systems in place in Canada and 
the United States. As mentioned above, in 1979, Australia followed in the steps of 
Canada by implementing the Numerical Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS), a 
point based system based on individual economic contributions. It divided potential 
immigrants into three classes: skilled, family, and humanitarian (much like in the U.S.). 
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In 2010, however, they changed the point system to an economic needs based system 
called SkillSelect74. The program allows prospective immigrants to apply online and 
obtain an overall point score. Immigration officials review these online applications and 
invite those who best meet employment needs to file formal visa applications. As 
mentioned above, Canada has also adopted a similar needs based process.  
 While Australia follows a version of Canada’s point system, the immigration 
process is similar to that in the United States. Like Canada, Australia has both a 
nonimmigrant and immigration visa process, but unlike Canada the nonimmigrant visa is 
the most common method for entering the country initially (much like the U.S.).  
 The most common nonimmigrant process exclusively for skilled workers is the 
Subclass 457. Employer sponsored workers can enter the country through a Temporary 
Business (Long Stay) Standard Business Sponsorship, also known as Subclass 457. It 
requires employer sponsorship by either an Australian business or an overseas business 
operating in Australia. Applications for Subclass 457 must be for a skilled position that is 
specified by the government on a skilled occupation list that is based on the ASCO 
system, indicating national and regional labor needs
75
. The list was changed most 
recently in 2010 to use the ANZSCO classification system, and the occupation list itself 
was changed only slightly. The visa allows employers to employ foreign workers for any 
period up to four years. Additionally, employers must pay equivalent market salary rates 
to foreign employees (much like the prevailing wage in the U.S.) and the visa is employer 
specific.  
                                               
74 http://www.deccanherald.com/content/51465/australia-cancel-20000-visa-applications.html 
75 http://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/_pdf/sol-schedule1.pdf 
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 Subclass 457 bears many similarities to the H-1B. Both are temporary visas, valid 
for up to three years in the U.S. and four in Australia, require employer sponsorship, and 
have a minimum wage requirement. There are several noteworthy differences, however. 
The U.S. has an annual cap on these visas while Subclass 457 does not. Additionally, 
while the U.S. has a multitude of nonimmigrant visas available, the majority of all long 
term immigrants to Australia are on Subclass 457, or approximately four out of five  
immigrants76.  
 Unlike the U.S., Australia also has a program (the General Skilled Migration 
Program or GSM) for professionals and other skilled migrants who do not have employer 
sponsorship but whose skills are in demand. Because Australia (like most countries) has a 
documented shortage of physicians and nurses, they have a system in place that 
essentially allows doctors and nurses to register with a government agency, find 
employment, and obtain either a Subclass 457 visa or go through the permanent visa 
process. This is vastly different from the U.S. process where permanent residence for 
even the most highly skilled and in the fields with the greatest shortages (i.e. healthcare) 
can take at least a couple of years at the very minimum in the very best case scenario to 
over a decade in the worst case.  
 As with Canada, Australia has been successful in making positive changes to their 
skilled worker program in the late 2000s when their U.S. counterpart completely halted 
any legislative efforts. In 2011, for example, Australia’s Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship announced a new Migration Plan that would reform their immigration policy 
in order to increase the number of skilled immigrants and make the process for skilled 
                                               
76 http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/australian-government-overhaul-of-
visa-scheme?autoplay=423328 
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immigrants more efficient and effective77. Through these reforms, the federal government 
will allocate immigrant visas for specific regional areas. Additionally, a fast track process 
green card process was be implemented in 2012 for those on a temporary business visa 
(Subclass 457) whose employers agree to sponsor them for an additional two years.  
Comparing the U.S., Canada, and Australia 
 While Canada and Australia have attempted to increase their share of skilled 
workers, the U.S. has experienced a decrease, due likely to stagnant immigration policies. 
Between 2001 and 2011, for example, employment based immigration decreased from 17 
percent to 13 percent. Additionally, the U.S. allocates approximately 7 percent of its 
permanent visas to employment categories, compared to 25 percent in Canada and 42 
percent in Australia78.  
 In the United States, positive policy on skilled workers halted after 2004. In 
Canada, however, policymakers passed a positive immigration bill in 2008, in the midst 
of a worldwide economic recession, to reduce the application backlog and fill labor 
shortages in the Canadian labor market. Two years later, however, as the economic 
recession continued with no end in sight, Canadian policymakers passed a law to cap the 
number of skilled workers admitted each year, for the first time mirroring U.S. policy. 
Yet even with the cap, applications are granted based on labor needs and those regions 
with substantiated labor needs are still able to obtain skilled foreign workers. 
Additionally, Canada is actively trying to improve their immigration system by 
attempting to decrease backlogs and granting the Immigration Minister carte blanche 
                                               
77 http://www.embraceaustralia.com/australian-migration-thinks-local-9475.htm 
78 Orrenius, Pia and Madeline Zavodny, From Brawn to Brains: How Immigration Works for America, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas: 2010 Annual Report, p. 15. Available at 
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/fed/annual/2010/ar10b.pdf 
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authority to fix the system. The same is true in Australia where recent legislation has 
been passed to make the green card process for skilled workers faster and more efficient.  
 While the percentage of high skilled immigrants as a percentage of all immigrants 
has increased in both Canada and Australia in each 10 year period since 1991, the 
percentage has steadily decreased in the United States over the past 20 years. Table 9.2 
shows a staggering difference between actual immigration numbers among these three 
countries. Between 1991 and 2011, the percentage of skilled immigrants jumped from 37 
percent to 67 percent in Australia and from 18 percent to 67 percent in Canada. In the 
U.S., however, the percentage fell from 18 percent in 1991 to 13 percent in 2011.  
 
Table 9.2 High Skilled Immigrants as a Percentage of All Immigrants 
  
          Year U.S. Canada Australia 
      1991 18 18 37 
      2001 17 55 60 
      2011 13 67 67 
      
          Source: "Not Coming to America: Why the U.S. is Falling Behind in the  
Global Race for Talent" 
 
Comparing the Annual Cap Restriction in Canada and the U.S. 
 In Canada, exemptions from the annual cap exist for applicants who have secured 
a job offer with a Canadian employer. In the United States, exemptions from the annual 
cap exist only for institutions of higher education as defined by section 101(a) of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)), nonprofit entities related to or 
affiliated with a nonprofit educational entity as defined by section 101(a) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)), nonprofit or governmental research 
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organizations as defined by 8 CFR 214(h)(19)(iii)(C), for physicians who have obtained a 
waiver of their home residency requirement and agreed to work in a federally designated 
medical shortage area for a period of at least three years, and for applicants who have 
obtained a Master’s Degree in a United States educational institution. 
 Examining the cap exemptions only on their face, the Canadian cap is clearly 
much less restrictive than the United States cap. Normalizing the percentage of the 
American and Canadian populations that are skilled workers and examining the 
percentage of that population that are skilled workers can shed some light on the 
regulations that have been implemented. As Table 9.3 below indicates, the total 
population of skilled workers in the United States is more than ten times the total 
population of skilled workers in Canada. However, upon examining the percentage of the 
total population with a Bachelor’s Degree, the numbers are extremely close, indicating 
that a comparable share of the Canadian and American populations is comprised of 
skilled workers.  
 In contrast, however, the percentage of the skilled worker population that has a 
skilled visa in Canada is almost double the percentage of skilled workers with a skilled 
worker visa in the United States, indicating that Canada approves much more skilled 
foreign workers as a share of their population than the United States. Considering the fact 
that the United States labor market is much larger than the Canadian market, with 
shortages in many fields, it is interesting that Canada approves double the percentage of 
skilled workers than the United States.  
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Table 9.3 U.S. and Canadian Skilled Worker Populations (Foreign and Domestic) 
        
  Year 
Total 
Population 
Total 
Population 
with B.A. 
% 
Population 
with B.A. 
Total # 
with 
Skilled 
Visa 
% Skilled 
Population 
with 
Skilled 
Visa 
 U.S. 2006 299,398,485 33,496,187 11.5 270,981 0.8 
 Canada 2006 32,576,100 2,981,465 9.2 44,161 1.5 
 
        Sources: U.S. Census Bureau 2006 American Community Survey 
 USCIS Annual Report, 2006, Statistics Canada 
 CANSIM, Statistics Canada Census of Population 2006 
  
Additionally, data from West’s (2011) Brookings Policy Brief Series indicates 
that 26 percent of all Canadian immigrant visas are in the skilled worker category while 
only 6.5 percent of immigrant visas issued in the United States are for skilled workers. It 
is unclear whether West is referring to workers in the actual immigrant category (where 
they have received approval for legal permanent residence) or if he is simply using the 
colloquial definition of immigrant to refer to all foreign nationals admitted. Regardless, 
the data shows the extremely different results from two very different policies.  
Comparing Actual Skilled Immigrant Flows 
 A 2006 study indicated that over the past decade, the greatest percentage of high 
skilled immigration to Canada came from China (18%), India (11%), Philippines (7%), 
Pakistan (4%) and Romania (4%). In Australia, the greatest percentage came from the 
United Kingdom/Ireland (25%), India (13%), China (11%), South Africa (5%), and 
Malaysia (5%)
79
. Comparatively, in the United States, according to USCIS
80
 between 
                                               
79 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/labourmarket.pdf 
80 The earliest H-1B data made public by USCIS is the 2004 Fiscal Year data, which includes data from 
2003 as well.  
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2003 and 2006, the greatest percentage of H-1B visa holders came from India (43.5%), 
China (9.4%), Canada (4.2), Philippines (3.9), Korea (3.3%), and the United Kingdom 
(2.5%).  
 The greatest percentages of Indian immigrants are clearly coming to the United 
States while a greater percentage of Chinese immigrants are going to Canada. In 
Australia, however, the labor pool appears to rely more on United Kingdom/Ireland 
immigration flows. Regardless of the exact percentage, however, it does appear that the 
greatest number of skilled immigrants globally is coming from India, China, Philippines, 
and the United Kingdom. Immigrants from these countries make up the bulk of the 
skilled immigrants in at least two of these countries (which are also the three largest 
immigrant accepting countries in the world).  
 Therefore, our three countries appear to be competing largely for the same labor 
pool. The consequence of this is that the country (or countries) with the most favorable 
policy or policies will likely win this race in the long run, assuming other market 
conditions are comparable. Therefore, policy on skilled workers will increasingly become 
more important for the United States if employers will continue to need the same skilled 
immigrant flows in the future. Thus far, this flow has not slowed.  
The Spillover Effect and an Explanation 
 While there is no cohesive explanation in the literature as to why policies among 
these three countries diverge, scholars have been able to make some important findings. 
Walsh (2008) argues that by the 1990s, ethnocentric fears began growing in both Canada 
and Australia, resulting in some anti-immigrant sentiment. In Australia, for example, the 
presence of “boat people” from Asia in both Australia and to a lesser extent Canada 
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became a new political issue (Walsh 2008: 802). Additionally, public opinion, 
particularly in Canada over time has not been positive towards immigration generally 
(Reitz 2004).  
 Yet immigration policies in both Canada and Australia have tended to be more 
open than public opinion in these countries would have preferred (much like in the U.S.). 
In both Canada and Australia, business interests mobilized in opposition to restrictive 
immigration policies (Reitz 2004; Skeldon 1995) and as a result, Walsh (2008) argued 
that both governments placed more emphasis on skilled workers in order to appease both 
constituencies. As a result, after 1996 in both countries the number of skilled workers 
admitted outpaced the number of family and refugee immigrants. This trend has 
continued to date. This has allowed both countries to maintain high levels of public 
approval (Walsh 2008).  
 These experiences in Canada and Australia are a major departure from the 
experience in the United States. In the U.S., polarization has majorly divided the parties 
to the extent where policy has been made very difficult to pass. This has not happened in 
either Canada or Australia (Dalton 2008). Additionally, the spillover effect from the 
“easy” issue of immigration (border security and the issue of undocumented Mexican 
immigration) has resulted in a public very averse to increasing immigration generally. 
Rather than switching gears and making immigration an economic issue, Congress, as 
opposed to its counterparts in Australia and Canada, remains focused on “solving” the 
issue of undocumented immigration where the Australian and Canadian Parliaments 
managed to distract their publics while their economies benefitted and individual 
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members benefitted from the support of both their base and their business constituents. 
Congress may have much to learn.  
Conclusion  
 While both Canada and Australia have been able to pass positive legislation on 
skilled immigrants during the same period when the U.S. has failed to pass any, they have 
also managed to pass significant positive changes to their general respective immigration 
policies as well while the U.S. has also failed.  
 Australia has recently adopted policies to keep international students who studied 
in Australia within the country81. The Skilled Graduate Temporary Visa program allows 
highly qualified international students who fail to qualify for permanent residence 
through the point system to stay for up to 18 months after they graduate in order to gain 
the skills and job sponsorship they need in order to raise their score.  
 Similarly, three policy changes in 2008 in Canada made significant changes to 
allow international students who study in Canada to remain and work82. One policy grants 
additional points for the permanent residence points system through the Canadian 
Experience Class program. Another program grants up to 1,000 international students 
who have completed at least two years of a Ph.D. program in a STEM field permanent 
resident status. Those who still do not qualify for permanent residence can still qualify to 
stay and work for up to three years after graduating from a Canadian college or 
university.  
 Both of these policies diverge sharply from U.S. policy. There are currently no 
programs in place for a direct path for permanent residence for international students. 
                                               
81 http://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/general-skilled-migration/485/ 
82 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2011/2011-11-02.asp. 
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Additionally, the process can take many years for those that are able to obtain an H-1B 
visa. More puzzling still is the fact that roughly 40 percent of these international students 
receive federal funding in the form of grants and scholarships within the U.S83. 
 This chapter has examined the various skilled immigration policies of the United 
States, Canada, and Australia tracing their historical transformations over the years. It has 
attempted to provide a comparison of the policies, the changes to these policies over time, 
as well as the results of these policies.  
 As has been shown, both Canada’s and Australia’s policies have been much less 
restrictive and more receptive to using foreign skilled workers to alleviate domestic labor 
shortages. This has been done with support of both the voters and business constituents as 
their Parliaments have been able to distract voters from domestic issues of relatively high 
refugee numbers by increasing skilled workers and showing a link to relatively steady 
economic growth. In the United States, however, skilled worker immigration policy has 
been much more restrictive with annual caps and employer sponsorship requirements. 
Additionally, spillover effects from the high levels of undocumented immigrations in the 
U.S. has resulted in negative public opinion on immigration generally, and a Congress 
risk averse to doing anything at all about skilled worker immigration.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
83 http://www.iie.org/~/media/Files/Corporate/Publications/International-Students-in-the-US.ashx 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 I began this project wanting to understand why in the years when H-1B numbers 
were in greatest demand Congress suddenly changed its tune and halted any real attempt 
at passing positive legislation to increase the cap in one way or another. My major 
finding was that the increase in polarization combined with a variety of changes in the 
macro environment resulted in a Congress risk averse to any immigration related 
legislation.  
 This work deviated from prior studies on skilled worker immigration in that these 
prior studies focused their scope on the immigrant visa category because it grants 
permanent resident status. Because the majority of immigrants to the United States enter 
the country on a nonimmigrant visa first and then go through the process of permanent 
residence, I found those studies premature. Therefore, this study attempted to fill that gap 
in the literature in order to understand congressional behavior on one particular 
nonimmigrant visa, the H-1B visa.  
 The H-1B visa is the only nonimmigrant visa available exclusively to skilled 
workers. This study attempted to explain congressional behavior on the H-1B visa in 
order to understand why Congress was proactive on the issue from the 1990s through 
2004 and then refused to touch the issue regardless of constituent demands for change.  
  In a relatively short period of time, the same policy went from being relatively 
noncontroversial with bipartisan support to completely stalemated. This analysis 
attempted to explain what changed. One major shift over time and during our time period 
has been the increase in polarization both in the broader political environment and within 
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Congress as well, which resulted from ideological sorting coupled with economic and 
social changes. What we were left with is legislation that was once routine can now only 
be passed through unorthodox methods until eventually members become too risk averse 
to passing anything.   
 My analysis examined H-1B policymaking within the context of these broader 
trends in American politics. And while the timeframe is short, the forces shaping the 
internal and external environment accelerated a great deal during this period. As a result, 
a variety of congressional models needed to be used. These included pivotal politics, 
party models, unorthodox lawmaking, and stalemate game theory models in order to 
explain policymaking (or the lack thereof) on the H-1B visa and answer the following 
research questions: 
 1) What factors explain congressional policy making within the context of skilled 
 worker (H-1B) immigration?  
 2) Why did Congress stop using alternative methods (i.e. riders) to pass positive 
 H-1B legislation?  
 3) Why did even minor changes to the H-1B program that were successful as 
 stand-alone pieces of legislation pre-2004 fail after 2004?  
 4) Is the U.S. experience unique? How does it compare to legislation in Canada 
 and Australia?  
 The bulk of the analysis consisted of a four part longitudinal study that examined 
policy making using four different congressional theories to explain the following periods 
of passage and failure: (1) the creation of the H-1B skilled worker visa in 1990; (2) 
passage of legislation from 1998-2004 largely as individual pieces of legislation; (3) 
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passage of legislation through the use of riders from 1998-2004; and (4) failure of 
legislation from 2006-2008, followed by a lack of legislation introduced to date. My 
findings are as follows. 
Findings 
 In chapter two, I provided a general history of immigration policymaking, as well 
as an overview of the H-1B visa in order to set the stage for the analysis. Chapter three 
outlined the relevant literature and congressional models used in the analysis, including 
Krehbiel’s pivotal politics (1998), Cox and McCubbins’ party models (2005; 2007), 
Sinclair’s (2007) unorthodox lawmaking, and Gilmour’s (1995) strategic disagreement. 
In chapter four, I outlined my research design. Specifically, this study has been a 
longitudinal qualitative analysis using the four congressional models just listed to explain 
four key periods of H-1B legislation: (1) the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990; (2) 
passage of stand-alone legislation from 1998 through 2002; (3) passage of legislation 
through the use of riders from 1998 through 2002: and (4) complete stalemate after 2004.  
 Chapters five through eight were the bulk of the analysis, where I examined the 
effect polarization had on legislation on the H-1B visa in order to ascertain the shift in 
congressional behavior. Finally, chapter nine compared similar polices in Canada and 
Australia. The following sections summarize my main findings.  
Polarization: Causes and Consequences 
 Since the 1970s, the parties have increasingly polarized and members have 
become more ideologically homogenous. This has resulted in two consecutive polarizing 
phenomena: vanishing moderates and the clustering of the two parties as conservatives or 
liberals. 
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 While Congress is a well-bound institution, it is still a permeable institution and is 
often affected by external events and forces. Polarization has changed congressional 
behavior by increasing gridlock, and making major legislation successful less frequently. 
In the Senate, polarization has made overcoming the filibuster very difficult, and has 
made Democrats unwavering in their reluctance to pass H-1B related legislation without 
a comprehensive immigration reform package attached.  Polarization also explains why 
members stopped attempting to use riders to attach legislation onto larger, must pass 
legislation, and why the introduction of any H-1B related legislation stopped altogether 
after 2008.  
Institutional Arrangements Matter 
 Many of the most well known studies on Congress focus on only the Senate or the 
House. Yet in order for legislation to pass, it has to get through both chambers in 
identical fashion. As a result, I showed that institutional arrangements in both chambers 
can and do hinder the ability of members to get legislation passed.    
 In the Senate, the cloture rule is one of the more recent institutional changes that 
has greatly impacted the success or failure of a piece of legislation. Since the 1970s, 
passing legislation in the Senate requires a supermajority of 60 votes in order for to 
overcome the filibuster and pass legislation. As neither party has been able to reach 60, 
reaching cloture instead requires the presence of moderate members. Combined with 
increased polarization and the clustering around the conservative and liberal poles, 
moderate members have all but disappeared and getting legislation passed has been 
rendered very difficult over time.  
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 In the House, changes in the committee process combined with increased 
polarization have resulted in a much more divided chamber. In effect, legislation without 
partisan support dies before it makes it to committee or shortly after.  
 As a result of these institutional hindrances, the rider has become a tool for 
members to manipulate the institutions in order to get their goals’ realized. For a number 
of years, members were unable to get H-1B legislation passed on its own and were 
successful in using riders in order to get their desired outcomes.  
 Conversely, however, in recent years a sharply divided electorate has rendered it 
nearly impossible for a party to make it to 60 members in the Senate or to obtain as much 
partisan support in the House for legislation to pass. Combined with increasing reelection 
fears and the permanent campaign members are engaged in, members are increasingly 
engaged in uptake, or adjusting their legislative agenda based on criticisms of their own 
legislative history from their prior election challenger, out of fear of their own base. 
Essentially, if an incumbent is criticized by his opponent for his stance on immigration in 
a previous term, he will adjust his voting record in the future in order to keep that critique 
at bay during the next election. Combined with a more hostile political and economic 
climate towards immigration generally, we have more gridlock than ever before. Now 
combine that with a Democratic Party that is dead set on passing comprehensive reform 
and you have stalemate.  
Changes in the Macro Political Environment Affect Policymaking 
 Polarization has dramatically changed policymaking over the past thirty years. 
During this time, Congress created a new nonimmigrant visa category for foreign skilled 
workers and debated and passed a number of bills throughout the late 1990s and early 
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2000s to alter that visa category in a positive manner. As time went on, the scope of this 
legislation grew smaller and smaller until legislation became completely unsuccessful 
beginning in the mid 2000s.  
 While the issue of foreign skilled workers has remained the same during this time, 
the politics both within and outside of Congress have changed dramatically in the past 20 
years. As we have seen, the one major political change that occurred during this period 
was the ideological sorting of the electorate and increased polarization within Congress 
which resulted in stalemate on this type of policy.  
 Additionally, a number of macro-level political and economic changes have also 
affected the ability of Congress to pass this type of legislation. First, the recent addition 
of Latino voters has shifted the balance of power in Congress. Democrats have largely 
been the winners of the Latino vote and as a result, have been successful at blaming 
Republicans when immigration related immigration fails, thus garnering greater support 
from the Latino base.  
 Second, I argue that the introduction and failure of comprehensive immigration 
reform was the tipping point for this failure in 2006. Desperate for reform (and to fully 
secure the Latino vote to boot), Democrats were content to sacrifice their half of the loaf, 
which consists of increasing H-1B numbers (pre economic recession) in an attempt to get 
the entire loaf of comprehensive reform. Yet Republicans have not budged on the issue 
and as a result, the H-1B visa, countless businesses, and foreign skilled workers have 
suffered.  
 Finally, the recent economic recession can explain the post 2008 moratorium on 
the introduction of any H-1B legislation. Gimpel and Edwards (1999) tell us that 
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immigration is not a salient issue to the public until the economy is so bad that people 
begin to blame immigrants. While the argument that H-1B skilled workers are not taking 
jobs away from U.S. workers may have merit, in reality the high unemployment levels in 
the late 2000s makes increasing immigrant numbers a dangerous stance for any legislator 
to take, particularly as public opinion for immigration generally was low during this 
period. As a result, members increasingly become more risk averse over time as the 
economy continues to slump and their concerns for reelection increase.  
A Dysfunctional Congress 
 In addition to illustrating how polarization has impacted the success of H-1B 
legislation, this study also highlights the general dysfunction that exists in Congress. This 
theme is not unique to immigration policymaking but rather on policymaking within the 
institution as a whole.  
 Polarization has rendered it near impossible for members to deliberate and 
compromise. Instead, each party has its own policy agenda and is content on sacrificing 
legislation in the short run in the hopes of garnering enough party support in a later 
election. What the framers envisioned for the legislative branch, a majoritarian institution 
that would deliberate and compromise, has instead transformed into their worst 
nightmare, an institution rife with stalemate and gridlock.  
The Unique U.S. Experience  
Additionally, I sought to ascertain whether legislatures in Australia and Canada 
had similar experiences during this time throughout the 2000s. Canada, Australia, and the 
U.S. share similar colonial histories and relied to a large extent on immigration to 
populate their countries at one point. As such, Canada, Australia and the U.S. have 
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historically been the largest immigrant receiving countries in the world and a number of 
studies illustrate the similarities in their policies. Yet some important differences in the 
immigration policies of these three countries exist.  
In looking at similar policies in Canada’s and Australia, we see that they have 
been much less restrictive and more receptive to using foreign skilled workers to alleviate 
domestic labor shortages. While public opinion throughout the 1990s was negative 
towards immigration policy, the Parliaments in these countries were able to shift the 
public’s negative focus on Asian refugees to passing legislation to increase the number of 
skilled workers. This has resulted in relatively steady economic growth and made public 
opinion on immigration more positive. 
In the United States, however, skilled worker immigration policy has been much 
more restrictive with annual caps and employer sponsorship requirements. This can be 
attributed to a number of political phenomena that have been unique to the United States, 
largely: (1) party polarization has over time made it more difficult for this type of 
legislation to pass; (2) the increase in the Latino voting population has changed the 
dynamics of legislative politics on the subject of immigration generally; and (3) changes 
at the macro-level over time have resulted in less congressional support for the H-1B 
program and the 2006 failure of comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) was the 
tipping point for this shift in policy.  
As can be seen, while polarization may have been unique to the U.S., Canada and 
Australia were able to turn the tide of public opinion in their favor by using skilled 
foreign immigration to improve the general economy. Had Congress employed a similar 
tactic prior to the recession, legislation on the H-1B may have taken a different course. I 
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am not optimistic, however, that a similar policy would be successful in the United States 
today with the state of the economy, the perception
84
 that undocumented immigrant level 
are high, and the spillover effects that have made members risk averse.  
Recommendations for Future Research  
 As I stated in the introduction, research on congressional behavior on 
nonimmigrant visas is nonexistent within the literature. This study focused on the change 
in congressional support for skilled worker nonimmigrant visas since its creation to date. 
As such, this study is simply a beginning to the study of congressional behavior on 
skilled workers.  
 Looking at the legislation that was introduced and/or passed, there does not 
appear to be much of a pattern among the members sponsoring H-1B related bills. Across 
the board, they do not appear to have much in common politically, institutionally, or 
geographically. The Brookings Institution is currently working on putting together a data 
set of where H-1B visa holders have resided over time. Therefore, future studies into 
these members’ constituencies may provide a better understanding of their motivations 
and perhaps a pattern may emerge among sponsors. 
 Additionally, as we have seen, in each year since 1997, the H-1B cap has been hit 
prior to the end of the fiscal year. In 2006, 2007, and 2008, the cap was hit either on the 
first day applications were accepted or within just a few weeks. Yet in those years, 
Congress failed to pass any positive legislation.  
 The pattern in Congress thus far has been successful legislation from 1998 to 
2004 (either as stand-alone legislation or attached as riders), the introduction of stand-
                                               
84 While in recent years, the number of undocumented immigrants (particularly Mexicans) has decreased, 
both the actual numbers and the perception that numbers are high remain.  
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alone legislation but no passage from 2006 to 2008, and then no movement at all despite 
constituent demands for positive change. This is likely not the end of the line for 
congressional behavior on the H-1B visa, particularly since the 2013 fiscal year H-1B cap 
was hit in June 2012, more than five months ahead of the 2012 fiscal year and closer to 
cap dates in the mid 2000s, indicating that demand for foreign skilled workers is up 
again. As such, further notice of congressional behavior will be necessary to ascertain 
whether Congress continues on a trajectory of non-action or if and how they attempt to 
address the lack of cap numbers each year.   
 Additionally, this study focused exclusively on positive changes to the H-1B 
program. To date, very little movement has been made within either chamber to 
negatively impact the program. If negative economic conditions continue, future research 
may be warranted to determine whether a spillover effect occurs on the basis of the 
“easy” versus “hard” issue distinction between immigration generally and skilled worker 
immigration to either bolster or refute the findings here.  
Policy Recommendations and the Future of Policymaking 
 In the wake of the recent economic recession, many argue that the United States 
will need to open and liberalize its immigration policies to the more highly skilled 
workers in order to remain competitive in the global economic market, especially as 
many of the developed European Union states have already enacted more aggressive 
policies in an attempt to attract highly skilled immigrants. It remains to be seen how 
Congress will deal with this issue in the future, but if past policies predict the future, the 
future of skilled immigration to the United States appears grim indeed.   
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 Politically, Congress will likely continue to face the same obstacles to H-1B 
legislation as in previous years. Politics in Congress have certainly changed. With the 
increase of polarization, change in the electorate resulting in Republicans increasingly 
becoming more fearful of their own base, the increased presence of freshmen Senators 
(43 after the 2010 election, compared with 30 in the 2004 election), and the 
disappearance of the old Senate “giants” like Ted Kennedy who could “carry 10 votes 
with his mere presence”, members are much more concerned with the permanent 
campaign and fearful of losing their seats than ever before (Milbank 2012). As a result, 
gridlock is more likely to continue in greater numbers.  
 As H-1B cap numbers are being hit earlier and earlier again, I estimate that in a 
matter of years Congress will seriously have to face increasing cap numbers again. In 
order to be successful, however, Republicans will have to disentangle H-1B legislation 
from broader comprehensive reform and Democrats will have to sacrifice reform in the 
short run. Depending on the partisan makeup and where the pivot falls, this may have to 
occur with a package deal including the DREAM Act or some other type of concession 
on the part of Republicans that falls somewhere in between the status quo and the liberal 
right.  
 In concert with increasing cap numbers, a common recommendation has been to 
improve higher education in the United States so that employers do not have to import 
highly skilled workers. Some efforts have been attempted on this front, including some 
H-1B government filing fees earmarked for higher education and minority education, yet 
they do not appear to have been very successful. A more preferable policy would be to 
assess the industries that currently have major shortages, including health care and IT, for 
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example, and provide additional training opportunities in those fields. As outlined in the 
analysis, a number of bills have been introduced proposing a cap exemption for 
employers who create scholarships for U.S. students in U.S. institutions of higher 
education. As we have seen, however, thus far these have been unsuccessful.  
 Meanwhile, throughout the world, emigration of skilled workers has risen steadily 
since 1970, with the greatest numbers from developing states Philippines and India, 
Mexico, China, North and South Korea, Vietnam, and Poland (Legrain 2006:183-184). In 
the United States, population decline in the highly educated and skilled sector has already 
begun and is projected to continue. This decline should result in an increased demand for 
foreign skilled workers. This supply will likely come from developing states with the 
institutions to educate and produce skilled workers but not the infrastructure to employ 
them.  
Skilled migrants, however, will likely favor states with economic opportunities 
and immigration incentives such as Canada and throughout the European Union. As is, 
immigration to the United States is relatively difficult with visa opportunities limited and 
overly narrow. Following the hypotheses of Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005) and 
Schachar (2006), in order to remain competitive in the global market, the United States 
will need to create policies to attract the more educated and skilled migrants to the United 
States. A good economy and the promise of a better life alone are unlikely to continue to 
attract higher skilled migrants as other economically sound states such as Canada, 
Australia, and even states through the European Union provide actual tangible incentives 
for skilled immigrants. In the years ahead, congressional members will need to examine 
the policies created by states gaining speed on skilled immigrants in an attempt to either 
167 
 
provide similar or better incentives to attract the highly skilled immigrants to the United 
States.  
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